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ABSTRACT	OF	THE	DISSERTATION	
 Essays	in	labor	and	experimental	economics	with	a	focus	on	crime	and	discrimination		By		Timothy	Young		Doctor	of	Philosophy	in	Economics			University	of	California,	Irvine,	2019		Professor	David	Neumark,	Chair										This	dissertation	exams	how	policies	designed	to	alleviate	discrimination	in	labor	markets	affect	relative	worker	effort,	how	criminal	justice	policies	affect	labor	markets,	and	how	the	availability	of	affordability	housing	affects	criminal	recidivism.	The	data	used	for	this	dissertation	include	self-collected	data	from	laboratory	experiments,	publicly	available	data	from	large	U.S.	government	agencies,	and	restricted	access	data	from	U.S.	government	agencies.	The	empirical	methods	consist	of	experimental	randomization,	and	difference-in-differences	models.	In	the	first	chapter,	I	show	that	workers	do	not	change	the	effort	they	exert	at	work	when	they	learn	about	their	coworker’s	wages,	which	is	contrary	to	much	of	the	anecdotal	evidence	received	from	managers	for	why	they	prefer	to	not	implement	pay	secrecy	bans	in	the	workplace.	In	the	second	chapter,	I	show	that	decriminalization	of	marijuana	possession	is	associated	with	lower	wages	and	decreased	employment	for	young	workers,	which	I	argue	is	driven	by	decriminalization	shifting	the	composition	of	the	workforce	to	include	more	marijuana	users.	In	the	third	chapter,	I	show	offenders	released	
 		 xiii 
into	areas	with	better	access	to	affordable	housing	are	less	likely	to	recidivate	and	return	to	prison	
 						
  1 
CHAPTER	1.	PAY	SECRECY	AND	WAGE	COMPARISONS		
Introduction	The	gender	wage	gap	in	the	United	States	has	been	persistent	despite	sex-based	wage	discrimination	being	explicitly	prohibited	by	the	Equal	Pay	Act	of	1963.	In	2015,	women	earned	on	average	80%	of	what	men	earned	(Altonji	and	Blank,	1999;	Blau	et	al.,	2012;	Card	et	al.,	2015;	Costello,	2016).1	To	reduce	the	gender	wage	gap,	state2	and	federal3	governments	have	enacted	pay	secrecy	laws,	also	called	equal	pay	laws,	which	enable	workers	to	identify	wage	discrimination	by	allowing	workers	to	learn	their	co-worker’s	wages.	In	this	paper,	I	use	a	laboratory	experiment	to	examine	how	pay	secrecy	laws	affect	employee	morale,	which	I	measure	using	effort.	I	design	the	experiment	as	a	standard	three-person	gift	exchange	game4	where	two	workers	–	one	randomly	assigned	to	have	low	productivity,	and	one	high	productivity	–	are	randomly	matched	to	one	employer.	The	
                                                        1	This	does	not	imply	that	all	of	the	wage	gap	is	attributable	to	discrimination.	Blau	et	al.	(2012)	show	that	some	of	the	wage	gap	is	attributable	to	gender	differences	in	choice	of	occupation	and	industry,	roles	in	society,	and	division	of	labor,	but	that	discrimination	still	explains	some	of	the	gap.		2	Colorado	passed	Senate	Bill	08-122	in	2008;	Illinois	passed	ST	CH	820	section	112/10;	Louisiana	passed	Chapter	6-A	(Louisiana	Equal	Pay	for	Women	Act)	of	Title	23	of	the	Louisiana	Revised	Statutes	of	1950;	Maine	passed	Chapter	29,	S.P.	33	-	L.D.	84,	An	Act	to	Ensure	Fair	Pay	and	made	it	effective	in	2009;	Minnesota	passed	Ch.	239–H.F.	No.	2536;	New	Jersey	passed	Title	10.	Civil	Rights	Sec.	10:5-12.	Unlawful	employment	practices,	discrimination;	Vermont	passed	Title	21	(Labor),	Chapter	5	(Employment	Practices),	Sec.	495	(Unlawful	Employment	Practices);	New	Hampshire	passed	S.B.	207:	Title	XXIII,	Chapter	275	Sec.	275:38-1	and	Sec.	275:41-b;	Connecticut	passed	HB	No.	6850	Public	Act	No.	15-196	in	2015;	and	Oregon	passed	Ch.	307	HB	2007	in	2015.		3	President	Obama	exercised	his	executive	authority	in	2014	by	removing	pay	secrecy	for	federal	employees	and	contractors.		4	Three-person	gift	exchange	games,	where	two	workers	are	randomly	matched	to	one	employer,	are	the	canonical	experimental	design	to	test	wage	comparison	effects.	See	for	example	Abeler	et	al.	(2010);	Charness	and	Kuhn	(2007);	Gächter	and	Thöni	(2010);	Güth	et	al.	(2001);	Hannan	(2005);	Nosenzo	(2013)			
  2 
employer	makes	wage	offers	to	each	worker	simultaneously	and,	after	observing	their	wage,	each	worker	chooses	how	much	effort	(which	is	costly)	to	exert.	My	innovation	is	to	vary	the	wage	and	productivity	information	available	to	workers	when	they	choose	their	effort.	In	one	treatment	–	which	I	refer	to	as	the	“pay	secrecy”	case	–	workers	know	their	own	wage	and	their	own	productivity	but	do	not	know	their	coworker’s	wage	or	productivity.	The	second	treatment	(“pay	transparency”)	removes	pay	secrecy	so	that	workers	choose	effort	conditional	on	their	own	wage	and	their	co-worker’s	wage.	In	both	treatments,	workers	are	completely	uninformed	that	workers	are	assigned	different	productivities.5	The	third	treatment	(“full	information”)	removes	pay	secrecy,	as	in	the	second	treatment,	but	also	explicitly	informs	workers	of	their	co-worker’s	productivity,	which	is	always	higher	or	lower.	I	induce	employers	to	pay	different	wages	by	randomly	assigning	different	productivity	to	workers,	and	I	examine	how	making	these	productivity	differences	salient	affects	worker’s	perceptions	of	fairness.	I	find	no	statistically	significant	difference	in	worker	effort	between	the	pay	secrecy	and	pay	transparency	cases,	suggesting	any	unintended	consequence	from	enacting	pay	secrecy	laws	on	worker	morale	is	small.	Additionally,	worker	effort	in	the	full	information	case	is	not	statistically	significantly	different	from	the	pay	transparency	case,	suggesting	informing	workers	of	productivity	differences	is	not	an	important	determinant	of	how	they	respond	to	wage	differentials.	In	the	pay	transparency	case,	some	workers	exert	higher	effort	when	wages	are	equal	and	in	the	full	information	case	some	workers	exert	higher	effort	when	wages	are	equitable6	however,	the	average	worker	does	not	vary	their	effort	
                                                        5	I	make	the	assumption	that,	in	the	absence	of	information,	workers	assume	that	their	coworker	has	the	same	productivity.		6	By	equitable,	I	mean	that	high	productivity	workers	receive	higher	wages	than	low	productivity	workers.	
  3 
based	on	wage	differentials	in	either	case.	If	workers	did	exhibit	preferences	for	wage	equality	or	equity,	employers	would	find	it	optimal	to	compress	wages7	in	the	pay	transparency	and	full	information	cases	relative	to	the	pay	secrecy	case.	I	find	no	evidence	of	wage	compression,	which	is	consistent	with	employers	responding	optimally	to	worker	behavior.		This	is	the	first	paper	to	examine	how	worker	effort	is	affected	by	informing	workers	of	their	relative	wages	and	productivity	in	a	laboratory	setting.8	However,	it	is	not	the	first	to	examine	the	effect	of	simply	revealing	coworker’s	wages	on	worker	effort.	Evidence	on	wage	comparison	effects	from	previous	experiments	range	from	small	and	statistically	insignificant	to	large	statistically	significant	comparison	effects	where	relatively	underpaid	workers	decrease	effort.	Generally,	the	papers	that	find	null	effects	assign	workers	heterogeneously	productivity,	and	the	papers	that	find	strong	wage	comparison	effects	assign	homogeneous	productivity	to	workers	(See	Table	1.1).	The	primary	difference	between	experiments	that	assign	homogeneous	versus	heterogeneous	productivity	workers	is	how	the	experimental	design	induces	wage	gaps.	When	workers	have	homogeneous	productivity,	employers	have	little	incentive	to	pay	workers	different	wages.	In	this	context,	there	are	several	designs	that	can	induce	wage	gaps.	Clark	et	al.	(2010)	use	a	two-person	gift	exchange	that	pairs	one	employer	to	one	worker	and	compares	worker	effort	based	on	whether	workers	are	informed	of	how	their	wage	ranks	relative	to	other	employer-worker	pairings.	They	find	that	workers	who	are	
                                                        7	Wage	compression	is	where	employers	pay	more	similar	wages	to	workers,	which	reduces	(or	compresses)	the	wage	gap.		8	Empirical	studies	have	also	examined	the	effects	of	pay	secrecy	bans,	such	as	Burn	&	Kettler	(2019)	that	finds	pay	secrecy	bans	increased	wages	for	managers,	but	no	effect	on	wage	differences	by	gender.	
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paid	wages	that	rank	higher	relative	to	wages	received	by	other	workers	exert	higher	effort.	Using	a	three-person	gift	exchange	experiment,	both	Nosenzo	(2013)	and	Gächter	and	Thöni	(2010)	induce	wage	gaps	through	evidently	random	wage	setting	by	the	employer	and	find	that	underpaid	workers	reduce	their	effort	when	they	are	informed	of	the	wage	gap.	There	are	two	issues	with	these	experiments.	First,	in	reality	employers	to	not	set	wages	randomly	–	this	would	be	inefficient	and	would	likely	skew	worker	incentives.	Second,	the	wage	menu	of	wages	in	each	experiment	that	the	employer	can	choose	from	induce	large,	unrealistic	variation	in	wages.	In	Nosenzo	(2013)	employers	can	choose	a	wage	of	1,	4,	or	7	and	in	Gächter	and	Thöni	(2010)	employers	choose	a	wage	of	either	10,	100,	or	200.	For	both	experiments,	the	percent	difference	between	the	lowest	and	middle	wage	is	400%	and	1,000%,	respectively.	It	is	difficult	to	imagine	a	real-life	analog	where	similar	employees	experience	wage	differentials	this	large.	Prior	three-person	gift	exchange	game	experiments	where	employers	are	incentivized	to	offer	workers	different	wages	because	of	heterogeneous	productivity	generally	find	no	evidence	of	wage	comparison	effects	(Charness	and	Kuhn,	2004,	2007;	Johnson	and	Ramalingam,	2016).	In	these	experiments,	workers	have	knowledge	of	different	worker	types,	but	are	not	explicitly	informed	of	the	productivity	differences.	Johnson	and	Ramalingam	(2016)	find	that	employers	compress	wages	so	much	that	the	wage	gaps	are	not	large	enough	to	induce	an	effort	response.	Because	all	the	studies	that	assign	heterogeneously	productivity	to	workers	also	have	more	reasonable	wage	schedules	(e.g.,	$0,	$1,	$2,	$3,	$4.),	it	is	impossible	to	determine	whether	the	difference	in	findings	between	papers	that	use	homogenous	and	heterogeneous	workers	is	due	to	variation	in	wage	schedules,	or	to	salience	about	productivity	differences.		
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In	this	paper,	I	make	four	main	contributions	to	the	literature	on	wage	comparison	effects	that	could	be	induced	by	pay	secrecy	laws.	First,	using	Charness	and	Kuhn	(2007)’s	experimental	design,	I	examine	how	wage	comparisons	are	affected	by	informing	workers	of	their	relative	productivities.	The	primary	difference	between	this	paper	and	Charness	and	Kuhn	(2007)	is	that	I	vary	information	about	relative	worker	productivity	across	treatments.	Second,		it	uses	wage	schedules	(also	from	Charness	and	Kuhn	(2004,	2007)),	which		are	arguably	more	reasonable	than	schedules	used	in	studies	that	find	large	wage	comparison	effects	on	worker	effort	to	identify	the	role	of	informing	workers	about	productivity	differences	under	pay	transparency.	Third,	this	paper	uses	the	strategy	method	to	examine	the	entire	distribution	of	each	worker’s	potential	effort	response	to	wage	differentials.9	Using	the	strategy	method	enables	me	to	collect	more	data	on	worker	responses	for	the	full	range	of	possible	wage	pairs	than	in	previous	studies.10	Last,	this	paper	extends	the	equal	wage	comparison	model	in	Charness	and	Kuhn	(2007)	to	allow	for	equitable	wage	comparisons	where	wage	comparisons	are	made	relative	to	worker	productivity.		The	remainder	of	this	paper	is	organized	as	follows.	section	2	presents	the	model	for	optimal	wage	offers	by	employers	under	three	different	information	cases.	Section	3	
                                                        9	In	Charness	and	Kuhn	(2007),	effort	is	elicited	for	only	the	wages	that	a	worker	(and	their	coworker)	actually	receive.	10	Another	difference	between	this	paper	and	Charness	and	Kuhn	(2007)	is	that	I	elicit	responses	from	workers	for	all	twenty-five	wage	combinations	of	$0	-	$4	where	total	wages	(𝑤" + 𝑤$$)	must	be	≤	$8.	Charness	and	Kuhn	(2007)	use	the	same	wage	offer	combinations	of	$0	-	$4	but	require	total	wages	(𝑤$ +𝑤$$)	to	be	≤	$4.	This	removes	combinations	such	as	$4	and	$4	from	the	set	of	available	wage	offers.	An	important	limitation	of	this	design	is	that	in	the	pay	secrecy	case	workers	who	receive	wages	above	$2	know	for	certain	they	must	be	receiving	a	higher	wage	than	their	coworker	but	are	uncertain	who	receives	more	when	they	are	paid	$2	or	less.	In	other	words,	the	pay	secrecy	case	is	only	binding	for	workers	who	receive	low	wages	–	comparing	effort	for	workers	paid	more	than	$2	in	the	pay	secrecy	and	pay	transparency	cases	would	therefore	be	uninformative	since	in	both	cases	the	workers	know	they	are	receiving	more	than	their	coworkers.	
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presents	hypotheses	which	correlate	to	the	different	information	cases.	Section	4	discusses	the	experimental	design	and	formally	presents	the	treatments	used	to	test	the	hypotheses	in	described	in	Section	3.	Lastly,	Section	5	presents	the	findings,	and	Section	6	concludes.		
	
The	Model	There	are	two	primary	models	that	analyze	how	other	regarding	preferences,	such	as	fairness,	affect	decision	making:	intention	based,	and	outcome	based.	Intention	based	models	allow	an	agent’s	behavior	to	be	affected	by	their	beliefs	of	other	agents’	intentions.	For	example,	if	the	wages	employers	offer	to	workers	are	only	received	by	the	workers	with	some	probability,	an	intention-based	model	would	be	appropriate	for	analyzing	whether	workers	respond	to	good	intentions	of	the	firms	who	offer	high	wages,	even	if	they	don’t	receive	them.	Outcome	based	models	analyze	agent’s	behavior	as	a	function	of	only	the	outcome,	and	disregard	others’	underlying	intentions.	This	type	of	model	is	useful	for	analyzing	whether	workers	determine	their	effort	based	on	relative	payoffs.	Given	that	the	purpose	of	this	paper	is	to	determine	whether	workers	are	affected	by	wage	outcomes	under	different	information	structures,	I	model	employer	and	worker	behavior	using	an	outcome-based	model	is	most	appropriate	in	this	context.		In	particular,	I	extend	Charness	and	Kuhn	(2007)’s	outcome-based	model	of	social	preferences	to	analyze	wage	compression	driven	by	wage	comparison	effects	that	depend	on	relative	worker	productivity.	In	this	model,	worker	effort	is	determined	by	the	worker’s	own	wage	and	other	regarding	preferences	for	wage	equality.	I	extend	the	model	to	include	preferences	for	equity	that	can	affect	workers’	effort.		
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Workers’	social	preferences	for	equality	and	equity	are	at	the	core	of	whether	wage	comparisons	affect	employee	morale	in	the	workplace	(Abeler	et	al.,	2010).	Table	1.2	describes	equality	and	equity	based	on	wages	and	productivity.	Wage	equality	is	the	preference	for	workers	to	receive	the	same	wage	regardless	of	productivity.	Wage	equity	is	the	preference	for	workers	to	receive	the	same	wage	conditional	on	productivity.	When	workers	have	identical	production	functions	and	effort	cost	functions,	equal	wages	are	the	same	as	equitable	wages.	Assuming	workers	condition	only	on	individual	productivity	when	selecting	effort,	earning	an	equitable	wage	is	the	same	as	earning	a	wage	based	on	marginal	productivity.		I	model	a	two-stage	gift	exchange	game	where	the	employer	moves	first	by	offering	a	wage	to	each	worker	followed	by	each	worker	choosing	a	level	of	effort.	If	workers’	utility	functions	only	include	monetary	payoffs,	then	rational	workers	always	provide	zero	effort,	because	this	maximizes	the	monetary	payoff	given	any	wage	offer	in	this	one-shot	game.	However,	previous	experiments	consistently	show	that	workers	respond	to	non-zero	wage	offers	with	positive	effort	(Brandts	and	Charness,	2004;	Charness	et	al.,	2004;	Charness	and	Kuhn,	2007;	Fehr	et	al.,	1998,	1993;	Hannan	et	al.,	2002).	Therefore,	I	model	workers’	utility	as	a	function	of	their	own	wage	and	other	regarding	preferences	that	include	equality	and	equity	in	wages.		Consider	an	employer	who	hires	two	workers	where	workers	are	one	of	two	types:	type-I	and	type-II.	Each	type	of	worker	is	identical	except	for	productivity.	Let	type-I’s	productivity	be	given	by	𝜃)	and	type-II’s	productivity	be	given	by	𝜃*.	Type-II	workers	are	more	productive	than	type-I	workers	by	assumption,	so	that	θ* > 𝜃).	Normalizing	the	type-
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I’s	productivity	to	one	implies	that	θ) 	= 	1	 < θ*.	I	assume	employers	are	fully	informed	of	each	worker’s	type.	The	effort	decision	for	worker	I	can	be	written	as:		
𝐸" = 𝑎𝑤" + 𝐼*{𝑏*6𝑤" − 𝑤89 + 𝐼:{𝑏: ;𝑤" − <=>=?}	 	 (1)	Subscripts	correlate	to	each	worker’s	type	where	i	 ≠ 	j	and	i, j	 ∈ 	 [1,2].	Parameter	a	reveals	a	worker’s	level	of	reciprocity	with	respect	to	their	wage,	which	can	be	interpreted	as	a	measure	of	fairness.	In	simple	gift	exchange	games	with	only	one	worker	per	employer,	a	is	the	only	estimable	parameter.	Given	that	previous	literature	has	consistently	found	this	measure	of	reciprocity	to	be	positive	this	model	assumes	𝑎	 > 	0.		𝐼*	and	𝐼:	are	indicator	functions	that	turn	on	in	cases	2	and	3	respectively,	described	below.	Both	indicator	functions	equal	0	for	all	other	cases.		Parameter	𝑏	is	estimated	using	experimental	data	and	captures	how	wage	comparisons	affect	effort	provision.	If	𝑏 = 0,	worker	i’s	effort	is	unaffected	by	their	coworker’s	earnings.	𝑏	 > 	0	implies	that	relatively	lower	paid	workers	choose	lower	effort	relative	to	the	effort	chosen	when	wages	are	equal.	Moreover,	if	this	effect	is	symmetric,	higher	paid	workers	exert	more	effort	if	they	are	paid	more	than	their	coworker.11		If	𝑏	 <	0,	workers	decrease	their	effort	when	they	are	paid	more	than	their	coworker	and	increase	their	effort	when	they	are	relatively	underpaid.	Assuming	symmetric	responses,	𝑏	 <	0	suggests	workers	have	preferences	for	wage	equality	and	punish	employers	for	underpaying	their	coworker.		
                                                        11	Interpreting	𝑏	in	this	way	assumes	conditionality	on	the	worker’s	own	wage	and	that	workers	respond	symmetrically	to	being	relatively	under	paid	or	over	paid.			
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How	much	effort	workers	provide	is	an	empirical	question	since	it	depends	on	exogenous	parameters	𝑎	and	𝑏.	I	assume	individual	preferences	that	affect	a	and	b	are	uncorrelated	with	worker	types.	This	assumption	is	valid	in	this	experimental	context	because	I	randomly	assign	productivity.		The	primary	benefit	of	this	modeling	framework	is	that	it	produces	wage	predictions	for	profit	maximizing	employers.	Employer’s	revenue	increases	with	worker	effort	while	costs	increase	with	wages.	Employer	profit	consists	of	separable	revenue	functions	for	each	worker,	𝑅(𝐸𝑖),	which	by	assumption	have	the	following	properties:	𝑅′(𝐸𝑖) 	> 	0	and	𝑅′′(𝐸𝑖) 	< 	0.	Profit	maximizing	employers	maximize	the	amount	of	revenue	that	each	worker	produces	subject	to	wages:		𝛱 = 𝑅(𝐸$	) + 𝑅(𝐸$$	) − 𝑤$ − 𝑤$$ 	 	 (2)	Employers	determine	wages	to	maximize	the	sum	of	revenues	as	a	function	of	worker	efforts	–	employer’s	own	preferences	for	equality	or	equity	more	generally	are	absent	from	the	employer’s	problem.	I	assume	employer	utility	is	only	a	function	of	profit	because	their	wage	allocation	decision	is	implicitly	determined	by	their	beliefs	of	each	worker’s	social	norms	and	attitudes	towards	equality	and	equity.	Additionally,	norms	for	equality	and	equity	most	directly	affect	the	workers’	effort	decision	since	they	are	second	movers.		Below,	I	analyze	three	cases	that	reflect	different	information	structures.	Cases	1	and	2	replicate	results	from	Charness	and	Kuhn	(2007)	for	comparison.	Each	case	provides	a	different	perspective	on	how	preferences	for	equality	and	equity	can	affect	effort	provision	and	how	employers	backward	induct	to	pay	profit	maximizing	wages.	A	
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summary	of	the	comparisons	between	how	each	case	contributes	to	the	analysis	of	equality	and	equity	is	provided	in	Table	1.3.		Case	1:	Private	Wages	and	Private	Productivity		First,	consider	the	simple	pay	secrecy	case	where	workers	are	informed	of	their	own	wage	offer,	but	not	their	coworker’s	wage	offer.	In	terms	of	equation	(1),		𝐼* = 𝐼: = 0	since	there	is	no	relative	wage	information	provided	to	workers	that	could	influence	their	other	regarding	preferences.	Additionally,	while	workers	know	their	own	productivity,	they	are	not	informed	of	their	co-worker’s	productivity	or	the	existence	of	heterogeneous	productivity	among	workers.	Equation	(1)	becomes	simply:		𝐸" = 𝑎𝑤" 	 	 (3)	Maximizing	equation	(2)	with	respect	to	w$	and	wQQ	and	setting	the	first	order	conditions		equal	to	each	other	yields:		𝑅′(𝐸𝐼	) 	= 	𝜃𝑅′(𝐸𝐼𝐼	)	 	 (4)	Since	𝜃	 > 	1	this	implies	𝐸$ 	> 	𝐸$$ .	Due	to	the	concavity	of	the	revenue	functions,	𝑤$$ 	> 	𝑤$ .	Therefore,	when	wages	are	private,	profit	maximizing	employers	pay	higher	wages	to	the	type-II	workers	and	there	is	no	incentive	for	employers	to	compress	wages.	The	intuition	behind	this	result	is	that	workers	earn	wages	relative	to	their	marginal	product,	which	is	consistent	with	neoclassical	theory	of	wage	setting.		Solving	for	wI	and	wII	using	equations	(3)	yields:		𝑤$)∗ = 	 STU 	 	 (5)	𝑤$$)∗ = 	 STTU 	 	 (6)	
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Wage	subscripts	denote	worker	type	and	superscripts	denote	case.	Equations	(5)	and	(6)	show	that	employers	set	wages	relative	to	effort	that	the	employer	wants	each	worker	to	exert.		Case	2:	Public	Wages	and	Private	Productivity		As	in	case	1,	workers	are	informed	of	their	own	type	and	their	own	wage.	Case	2	differs	from	case	1	in	that	workers	choose	effort	contingent	on	their	own	wage	and	the	wage	offered	to	their	coworker.	This	is	reflected	by	the	indicator	function	I*	turning	on	in	equation	(1).	Therefore,	other	regarding	preferences	for	wage	equality	can	affect	worker	effort	if	𝑏2 ≠ 0:		 𝐸𝑖	 = 𝑎𝑤𝑖	 + 𝑏2(𝑤𝑖	 − 𝑤𝑗)		 	 (7)	This	case	allows	other	regarding	preferences	for	wage	equality,	but	not	equity,	to	influence	a	workers’	effort	decision.	Allowing	wage	comparison	effects	to	impact	effort	leads	profit	maximizing	employers	to	compress	wages	relative	to	the	pay	secrecy	case.	Rearranging	equation	(7)	yields:		 𝑤" = 	 SWXYZ<=UXYZ 	 (8)	Plugging	equation	(7)	in	terms	of	i	into	(8)	in	terms	of	𝑗	yields	the	optimal	wage	for	worker	𝑖,	𝑤"∗,	in	terms	of	exogenous	parameters:		𝑤"*∗ = SW(UXYZ)XS=YUZX*UYZ 	 	 (9)	Equation	(9)	equates	worker	i’s	wage	to	a	weighted	sum	of	efforts	for	both	workers.	Taking	first	order	conditions	of	these	equations	with	respect	to	𝑏*	yields	how	wage	comparison	effects	influence	wages.		
[<WZ∗[Y = <=\<WUX*YZ 	 	 (10)	
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Wages	depend	on	differences	between	what	employers	believe	are	relative	worker	efforts.	As	in	case	1,	it	is	still	profit	maximizing	for	the	employer	to	pay	𝑤$$ 	> 	𝑤$ .	Therefore,	𝑤$ 	increases	with	𝑏2	and	𝑤$$ 	decreases	with	𝑏2.	This	implies	that	employers	increasingly	compress	wages	when	workers	have	preferences	for	equal	wages	when	wages	are	public,	and	workers	believe	they	have	the	same	productivity.		Case	3:	Public	Wages	and	Public	Productivity		In	Case	3,	workers	are	informed	of	relative	wages	and	productivity	differences.	To	capture	these	productivity	differences,	(7)	becomes:		
𝐸" = 𝑎𝑤" + 𝑏: ;𝑤" − <=>=?	 	 (11)	When	workers	receive	accurate	signals	of	their	own	and	their	co-worker’s	productivity,	profit	maximizing	employers	compress	wages	less	than	under	case	2.	Moreover,	type-I	and	type-II	worker	effort	functions	respectively	become:		
𝑤$ = 	 STX]^_TT`UXY^ 	 	 (12)	𝑤$$ = 	 STTXY^<TUX]^` 	 (13)	Plugging	(13)	into	(12)	and	(12)	into	(11)	yields	optimal	wages	for	both	worker	types:		
𝑤$:∗ = STaUX]^`bXSTT]^`UZXUY^()Xc`) 	 	 (14)		𝑤$$:∗ = STT(UXY^)XSTY^UZXUY^()Xc`) 	 	 (15)	Again,	taking	the	partial	derivative	of	equations	(16)	and	(17)	with	respect	to	b	shows	how	optimal	wages	change	with	respect	to	wage	comparison	effects.	This	yields:		
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[<T^ ∗[Y^ = _TT` \<TUXY^()Xc`)	 	 (16)	
[<TT^∗[Y^ = <T\	_TT`UXUY^()Xc`)	 	 (17)	When	workers	receive	signals	of	both	their	own	and	their	coworker’s	wages	and	productivity,	wage	comparisons	impact	effort	for	the	type-I	worker	if	𝑤$ − <TT> ≠ 0.	That	is,	if	<TT<T > 𝜃,	then	an	increase	in	wage	comparison	effects	for	a	type-I	worker	would	lead	the	employer	to	increase	𝑤𝐼.	For	the	type-II	worker,	𝑤$$	falls	when	wage	comparison	effects	increase	if	<TT<T < 𝜃.	Therefore,	it	is	profit	maximizing	for	employers	to	compress	wages	when	𝑏	increases	and	by	symmetry,	wages	approach	marginal	product	as	b	falls,	depending	on	relative	productivity	and	the	current	wage	gap.	By	incorporating	relative	productivity,	wage	comparisons	that	affect	effort	no	longer	result	from	wage	inequality;	now	they	result	from	wage	inequity.	Equitable	wages	occur	when	the	ratio	of	wages	is	equal	to	the	productivity	differences	between	the	two	workers,	<TT<T = 𝜃.	Moreover,	wage	compression	is	less	than	in	case	2	since	productivity	differences	alleviate	fairness	concerns	between	workers	if	workers	have	stronger	preferences	for	equity	than	equality.	An	overview	of	model	predictions	is	presented	in	Table	1.4.			
Hypotheses	The	hypotheses	below	correlate	to	the	model	in	Section	2.	They	are	designed	to	test	the	resulting	predictions	from	each	case.	Each	hypothesis	addresses	worker	and	employer	behavior	for	each	case.	Hypotheses	1.1-1.2	tests	the	wage	and	effort	outcomes	of	case	1,	hypotheses	2.1-2.2	for	case	2,	and	hypotheses	3.1-3.2	for	case	3.		
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Case	1:	Private	wages	and	productivity	Hypothesis	1.1:	Worker	effort	increase	with	wages.	This	hypothesis	predicts	that	subjects	have	reciprocal	behavior	consistent	with	other	gift	exchange	experiments.	In	terms	of	the	model,	this	hypothesis	predicts	parameter	𝑎	 > 	0.		
Hypothesis	1.2:	Employers	pay	type-II	workers	higher	wages	on	average	than	type-I	workers.		
In	all	cases,	profit-maximizing	employers	will	pay	higher	productivity	type-II	workers	a	higher	wage	than	lower	productivity	type-I	workers.		
Case	2:	Public	wages	and	private	productivity		
Hypothesis	2.1:	Wage	comparisons	affect	effort	provision	when	productivity	is	privately	known.		
This	hypothesis	predicts	𝑏	 > 	0.	Therefore,	this	hypothesis	states	that	workers	have	preferences	for	wage	equality	and	that	being	under	paid	violates	these	preferences	the	same	as	being	over	paid.	That	is,	workers	who	receive	a	higher	wage	will	respond	with	greater	effort	than	under	pay	secrecy,	and	workers	who	receive	a	lower	wage	will	respond	with	lower	effort	than	under	pay	secrecy.	This	hypothesis	further	assumes	lower-paid	workers	express	their	jealousy	by	exerting	lower	effort	when	paid	less	than	their	coworkers,	and	that	higher	paid	workers	reward	their	employer	by	exerting	higher	effort	than	if	wages	were	equal.		
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Hypothesis	2.2:	When	workers	are	informed	of	their	coworker’s	wage	and	receive	an	uninformative	signal	of	their	coworker’s	productivity,	employers	compress	wages.		
This	hypothesis	predicts	that	(𝑤$) 	− 𝑤$$*) 	> 	 (𝑤$* 	− 𝑤$$* 	).	When	workers	choose	effort	conditional	on	their	knowledge	of	their	coworker’s	wage,	this	hypothesis	claims	that	concerns	for	equality	affect	effort	provision.	This	concern	preempts	backward	inducting	employers	to	pay	workers	more	similar	wages	to	alleviate	the	effects	of	wage	comparisons	on	effort.	This	correlates	to	case	2	in	the	model.		
Case	3:	Public	wages	and	productivity		
Hypothesis	3.1:	Providing	workers	accurate	signals	of	their	coworker’s	type	reduces	wage	comparison	effects,	relative	to	case	2.		
This	hypothesis	predicts	that	workers	care	about	both	equality	and	equity.	When	workers	are	able	to	condition	their	effort	choice	on	wages	relative	to	productivity,	this	hypothesis	says	that	preferences	for	equity	will	alleviate	some	of	the	fairness	concerns	that	result	from	inequality.	Comparing	the	b	from	case	3	to	case	2	identifies	workers’	preferences	for	equity.		
Hypothesis	3.2:	When	wages	and	productivity	are	public	information	for	workers,	employers	compress	wages	less	than	when	worker	productivity	is	private	information	in	case	2,	but	more	than	when	workers	are	uninformed	of	relative	wages	in	case	1.		
This	hypothesis	is	consistent	with	case	3	in	the	model	where	workers	are	fully	informed	of	relative	wage	and	productivity	differences.	That	is,	they	have	the	same	
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information	as	the	employer	when	he	or	she	chooses	wages.	This	hypothesis	tests	whether	the	average	wage	differences	for	each	worker	type	across	the	three	cases	are	different	from	one	another.		
Specifically,	it	tests	the	following	relationship	between	wage	differences:	(𝑤$) − 𝑤$$) ) > (𝑤$: − 𝑤$$:) > (𝑤$* − 𝑤$$*)	
	
Experimental	Design	
I	test	the	above	hypotheses	using	a	three-person	gift	exchange	game	experiment.	Before	the	experiment	begins,	one-third	of	subjects	are	randomly	assigned	the	role	of	employer	and	two-thirds	are	assigned	the	role	of	worker.	Workers	are	randomly	assigned	to	be	either	type-I	or	type-II	where	the	only	difference	between	the	two	types	is	that,	conditional	on	effort,	type-II	workers	are	more	productive	than	type-I	workers.	All	roles	are	fixed	for	the	duration	of	the	experiment.	Once	participants	have	read	the	instructions	and	taken	a	quiz	that	tests	their	comprehension	of	the	instructions,	participants	are	randomly	matched	into	employer-worker	groups	that	consist	of	one	employer,	one	type-I	worker,	and	one	type-II	worker.		
Table	1.5	describes	the	worker’s	production	and	cost	functions.	Every	worker	chooses	effort	based	on	an	identical	cost	function	that	is	increasing	and	convex	in	effort12.	
                                                        12	Brüggen	and	Strobel	(2007)	find	that	experiments	using	real	effort	tasks	produce	equivalent	results	to	those	that	use	chosen	effort.		
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The	productivity	schedule	and	effort	cost	function	are	identical	to	the	one	used	by	Charness	and	Kuhn	(2007)	and	remains	identical	across	treatments	and	rounds.		
Each	round	is	a	one-shot	game	where	each	employer	chooses	a	pair	of	wages	to	pay	their	type-I	and	type-II	workers,	workers	choose	effort	for	each	potential	wage	offer,	and	each	participant	is	informed	of	his	or	her	own	payoff.	Each	worker’s	full	strategy	set	is	elicited,	which	means	they	select	an	effort	level	for	each	potential	wage	offer.	I	elicit	each	workers’	full	strategy	set	for	effort	conditional	on	each	potential	wage	they	could	receive	from	their	employer.	Using	the	strategy	method	avoids	one	of	the	potential	issues	with	Charness	and	Kuhn	(2007)’s	design	where	conflicting	individual	heterogeneity	in	worker	preferences	may	cancel	wage	comparison	effects	in	the	aggregate	(Gächter	and	Thöni,	2010).	Playing	multiple	rounds	allows	workers	to	modify	their	strategy	from	the	last	round	and	ensures	misunderstanding	does	not	drive	their	decisions.	This	also	allows	workers	and	employers	to	calibrate	their	beliefs	about	the	distribution	of	each	other’s	preferences.	All	players	play	five	rounds	and	are	randomly	reallocated	to	different	groups	in	each	round.		
The	employer’s	budget	is	equal	to	a	total	of	$8	which	the	employer	must	allocate	among	the	two	workers	under	the	constraint	that	no	more	than	$4	can	be	allocated	to	any	one	worker.	This	constraint	ensures	that	workers	cannot	deduce	their	coworker’s	wage	in	the	no	information	treatments.13	Revenue	is	the	sum	of	the	revenues	produced	by	each	worker.	Revenue	is	determined	by	each	worker’s	choice	of	effort.	The	cost	is	the	sum	of	
                                                        13	Without	this	constraint,	workers	who	receive	wages	greater	than	$4	would	know	they	received	a	higher	wage	than	their	coworker.	For	example,	a	worker	who	received	a	wage	of	$6	could	be	certain	that	they	received	at	least	$2	more	than	their	coworker	since	the	employer	only	has	a	budget	of	$8.		
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wages	paid	to	both	workers	from	the	employer’s	budget.	The	employer’s	payoff	(denoted	by	the	subscript	𝑒)	for	each	round	is	determined	by	the	following	equation:		
𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑓𝑓i = $8 + 𝑅(𝐸$) + 𝑅(𝐸$$) − 𝑤$ − 𝑤$$ 	 	 (18)	
The	worker’s	payoff	function	is	determined	by	the	following	equation:		
𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑓𝑓" = 𝑤" − 𝑐(𝐸")	 	 (19)	
Where	𝑖	 ∈ 	 [𝐼, 𝐼𝐼]	and	𝑐(𝐸𝑖)	is	a	convex	cost	function	which	is	the	same	across	workers.	The	employer	determines	the	workers’	wages	and	the	worker’s	cost	of	effort	is	determined	by	the	amount	of	effort	the	worker	chooses	to	exert	conditional	on	their	wage.		
The	experiment	is	structured	as	a	3x1	between-subjects	design.	A	between-subjects	design	is	preferred	because	it	avoids	order	effects	and	experimenter	demand	effects,	which	could	affect	participant	behavior	when	using	a	within-subjects	design.	Each	treatment	changes	the	information	available	to	workers	and	correlates	to	the	respective	cases	described	in	section	2.	
Treatment	1:	Private	wages	and	productivity	
In	treatment	1,	workers	are	uninformed	of	heterogeneous	types	and	are	only	informed	of	their	own	cost	function,	own	production	function,	and	own	wage	offer.	This	treatment	correlates	to	case	1	and	is	used	to	test	hypothesis	1.1-1.2.	Employers	offer	wages	to	each	worker	knowing	that	workers	are	informed	only	of	their	own	wage	and	own	productivity.	This	treatment	sets	a	baseline	where	there	is	no	mechanism	for	horizontal	fairness	concerns	to	influence	worker	effort.		
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Treatment	2:	Public	wages	and	private	productivity		
Treatment	2	tests	hypotheses	2.1-2.2	and	correlates	to	case	2.	It	differs	from	the	treatment	1	in	two	important	ways.	First,	employers	are	informed	that	workers	exert	effort	conditional	on	their	wage	offer	and	their	coworker’s	wage	offer.	Second,	instead	of	eliciting	workers’	effort	responses	for	just	their	own	wage,	I	elicit	their	response	for	each	potential	pair	of	wages	that	could	be	paid	to	them	and	their	coworker.	Workers	are	still	uninformed	of	the	existence	of	worker	types.	Comparing	average	effort	levels	for	each	worker	type	from	treatment	2	to	treatment	1	identifies	the	effect	of	wage	comparisons	on	effort.	More	specifically,	this	identifies	how	preferences	for	equality	affect	worker	morale.	Comparing	wage	offers	to	each	worker	type	across	treatments	1	and	2	estimates	of	employer	wage	compression.		
Treatment	3:	Public	wages	and	productivity		
Treatment	3	tests	hypotheses	3.1-3.2	and	correlates	to	case	3	where	workers	are	informed	of	their	productivity	and	their	coworker’s	productivity.	Employers	are	always	aware	of	their	workers’	information	set.	Comparing	effort	levels	from	treatments	2	and	3	identifies	whether	knowledge	of	productivity	differences	affects	fairness	concerns.	This	comparison	reflects	how	preferences	for	equity	affect	worker	morale.		
The	experiment	is	coded	using	Z-tree	(Fischbacher,	2007)	software	and	was	conducted	at	the	University	of	California,	Irvine	in	the	Experimental	Social	Science	Laboratory	between	February	and	March	of	2017.	Subjects	were	recruited	from	a	random	pool	of	students	representing	a	diverse	student	body.	Subjects	were	paid	for	one	randomly	
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selected	round	and	average	earnings	were	about	$10,	which	included	a	$7	show	up	payment.	Each	session	lasted	an	average	of	30	minutes.	Treatment	1	was	run	twice	with	27	and	18	students	in	each	session.	Treatment	2	was	run	twice	with	39	and	33	students	in	each	session.	Treatment	3	was	run	twice	with	24	and	39	students	in	each	session.		
	
Findings	
Each	finding	below	addresses	the	respective	hypothesis.		
Hypothesis	1.1:	Workers	effort	increases	with	wages.		
This	hypothesis	tests	whether	worker	effort	increases	with	wages,	which	is	an	estimate	of	parameter	a	in	the	model.	Figure	1.1	shows	that,	for	both	worker	types	and	across	all	treatments,	effort	is	positively	related	to	wage	offers.	Table	1.6	shows	estimates	of	a	from	a	regression	of	own	effort	on	own	wage	for	each	treatment	individually	(columns	1-3)	and	pooling	across	treatments	(column	4).	This	specification,	and	all	others	that	follow,	include	subject,	round,	and	group	fixed	effects	with	standard	errors	clustered	at	the	subject	level	to	account	for	the	correlation	of	errors	within	subject.	Across	all	treatments,	I	find	evidence	consistent	with	hypothesis	1.	That	is,	workers	consistently	reciprocate	higher	wages	with	higher	effort.	A	one-dollar	higher	wage	is	associated	with	an	increase	in	effort	by	about	37.8	percent	(0.404/1.07)	across	all	treatments.	The	estimate	of	a	is	nearly	identical	across	all	treatments.		
Hypothesis	1.2:	Employers	pay	type-II	workers	higher	wages	on	average	than	type-I	workers.		
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Figure	1.2	shows	that	type-II	workers	receive	significantly	higher	wages	on	average	com-	pared	to	type-I	workers.	Table	1.7	presents	the	estimated	wage	gap	shown	in	Figure	1.2,	and	the	wage	gaps	for	other	treatments.	On	average,	employers	offer	higher	productivity	workers	$0.97	more	than	lower	productivity	workers	in	treatment	1,	significant	at	the	1%	level.	This	supports	Hypothesis	1.2	and	that	employers	allocate	wages	in	a	way	consistent	with	expected	profit	maximizing	behavior	predicted	by	the	model.	The	wage	gap	is	persistent	across	all	treatments,	but	appears	to	be	smallest	in	treatment	2,	suggesting	possible	wage	compression	(discussed	further	below	in	Hypothesis	2.2	and	3.2).		
Hypothesis	2.1:	Wage	comparisons	affect	effort	provision	when	productivity	is	private.		
When	wages	are	made	public	in	treatment	2,	worker	effort	choices	can	be	influenced	by	their	own	wage	and	their	coworker’s	wage.	The	variable	“Wage	gap”	in	Table	1.8	captures	parameter	𝑏*	in	the	model	and	is	calculated	as	a	worker’s	own	wage	minus	their	coworker’s	wage.	That	is,	𝑏*	is	an	estimate	of	wage	comparison	effects.	The	estimate	for	“Wage	gap”	across	all	workers	is	about	-0.017,	which	means	that	workers	who	receive	$1	more	than	their	coworker	exert	about	0.017	less	effort.	This	estimate	is	both	economically	small	and	statistically	insignificant	and	is	very	similar	to	the	findings	in	Charness	and	Kuhn	(2007)	who	estimate	a	wage	comparison	effect	of	-0.015.	The	wage	comparison	effects	for	type-I	workers	is	-0.0398	and	for	type-II	workers	is	0.006,	but	both	are	still	economically	small	and	statistically	insignificant	(columns	2	and	3).	In	column	4,	I	show,	not	surprisingly,	that	there	is	no	statistically	significant	difference	in	how	type-I	and	type-II	workers	respond	to	wage	gaps.		
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Hypothesis	2.2:	When	workers	are	informed	of	relative	wages	but	not	relative	productivity,	
employers	compress	wages.		
Figure	1.3	shows	average	wage	differences	between	worker	types	in	treatments	1	and	2.	Type-II	workers	still	earn	significantly	higher	wages	in	treatment	2	but	making	wages	public	appears	to	cause	some	wage	compression.	Table	1.9	compares	wage	compression	between	treatments	1	and	2.	Consistent	with	Hypothesis	2.2,	the	wage	gap	between	the	type-II	and	type-I	workers	falls	by	about	14	cents	when	wages	are	made	public.	From	a	mean	wage	gap	of	97	cents	in	the	first	treatment,	this	reflects	a	14.4	percent	decline	in	the	wage	gap,	however	the	difference	is	not	statistically	significant.	This	suggests	that	employers	may	consider	workers	other	regarding	preferences	when	wages	are	made	public	but	given	that	worker	effort	does	not	actually	respond	to	wage	inequality,	it	is	not	surprising	that	employers	compress	wages	only	slightly	and	that	the	difference	is	not	statistically	significant.		
Hypothesis	3.1:	Informing	workers	of	productivity	differences	results	in	wage	comparisons	
affecting	effort	provision	less	than	in	case	2.		
Table	1.10	shows	estimates	of	wage	comparison	effects	in	treatment	3,	where	wages	and	productivity	are	public.	Contrary	to	Hypothesis	3.1,	the	coefficient	on	the	wage	gap	variable,	𝑏:,	is	actually	a	larger	magnitude	than	in	treatment	2,	but	is	still	statistically	insignificant	and	economically	small.	Pooling	across	work	types,	a	one-dollar	increase	in	the	wage	gap	decreases	worker	effort	by	about	3.6	percent	(0.0406/1.13),	but	again,	we	cannot	statistically	differentiate	this	effect	from	zero.	Columns	2	and	3	provide	sub-sample	
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analyses	for	each	worker	type.	The	estimated	response	to	the	wage	gap	is	similar	to	type-I	and	type-II	workers,	and	column	4	shows	that	the	difference	is	not	statistically	significant.		
Column	1	of	Table	1.11	tests	for	differences	between	𝑏*	and	𝑏:	for	all	workers.	The	differences	are	all	very	small,	and	statistically	insignificant	and	suggests	there	is	no	evidence	to	support	Hypothesis	3.1.	Columns	2	and	3	of	Table	1.11	perform	the	same	test	for	type-I	and	type-II	workers,	respectively.	The	differences	are	also	small	and	statistically	insignificant.		
Table	1.12	estimates	wage	comparison	effects	by	whether	the	wage	gap	is	positive	or	negative,	relative	to	the	effort	exerted	under	equal	wages	for	both	treatments	2	and	3	separately.	For	both	treatments,	a	negative	wage	gap	results	in	slightly	higher	effort,	but	a	positive	wage	gap	results	in	lower	effort	–	significantly	lower	effort	in	treatment	3.	This	suggest	that	𝑏*,	and	especially	𝑏:	,	are	not	symmetric	with	respect	to	the	direction	of	the	wage	gap.		
Hypothesis	3.2:	When	wages	and	productivity	are	public	information,	employers	compress	
wages	less	than	when	productivity	are	private	in	case	2	but	more	than	when	workers	are	
uninformed	of	relative	wages	in	case	1.		
Figure	1.4	compares	average	wages	paid	to	each	worker	in	each	treatment.	The	largest	gap	in	wages	occurs	in	treatment	3.	The	first	column	of	Table	1.12	shows	that	the	wage	gap	in	treatment	3	is	about	10	cents	larger	than	in	treatment	1,	and	26	cents	larger	than	in	treatment	2	(column	2)	however,	none	of	these	differences	are	statistically	significant.	Therefore,	I	do	find	suggestive	evidence	for	the	first	part	of	Hypothesis	3.2,	but	
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no	evidence	that	public	information	results	in	more	wage	compression	than	under	no	information.		
	
Conclusion		
In	this	paper,	I	use	a	three-person	gift	exchange	game	in	a	laboratory	setting	to	examine	how	employee	morale,	as	measured	by	worker	effort,	varies	under	three	different	information	treatments:	pay	secrecy,	pay	transparency,	and	full	information.	The	purpose	of	these	treatments	is	to	examine	potentially	unintended	consequences	from	enacting	pay	secrecy	policies	by	state	and	federal	governments	on	worker	effort	arising	from	worker	preferences	for	pay	equality	or	pay	equity.		
First,	I	find	that	on	average	employers	offer	higher	wages	to	higher	productivity	workers	and	that	workers	reciprocate	a	higher	wage	with	higher	effort,	both	of	which	are	consistent	with	prior	experimental	literature.	I	find	that	worker	effort	and	wage	compression	is	not	statistically	significantly	different	across	the	three	information	treatments,	and	that,	importantly,	revealing	relative	worker	productivity	does	not	statistically	significantly	affect	effort	under	pay	transparency.	The	primary	contribution	of	this	paper	to	the	literature	is	that	wage	comparison	effects	are	statistically	and	economically	insignificant	regardless	of	whether	workers	are	informed	of	their	coworker’s	productivity.	With	regards	to	pay	secrecy	policies,	my	findings	suggest	that	potential	unintended	consequences	on	worker	effort	and	morale	are	very	small	or	nonexistent.			
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Findings	from	previous	experimental	studies	that	use	heterogeneously	productive	workers	find	null	effects	while	studies	that	use	homogeneously	productive	workers	find	large	effects.	My	findings	are	in	line	with	other	experiments	that	use	heterogeneously	productive	workers,	which	also	use	realistic	wage	schedules	–	unlike	papers	with	homogeneously	productive	workers.	While	I	do	not	test	this	explicitly,	my	findings	suggest	that	the	difference	in	findings	among	experiments	that	use	homogeneously	productivity	workers	(my	pay	transparency	treatment)	and	heterogeneously	productivity	workers	(my	full	information	treatment)	is	due	to	different	wage	schedules	as	opposed	to	different	worker	productivity.	
As	additional	states	pass	laws	preventing	employers	from	taking	actions	against	workers	who	learn	their	coworker’s	wages	it	becomes	increasingly	important	to	understand	the	ramifications	for	workplace	interactions,	employee	morale,	and	wage	determination.	This	paper	contributes	to	a	nascent	but	growing	experimental	literature	on	the	effects	of	pay	secrecy	on	employee	effort,	and	employer	wage	choices.	In	reality,	workers	have	different	productivity,	or	employers	may	perceive	workers	to	be	different	productivity.	Productivity	differences	are	not	only	useful	in	this	paper	to	generate	wage	differences	to	study	wage	comparison	effects	but	are	also	leveraged	to	analyze	how	information	regarding	these	differences	affect	employer	and	worker	decision	making.		
Given	the	complexity	of	measuring	productivity	differences	among	workers	in	real	work	environments,14	it	is	important	for	employers	to	know	whether	making	investments	
                                                        14	While	many	employers	recognize	employee	effort	through	employee	of	the	month	awards,	or	performance	ratings,	these	are	generally	coarse	measures	of	productivity.	To	conduct	a	study	exploiting	the	revelation	of	these	performance	differences	is	difficult	from	a	practical	perspective	in	that	employers	would	likely	be	
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that	clarify	productivity	differences	among	workers	is	cost	effective	for	alleviating	wage	comparison	effects.	Additionally,	policy	makers	who	are	considering	passing	pay	secrecy	laws	should	be	concerned	with	the	unintended	consequences	of	these	laws	on	wage	equality	and	worker	effort.	This	paper	suggests	that	managers	should	not	be	concerned	with	pay	transparency	affecting	worker	effort,	regardless	of	whether	productivity	information	is	available	to	workers.	
	 	
                                                        resistant	to	implementing	an	experiment	to	vary	information	available	to	workers,	since	many	managers	are	concerned	with	potentially	lowering	employee	productivity.	
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Figure	1.1.	Average	worker	effort	by	wage	and	treatment
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Figure	1.2.	Average	wage	received	by	worker	type	–	pay	secrecy	case
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Figure	1.3.	Average	wages	received	by	worker	type	–	pay	transparency	case
	Note:	Treatment	1	refers	to	the	pay	secrecy	case	and	treatment	2	refers	to	the	pay	transparency	case.	 	
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Figure	1.4.	Average	wages	received	by	worker	type	
	Note:	Treatment	1	refers	to	the	pay	secrecy	case,	Treatment	2	refers	to	the	pay	transparency	case,	and	Treatment	3	refers	to	the	full	information	case.			 	
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Table	1.2.	Defining	worker	norms	for	equality	and	equity	Equality	 Equity	 Wages	 Productivity	Yes	 Yes	 𝑤$ = 𝑤$$ 	 𝜃) = 𝜃*	No	 No	 𝑤$ ≠ 𝑤$$ 	 𝜃) = 	𝜃*	Yes	 No	 𝑤$ = 𝑤$$ 	 𝜃) ≠ 𝜃*	No	 Yes	 𝑤$𝑤$$ = 𝜃)𝜃*	No	 No	 𝑤$ > 𝑤$$ 	 𝜃) ≤ 𝜃*	No	 No	 𝑤$ < 𝑤$$ 	 𝜃) ≥ 𝜃*			 	
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Table	1.3.	Estimable	worker	norms	by	case	Case/Treatment	 Fairness	of	own	wage(𝑎)	 Equality	(𝑏*)	 Equity	preferences	(𝑏:)	1	 Yes	 No	 No	2	 Yes	 Yes	 No	3	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes			 	
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Table	1.4.	Model	predictions:	Firm	profit	maximizing	effort	and	wages	Case/Treatment	 Effort*	 Wage	and	wage	compression*	1:	Pay	secrecy	 𝐸$) < 𝐸$$) 	 𝑤$) < 𝑤$$) 	2:	Pay	transparency	 𝐸$* = 𝐸$)	𝐸$$* = 𝐸$$) 		 𝑤$* > 𝑤$)	𝑤$$* < 𝑤$$) 	3:	Full	information	 𝐸$: = 𝐸$*	𝐸$$: = 𝐸$$* 	 (𝑤$) − 𝑤$$) ) > (𝑤$: − 𝑤$$:)> (𝑤$* − 𝑤$$*)	*	Subscripts	denote	worker	type.	Superscripts	denote	case.		 	
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Table	1.5.	Worker	effort,	cost,	and	revenue	production	schedule	Effort	level	 Cost	to	worker	 Revenue	produced	by	type-I	 Revenue	produced	by	type-II	Zero	 0	 0	 0	Low	 0.10	 1.90	 2.80	Medium	 0.30	 2.50	 4.20	High	 0.60	 2.70	 5.40			 	
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Table	1.6.	Relationship	between	own	wage	and	worker	effort	Outcome:	Effort	 Pay	secrecy	 Pay	transparency	 Full	information	 All	treatments	Own	wage	 0.416***	 0.400***	 0.399***	 0.404***		 (0.0472)	 (0.0307)	 (0.0423)	 (0.0223)		 	 	 	 	Mean	effort	 1.02	 1.10	 1.07	 1.07	Observations	 750	 1,200	 1,050	 3,000	Note:	Each	observation	is	a	level	of	effort	a	worker	is	willing	to	exert	for	a	given	wage.	The	pay	secrecy	case	is	Treatment	1,	pay	transparency	case	is	Treatment	2,	and	the	full	information	case	is	Treatment	3.	Each	column	is	a	separate	least	squares	regression	that	includes	round,	group,	and	subject	fixed	effects.	Standard	errors	are	in	parentheses	and	are	clustered	at	the	subject	level.		***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1					 	
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Table	1.7.	Average	wage	across	treatments	by	worker	type	Outcome:	wage	 Pay	secrecy	 Pay	transparency	 Full	information	 All	treatments	Type-II	 0.973***	 0.833***	 1.076***	 0.953***		 (0.259)	 (0.161)	 (0.132)	 (0.0988)		 	 	 	 	Mean	type-I	wage	 1.37	 1.73	 1.53	 1.57	Observations	 150	 240	 210	 600	Note:	Each	observation	the	wage	a	receives	from	their	employer.	The	pay	secrecy	case	is	Treatment	1,	pay	transparency	case	is	Treatment	2,	and	the	full	information	case	is	Treatment	3.	Each	column	is	a	separate	least	squares	regression	that	includes	round,	group,	and	subject	fixed	effects.	Standard	errors	are	in	parentheses	and	are	clustered	at	the	subject	level.		***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1					 	
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Table	1.8.	Relationship	between	wage	comparisons	and	effort	in	pay	
transparency	case	Outcome:	Effort	 All	workers	 Type-I	 Type-II	 Compare	Own	wage	 0.417***	 0.453***	 0.381***	 0.417***		 (0.0327)	 (0.0485)	 (0.0438)	 (0.0327)	Wage	gap	 -0.0169	 -0.0398	 0.00600	 -0.0218		 (0.0220)	 (0.0357)	 (0.0258)	 (0.0326)	Type-II	 	 	 	 0.375***		 	 	 	 (0.0640)	Wage	gap	*	Type-II	 	 	 	 0.00983		 	 	 	 (0.0412)		 	 	 	 	Mean	effort	 1.10	 0.94	 1.27	 1.10	Observations	 6,000	 3,000	 3,000	 6,000	Note:	“Wage	gap”	is	the	difference	between	a	worker’s	own	wage	and	their	coworker’s	wage.	In	Treatment	2,	wages	are	public,	but	productivity	are	private	information.	Each	column	is	a	separate	least	squares	regression	that	includes	round,	group,	and	subject	fixed	effects.	Standard	errors	are	in	parentheses	and	are	clustered	at	the	subject	level.	***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1					 	
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Table	1.9.	Wage	compression	between	pay	secrecy	and	pay	transparency	
cases	Outcome:	Effort	 Pay	secrecy	 Pay	transparency	 Compare	Type-II	 0.973***	 0.833***	 0.973***		 (0.259)	 (0.161)	 (0.248)	Pay	transparency	 	 	 2.576***		 	 	 (0.209)	Pay	transparency	*	Type-II	 	 	 -0.140	(0.294)		 	 	 	Mean	type-I	wage	 1.73	 2.14	 1.59	Observations	 150	 240	 390	Note:	Each	observation	is	the	wage	an	employer	pays	a	worker.	”Type	II”	is	a	dichotomous	variable	that	equals	one	if	recipient	of	the	wage	is	a	Type-II	worker,	and	zero	if	the	recipient	is	a	Type-I	worker.	In	the	pay	secrecy	case	(Treatment	1),	wages	and	productivity	are	private	in-	formation.	In	the	pay	transparency	case	(Treatment	2),	wages	are	public,	but	productivity	are	private	information.	Each	column	is	a	separate	least	squares	regression	that	includes	round,	group,	and	subject	fixed	effects.	Standard	errors	are	in	parentheses	and	are	clustered	at	the	subject	level.	***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1					 	
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Table	1.10.	Relationship	between	wage	comparisons	and	effort	under	full	
information	Outcome:	Effort	 All	workers	 Type-I	 Type-II	 Compare	Own	wage	 0.484***	 0.451***	 0.517***	 0.484***		 (0.0429)	 (0.0614)	 (0.0608)	 (0.0429)	Wage	gap	 -0.0406	 -0.0375	 -0.0436	 -0.0540		 (0.0259)	 (0.0413)	 (0.0325)	 (0.0385)	Type-II	 	 	 	 1.240***		 	 	 	 (0.0959)	Wage	gap	*	type	II	 	 	 	 0.0268		 	 	 	 (0.0475)		 	 	 	 	Mean	effort	 1.13	 1.11	 1.15	 1.13	Observations	 5,250	 2,625	 2,625	 5,250	Note:	“Wage	gap”	is	the	difference	between	a	worker’s	own	wage	and	their	coworker’s	wage.	In	Treatment	3,	wages	and	worker	productivity	are	public	information.	Each	column	is	a	separate	least	squares	regression	that	includes	round,	group,	and	subject	fixed	effects.	Standard	errors	are	in	parentheses	and	are	clustered	at	the	subject	level.	***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1				 	 	
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Table	1.11.	Differences	in	wage	comparison	effects	between	pay	transparency	
and	full	information	Outcome:	Effort	 All	workers	 Type-I	 Type-II	Own	wage	 0.448***	 0.452***	 0.445***		 (0.0266)	 (0.0381)	 (0.0377)	Wage	gap	 -0.0325	 -0.0393	 -0.0256		 (0.0221)	 (0.0339)	 (0.0286)	Wage	gap	*	Full	information	 0.00973	 0.00126	 0.0182		 (0.0313)	 (0.0471)	 (0.0417)		 	 	 	Mean	effort	 1.10	 0.94	 1.27	Observations	 11,250	 5,625	 5,625	Note:	“Wage	gap”	is	the	difference	between	a	worker’s	own	wage	and	their	coworker’s	wage.	Each	column	is	a	separate	least	squares	regression	that	includes	round,	group,	and	subject	fixed	effects.	Standard	errors	are	in	parentheses	and	are	clustered	at	the	subject	level.	***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1			
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Table	1.12.	Differences	in	wage	comparison	effects	by	wage	gap	Outcome:	Effort	 Pay	transparency	Wage	gap	<	0	 Pay	transparency	Wage	gap	>	0	 Full	information	Wage	gap	<	0	 Full	information	Wage	gap	>	0	Own	wage	 0.413***	 0.409***	 0.467***	 0.469***		 (0.0347)	 (0.0293)	 (0.438)	 (0.0396)	Wage	gap	 0.0177	 -0.0238	 0.0236	 -0.0895*		 (0.0431)	 (0.0549)	 (0.0486)	 (0.0531)		 	 	 	 	Mean	effort	 0.84	 1.36	 0.86	 1.41	Observations	 3,600	 3,600	 3,150	 3,150	Note:	“Wage	gap”	is	the	difference	between	a	worker’s	own	wage	and	their	coworker’s	wage.	Each	column	is	a	separate	least	squares	regression	that	includes	round,	group,	and	subject	fixed	effects.	Standard	errors	are	in	parentheses	and	are	clustered	at	the	subject	level.	***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1				
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Table	1.13.	Comparing	wage	compression	across	treatments	Outcome:	wage	 Pay	secrecy	–	Full	information	 Pay	transparency	–		Full	information	 Pay	secrecy	–		Pay	transparency	Type-II	 0.973***	 1.076***	 0.973***		 (0.248)	 (0.127)	 (0.248)	Full	information	 2.245***	 	 		 (0.218)	 	 	Full	information	*	type-II	 0.103	 	 		 (0.280)	 	 	Pay	transparency	 	 -0.266	 2.576***		 	 (0.226)	 (0.209)	Pay	transparency	*	type-II	 	 -0.243	 -0.140		 	 (0.202)	 (0.294)		 	 	 	Mean	wage	for	type-I	 1.47	 1.64	 1.59	Observations	 360	 510	 450	Note:	Each	column	is	a	separate	least	squares	regression	that	includes	round,	group,	and	subject	fixed	effects.	Standard	errors	are	in	parentheses	and	are	clustered	at	the	subject	level.	***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1					 	
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CHAPTER	2.	THE	EFFECT	OF	MARIJUANA	DECRIMINALIZATION	ON	
LABOR	MARKET	OUTCOMES	
	
“I	reject	the	idea	that	America	will	be	a	better	place	if	marijuana	is	sold	in	every	corner	store.	
And	I	am	astonished	to	hear	people	suggest	that	we	can	solve	our	heroin	crisis	by	legalizing	
marijuana	—	so	people	can	trade	one	life-wrecking	dependency	for	another	that’s	only	
slightly	less	awful.	Our	nation	needs	to	say	clearly	once	again	that	using	drugs	will	destroy	
your	life.”		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Jeff	Sessions	United	States	Attorney	General	March	15,	2017	 	 	 	
	
“It	is	time	to	tax	and	regulate	marijuana	like	alcohol.	It	is	time	to	end	the	arrests	of	so	many	
people	and	the	destruction	of	so	many	lives	for	possessing	marijuana...		Too	many	Americans	
have	seen	their	lives	destroyed	because	they	have	criminal	records	as	a	result	of	marijuana	
use.	That's	wrong.	That	has	got	to	change.”				 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 Bernie	Sanders		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 United	States	Senator		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 October	28,	2015		 	
	
Introduction		
In	2014,	22.2	million	Americans	reported	using	marijuana	in	the	past	month,	far	surpassing	use	rates	of	all	other	illicit	drugs	combined	(NSDUH	2014).	Yet	despite	this	high	rate	of	use,	increasing	social	acceptance15,	and	calls	for	reform	from	activist	groups	and	legislators	like	Senator	Bernie	Sanders,	there	were	over	600,000	arrests	for	marijuana	offenses	in	the	U.S.	in	2014,	constituting	over	5%	of	all	arrests.16	Over	80%	of	these	
                                                        15	Based	on	a	Pew	Research	study	published	in	2016,	57%	of	American	adults	believe	marijuana	should	be	legal	compared	to	32%	in	2006.	http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/10/12/support-for-marijuana-legalization-continues-to-rise/	(accessed	December	2,	2017)	16	According	to	the	FBI,	there	were	an	estimated	11,205,833	total	arrests	in	2014	(see	https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2014/crime-in-the-u.s.-2014/tables/table-29	accessed	August	8,	2018).	
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marijuana	related	arrests	were	for	possession.17	Considering	both	the	high	level	of	marijuana	arrests,	and	the	fact	that	being	arrested	and	incarcerated	negatively	affects	labor	market	outcomes,	(Gould,	Weinberg,	and	Mustard	2002;	Grogger	1995;	Kling	2006;	Mueller-Smith	2014;	Western	2002;	Western,	Kling,	and	Weiman	2001)	an	important	policy	question	is	how	changes	in	marijuana	arrests	affect	average	labor	market	outcomes.	In	this	paper,	I	examine	how	changes	in	arrests	for	marijuana	possession	affected	average	labor	market	outcomes	by	leveraging	variation	in	arrests	driven	by	marijuana	decriminalization	laws.	The	primary	challenge	in	studying	the	effect	of	changes	in	the	marijuana	arrest	rate	on	average	labor	market	outcomes	is	accounting	for	reverse	causality	between	changes	in	marijuana	arrests,	and	labor	markets.	For	example,	if	marijuana	use	and	arrests	are	correlated	with	the	unemployment	rate,18	then	estimates	of	the	relationship	between	marijuana	arrests	and	labor	market	outcomes	would	be	biased.	To	overcome	this	endogeneity,	I	leverage	the	enactment	of	decriminalization	laws	during	the	late	2000s,	which	remove	criminal	penalties	for	possession	of	small	quantities	of	marijuana.		The	effect	of	marijuana	decriminalization	on	labor	market	outcomes	is	theoretically	ambiguous.	Three	primary	channels	through	which	decriminalization	could	affect	labor	market	outcomes	are	changes	in	marijuana	consumption,	the	composition	of	the	workforce,	and	the	number	of	individuals	with	criminal	records.	If	decriminalization	increases	marijuana	consumption,	then	decriminalization	could	lead	to	worse	labor	market	outcomes	(Desimone	2002;	Register	and	Williams	1992).	Holding	direct	effects	on	
                                                        17	Based	on	author’s	estimates	using	2014	FBI	UCR	data	downloaded	from	ICPSR.	18	Badel	and	Greaney	(2013)	find	a	positive	relationship	between	being	unemployed	and	marijuana	use.	
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marijuana	use	constant,	decriminalization	could	increase	the	number	of	marijuana	users	in	the	labor	force	simply	because	they	are	no	longer	physically	removed	from	the	labor	force	to	be	incarcerated.	If	these	individuals	have	lower	than	average	productivity,	then	this	labor	force	compositional	change	would	push	down	average	wages.	Last,	assuming	police	do	not	substitute	other	arrests	for	marijuana	possession	arrests,	decriminalization	would	decrease	the	number	of	individuals	with	criminal	records	in	the	labor	force.	Because	having	a	criminal	record	leads	to	worse	labor	market	outcomes	(Bushway	2004;	Finlay	2008;	Pager,	Western,	and	Bonokowski	2006),	decriminalization	may	lead	to	improved	labor	market	outcomes	for	marijuana	users	who	would	have	been	arrested	absent	decriminalization.	This	is	the	first	paper	to	empirically	examine	the	effects	of	removing	penalties	for	low-level	marijuana	possession	on	labor	market	outcomes.	In	the	first	part	of	this	paper,	I	examine	the	relationship	between	enactment	of	decriminalization	laws	and	arrests	for	marijuana	possession.	I	use	event	study	and	difference-in-differences	models	with	state-by-year	marijuana	possession	arrest	rates	that	I	construct	from	the	Federal	Bureau	of	Investigation’s	(FBI)	Uniform	Crime	Report	(UCR),	to	show	that	enacting	a	decriminalization	law	reduces	the	arrest	rate	for	marijuana	possession	by	nearly	60%;	this	reduction	is	immediate	and	grows	slightly	over	time.	Decriminalization	laws	do	not	appear	to	be	endogenously	related	to	differential	trends	in	possession	arrests	between	treated	and	control	states	and	the	estimates	are	robust	to	including	controls	for	state	and	year	fixed	effects,	demographic	controls,	state-level	policies,	and	linear	state	time	trends.	Therefore,	I	conclude	that	my	estimates	are	consistent	with	a	causal	interpretation	of	decriminalization	enactment	reducing	marijuana	possession	arrests.	
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In	the	second	part	of	this	paper	I	examine	the	general	equilibrium	relationship	between	decriminalization	and	labor	market	outcomes	using	event	studies	and	reduced	form	differences-in-differences	models	with	data	from	the	Current	Population	Survey’s	(CPS)	Outgoing	Rotation	Group	(ORG)	files	from	2000-2016.	I	have	two	main	findings.	First,	I	find	that	decriminalization	is	associated	with	about	a	half-percentage	point	reduction	in	unemployment.	Second,	decriminalization	is	associated	with	2.5%	lower	average	weekly	earnings.	Both	findings	are	robust	to	controlling	for		demographic	controls,	state	level	controls,	state	fixed	effects,	year	fixed	effects,	and	state-by-year	time	trends.	Taking	these	two	results	together	suggests	that	decriminalization	reduces	the	share	of	the	labor	force	with	criminal	records,	thereby	shifting	the	supply	of	employable	workers,	which	increases	employment	and	decreases	average	earnings.	In	the	third	part	of	the	paper,	I	examine	potential	mechanisms.	First,	decriminalization	could	reduce	the	cost	of	possessing	marijuana	and	thus	increase	marijuana	use.	If	decriminalization	increases	the	number	of	employed	marijuana	users	and	marijuana	use	decreases	productivity,	then	this	could	be	the	channel	through	which	decriminalization	decreases	earnings.	Using	National	Survey	of	Drug	Use	and	Health	data	(NSDUH),	I	find	that	decriminalization	is	associated	with	an	increase	in	marijuana	use,	particularly	for	older	individuals	25	years	old	and	older.	Second,	I	find	that	decriminalization	is	associated	with	increases	in	marijuana	prices	(Anderson,	Hansen,	and	Rees	2013).	While	the	previous	literature	suggests	the	effect	of	marijuana	use	on	labor	market	outcomes	is	somewhat	ambiguous,	it	is	possible	that	this	is	a	channel	through	which	decriminalization	affects	unemployment	and	earnings	(Popovici	and	French	2014;	J.	J.	Sabia	and	Nguyen	2019).	Finally,	I	show	that	my	results	are	likely	not	driven	by	police	
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reallocating	arrests	away	from	marijuana	possession	to	other	types	of	drug,	or	alcohol	arrests,	including	marijuana	sales	and	distribution.	The	paper	is	organized	as	follows:	Section	2	describes	the	background	and	theory	regarding	arrests,	convictions,	and	labor	market	outcomes	as	well	as	a	description	of	decriminalization	over	time.	Section	3	provides	an	in-depth	discussion	of	the	data	sources	used,	their	strengths,	limitations,	and	how	the	latter	are	addressed.	Section	4	formally	presents	the	empirical	framework.	Section	5	presents	the	results,	and	Section	6	provides	a	discussion	and	robustness	checks.	Lastly,	Section	7	concludes.		
Background		
The	Relationship	between	Arrests	and	Labor	Market	Outcomes		
Studies	using	individual	level	data	show	that	involvement	with	the	criminal	justice	system	is	associated	with	worse	labor	market	outcomes	(Gould,	Weinberg,	and	Mustard	2002;	Grogger	1995;	Kling	2006;	Mueller-Smith	2014;	Western	2002;	Western,	Kling,	and	Weiman	2001).		Being	arrested	affects	the	arrestee’s	labor	market	outcomes	through	two	primary	channels.	First,	even	if	the	arrestee	is	not	convicted,	temporary	incarceration	resulting	from	an	arrest	can	directly	disrupt	current	employment	while	the	arrestee	is	booked	and	awaits	trial	or	for	bail	to	be	posted.	Further	repercussions	from	the	arrest,	such	as	meetings	with	lawyers	and	attending	court,	can	also	disrupt	current	employment.		The	second	channel	is	through	conviction,	receiving	a	criminal	record,	and	potential	incarceration.	The	mark	of	incarceration	generates	a	negative	signal	to	employers	that	an	applicant	is	untrustworthy	and	less	reliable	than	a	non-offender	(Holzer,	2007;	Western,	
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2002,	2006;	Western	et	al.,	2001)	so	that	for	a	given	wage,	the	demand	for	ex-offenders	is	generally	lower	than	for	those	without	a	criminal	record.19	Employer	surveys	point	to	significantly	lower	labor	demand	for	those	with	a	criminal	record	compared	to	those	without	(Holzer,	2007).	Audit	studies,	which	measure	revealed	preferences	of	employers,	echo	the	results	from	employer	surveys.	In	particular,	applicants	with	criminal	histories	are	less	likely	to	receive	callbacks	from	potential	employers	compared	to	applicants	without	a	criminal	background	(Pager,	2003,	2007).		At	the	individual	level,	an	arrest	can	reduce	the	probability	of	employment,	but	at	the	aggregate	level,	this	could	also	raise	average	wages	as	the	supply	of	employable	labor	(i.e.,	those	in	the	labor	force	without	a	criminal	record)	with	falls.	Therefore,	a	decrease	in	the	arrest	rate	may	increase	the	number	of	individuals	in	the	labor	force	who	are	employable,	but	could	also	put	downward	pressure	on	wages.	
Changes	in	decriminalization	over	time		 Decriminalization	is	defined	in	this	paper	as	any	law	that	reduces	the	punishment	associated	with	marijuana	possession	from	a	criminal	conviction	and/or	jail	time	to	a	non-arrestable	offense,	such	as	a	minor	violation,	that	does	not	result	in	jail	time	or	a	criminal	record.	Decriminalization	in	the	United	States	occurred	in	two	waves.	In	the	first	wave,	during	the	1970s,	eleven	states	decriminalized	possession	of	small	quantities	of	marijuana.	These	states	were	Alaska,	California,	Nebraska,	New	York,	North	Carolina,	Ohio,	Oregon,	Colorado,	Maine,	Minnesota,	and	Mississippi.	In	the	second	wave,	during	the	2000s,	seven	states20	either	enacted	new	decriminalization	laws	or,	for	some	states	that	decriminalized	
                                                        19	Government	interventions,	such	as	the	Work	Opportunity	Tax	Credit,	attempt	to	compensate	for	this	lower	demand	by	providing	employers	tax	credits	for	hiring	ex-offenders	and	other	targeted	groups.	20	Two	additional	states,	Alaska	and	Nevada,	enacted	changes	to	the	illicit	status	of	marijuana	during	my	
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during	the	first	wave,	relaxed	penalties	even	further	(see,	for	example,	the	discussion	on	California’s	decriminalization	law,	below).	Because	of	data	limitations21,	I	identify	the	effect	of	decriminalization	using	states	that	decriminalized	in	the	second	wave.	Table	2.1	provides	information	on	the	timing	and	details	of		decriminalization	laws	passed	in	the	second	wave.	In	most	of	the	states	that	decriminalized	possession,	the	punishment	for	possessing	under	an	ounce	of	marijuana	is	at	most	a	fine	of	$100-$200,	with	no	associated	criminal	record	(See	Table	2.1).	What	follows	below	is	a	more	detailed	discussion	of	each	state’s	law.	In	Massachusetts,	voters	approved	the	Sensible	Marijuana	Policy	Initiative	on	November	4,	2008.	This	initiative	replaced	criminal	penalties	for	possession	of	up	to	one	ounce	of	marijuana	with	civil	penalties,	consisting	of	a	$100	citation	and	forfeiture	of	their	marijuana.	This	civil	penalty	did	not	result	in	a	criminal	record.	The	policy	took	effect	on	January	2,	2009.22	California	originally	depenalized	marijuana	possession	under	the	Moscone	Act	(Senate	Bill	95)	in	1975,	which	reduced	the	penalty	associated	with	possession	from	a	felony	or	criminal	misdemeanor	to	a	civil	misdemeanor.	Individuals	arrested	for	possession	under	the	Moscone	Act	would	be	arrested	and	booked,	unless	they	can	provide	
                                                        sample	that	I	exclude	from	my	analysis,	because	their	law	changes	are	better	described	as	depenalization	rather	than	decriminalization.	Alaska’s	depenalization	is	not	only	brief	(from	2003-2006),	but	also	limited	because	the	Noy	v.	State	ruling	only	explicitly	protected	possession	within	one’s	own	home.	In	Nevada,	passage	of	Assembly	Bill	453	in	2000	decreased	the	penalty	for	possession	of	up	to	one	ounce	to	a	misdemeanor	that	carried	at	most	a	$600	fine	for	first-time	offenders	(Raybuck	2010).	Moreover,	medical	marijuana	laws	were	enacted	in	the	same	legislation	that	depenalized	possession,	which	means	that	I	cannot	separately	identify	the	effect	of	depenalization.	Appendix	Figure	2.1	plots	marijuana	possession	arrests	per	100,000	for	Alaska	and	Nevada;	the	changes	in	marijuana	legislation	do	not	appear	to	result	in	sustained	changes	in	arrests.	Results	are	similar	if	Alaska	and	Nevada	are	coded	as	decriminalized	states	(available	upon	request).	21	The	UCR	begins	reporting	arrests	for	marijuana	possession	in	1976,	however	it	is	highly	inconsistent	and	of	poor	quality	until	1980.	22	Source:	https://ballotpedia.org/Massachusetts_Sensible_Marijuana_Policy_Initiative,_Question_2_(2008)	
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“satisfactory	evidence	of	identity	and	a	written	promise	to	appear	in	court”	(C..	Senate	Bill	1149).23	The	maximum	punishment	was	a	$100	fine.	With	the	enactment	of	SB	1449	on	September	30,	2010,	marijuana	possession	of	one	ounce	or	less	was	reduced	from	a	misdemeanor	to	an	infraction	that	would	not	result	in	a	court	appearance	or	a	criminal	record.24	On	June	30,	2011,	the	Connecticut	Senate	voted	90-57	in	the	House	to	approve	Senate	Bill	1014,	which	reduced	penalties	for	possession	of	up	to	half	an	ounce	of	marijuana	from	up	to	one	year	in	jail	and	a	$1,000	fine	to	a	non-criminal	infraction	and	a	fine	up	to	$150.		Possession	of	quantities	between	0.5	–	4	ounces	were	still	punishable	by	up	to	one	year	in	prison	and	a	$1,000	fine,	and	quantities	greater	than	four	ounces	were	punishable	by	up	to	5	years	in	prison	and	$2,000	fine.25	In	2012,	Rhode	Island	law	makers	passed	House	Bill	7092	and	Senate	Bill	2253,	which	decreased	the	penalty	for	possessing	less	than	one	ounce	of	marijuana	from	a	criminal	misdemeanor	whose	conviction	is	punishable	by	up	to	one	year	in	jail	and	a	$500	fine,	to	a	non-arrestable	civil	offense	punishable	by	a	$150	fine.26	This	legislation	is	very	similar	to	Senate	Bill	1047	that	passed	in	Connecticut	the	previous	year.	The	Rhode	Island	law	took	effect	April	1,	2013.	Vermont’s	Governor	Shumlin	signed	into	law	House	Bill	200,	which	decriminalized	marijuana	possession	of	up	to	one	ounce	and	took	effect	June	6,	2013.27	Prior	to	
                                                        23	Source:	http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=200920100SB1449	24	Source:	https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=200920100SB1449	25	Source:	https://blog.norml.org/tag/connecticut/page/5/	and	http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=200920100SB1449		26	Source:	https://blog.norml.org/2012/05/30/rhode-island-lawmakers-moving-forward-with-marijuana-decriminalization-measures/	27	Source:	https://web.archive.org/web/20130610093111/http://governor.vermont.gov/gov-shumlin-signs-marijuana-decriminalization	
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decriminalizing,	punishments	for	possession	of	up	to	two-ounces	of	marijuana	was	punishable	by	6-24	months	in	jail	and	a	$500	fine.	In	April	2014,	Governor	O’Malley	of	Maryland	signed	Senate	Bill	364	which	decriminalized	possession	of	less	than	10	grams	of	marijuana.	The	punishment	for	first-time	offenders	was	a	civil	infraction	that	brought	a	$100	fine,	which	replaced	the	punishment	of	up	to	1-year	in	jail	and	a	$1,000	fine.	The	law	went	into	effect	on	October	1,	2014.28	In	June	18,	2015,	the	Governor	Markell	of	Delaware	signed	Senate	Bill	39,	wich	decriminalized	possession	of	up	to	1	ounce	of	marijuana.	Prior	to	decriminalization,	possession	of	small	quantities	was	classified	as	a	criminal	misdemeanor;	convictions	could	result	in	up	to	6	months	in	jail,	a	$575	fine,	and	a	criminal	record.29	The	legislation	reduced	the	criminal	penalty	for	possession	to	a	civil	infraction,	however	the	bill	contained	important	limitations.	Smoking	marijuana	in	a	vehicle,	public	area,	or	on	private	property	within	10	feet	of	a	street,	sidewalk,	or	other	area	accessible	to	the	public	was	still	a	misdemeanor	offense.30	The	decriminalization	law	took	effect	on	December	18,	2015.31		
Data	
Uniform	Crime	Report	(UCR)	Arrest	Data	
                                                        28	Source:	https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/04/14/maryland-marijuana-decriminalization_n_5107412.html	29	Source:	https://blog.norml.org/2015/06/18/delaware-governor-signs-measure-decriminalizing-minor-marijuana-possession-offenses/	30	Source:	https://www.delawareonline.com/story/firststatepolitics/2015/06/18/senate-debate-marijuana/28927757/	31	Source:	https://www.cannabisbusinesstimes.com/article/cbt-delaware-marijuana-decriminalization-to-take-effect/	
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Since	1930,	the	Federal	Bureau	of	Investigation’s	(FBI)	Uniform	Crime	Report	(UCR)	has	been	the	primary	source	of	arrest	data	in	the	U.S.	The	FBI	constructs	annual	UCR	age-sex-race	(ASR)	master	files	using	counts	of	arrests	reported	monthly	by	state	and	local	police	agencies	throughout	the	U.S.	I	use	annual	UCR	data	compiled	from	the	Inter-university	Consortium	for	Political	and	Social	Science	Research	(ICPSR)	(Kaplan	2018a).	
Features	and	issues	of	the	UCR	
The	UCR	is	the	one	of	the	largest	nationwide	datasets	that	contains	state-by-year	counts	of	marijuana	possession	arrests	for	2000-2016,	making	it	an	effective	dataset	for	studying	the	effects	of	decriminalization,	but	there	are	two	limitations	that	I	describe	and	address	below.		
First,	it	is	well	documented	that	the	FBI	lacks	a	statutory	obligation	for	individual	agencies	to	submit	arrest	counts,	which	leads	to	inconsistent	reporting	by	agencies	over	time	(Akiyama	and	Propheter	2005;	Maltz	and	Weiss	2007).	Specifically,	agencies	report	arrest	data	to	the	FBI	monthly,	but	many	agencies	fail	to	report	for	all	twelve	months	each	year.	The	FBI	performs	data	imputation	to	aggregate	missing	and	non-missing	monthly	counts	to	annual	counts,	which	constitute	the	data	I	use	in	this	paper.	Because	larger	agencies	report	more	consistently	than	smaller	agencies,	I	limit	my	analysis	to	agencies	that	cover	at	least	10,000	residents	(Y.	W.	L.	Chu	and	Townsend	2018).	
Second,	because	of	agency	non-reporting	over	time,	the	population	covered	I	each	state	by	reporting	agencies	varies	each	year.	The	UCR	provides	a	measure	of	the	total	population	covered	by	each	agency	that	I	use	this	to	generate	aggregate	arrest	rates	per	
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100,000	for	total	adult	arrests.	However,	the	UCR	does	not	provide	a	population	count	for	each	subgroup,	such	as	20-29	year	old	individuals.	Therefore,	I	combine	the	UCR	with	Census	Population	Estimate	data	to	determine	the	share	of	the	state	population	covered	by	reporting	agencies	by	calculating	the	share	of	population	covered	by	reporting	agencies	in	each	state	𝑠	and	year	𝑡:	
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒	𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑vw = 	𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑠	𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛vw𝑈𝐶𝑅	𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛vw 	
I	drop	state-by-year	observations	that	have	less	than	twenty-five	percent	of	the	population	covered	by	reporting	agencies,	which	constitute	a	little	less	than	four	percent	of	the	sample.	The	share	of	the	population	covered	is	important	because	the	state-by-year	arrest	totals	that	I	generate	by	aggregating	arrest	counts	across	agencies	in	each	state	and	year	do	not	necessarily	reflect	the	subgroup	populations	in	Census	Population	Estimate	data.	That	is,	if	I	compute	the	share	of	arrests	per	100,000	residents,	I	will	underestimate	actual	subgroup	arrest	rates	because	the	denominator	represents	the	state	population	count	for	subgroup	𝑖,	but	the	arrest	count	represents	only	a	fraction	of	that	state’s	population.	For	subgroups,	I	calculate	the	arrest	rate	per	100,000	residents	by	weighting	the	raw	arrest	counts	by	the	inverse	of	𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒	𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑:	
𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑠	𝑝𝑒𝑟	100,000	𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠~vw = #	𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑠~Uvw𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑠	𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛Uvw ∗ 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒	𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑vw	
Where	𝑜	is	offense,	and	𝑎	is	subgroup.	This	procedure	simply	rescales	the	subgroup	populations	form	the	Census	Population	Estimates	to	match	the	population	covered	by	reporting	agencies.		
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Trends	in	UCR	Arrests	
Figure	2.1	shows	the	trends	in	arrests	for	marijuana	possession	from	2000-2016	between	non-decriminalized	states	(including	first	wave	adopters),	denoted	by	the	solid	trend	line,	and	treated	states,	denoted	by	the	dashed	line.	Vertical	lines	mark	decriminalization	law	enactments	by	the	treated	states	throughout	the	sample.	Throughout	the	early	2000s,	prior	to	the	enactment	of	decriminalization	laws,	trends	in	marijuana	arrests	are	very	similar	across	never	treated	states	and	treated	states,	although	the	level	of	arrests	appears	lower	for	treated	states.	Beginning	around	2008,	when	treated	states	begin	to	decriminalize	possession,	there	is	a	precipitous	drop	in	the	marijuana	arrest	rate	that	continues	as	more	and	more	states	become	treated.	This	provides	suggestive	evidence	that	decriminalization	is	related	to	reductions	in	arrests	for	marijuana	possession,	and	that	observable	trends	in	marijuana	possessions	arrests	were	similar	between	treatment	and	control	groups.		
In	Figure	2.2,	I	examine	marijuana	possession	arrest	rates	for	each	of	the	seven	states	that	decriminalized	marijuana	during	the	2000s.	There	are	large	declines	in	the	arrest	rate	for	marijuana	possession	following	decriminalization	in	all	adopters,	and	the	effects	persist	over	time.32	
Labor	Market	Data	–	Current	Population	Survey	(CPS)	
Data	on	labor	market	outcomes	and	demographic	controls	are	from	the	2000-2016	
                                                        32	In	Appendix	Figure	2.1,	I	plot	the	time-series	of	arrests	for	the	two	states	that	I	exclude	from	the	sample:	Alaska	and	Nevada.	There	is	no	clear	decline	in	arrests	in	Nevada	following	decriminalization.	In	Alaska,	there	appears	to	be	a	small	decline	in	arrests	following	decriminalization,	but	the	effect	is	substantially	smaller	than	in	the	other	seven	states	on	which	I	focus.	
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Current	Population	Survey	(CPS)	Outgoing	Rotation	Group	(ORG)33	files	accessed	through	IPUMS-USA	database	(Sarah	Flood	and	Warren,	2015).	The	ORG	files	contain	detailed	responses	to	questions	about	labor	market	earnings	and	provide	about	three-times	the	number	of	observations	than	the	CPS’s	Annual	Social	and	Economic	Supplement	(ASEC),	which	is	the	other	commonly	used	large-scale	survey	of	U.S	workers’	earnings.	Respondents	in	the	CPS	are	interviewed	for	four	months,	ignored	for	eight	months,	and	then	interviewed	for	another	four	months	before	they	are	rotated	out	of	the	sample	indefinitely.		The	questions	that	constitute	the	ORG	files	pertain	to	respondents’	current	earnings	and	frequency	of	work	just	before	they	rotate	out	after	the	first	four	months	and	before	they	rotate	out	of	the	CPS	indefinitely.	This	survey	design	produces	two	“earner	observations”	per	respondent,	each	about	a	year	apart.	The	ORG	files	contain	only	civilians	aged	15	or	older	who	are	currently	employed	for	wages	or	salary	and	are	not	self-employed.	I	restrict	the	ORG	sample	to	20-64	years	old	individuals	who	are	not	in	the	armed	forces	to	match	my	UCR	sample.34	
Changes	in	the	arrest	rate	for	marijuana	possession	could	affect	average	labor	market	outcomes	on	the	extensive	or	intensive	margins.	To	fully	examine	the	effect	of	decriminalization	on	the	extensive	margin	I	examine	labor	force	participation,	employment-to-population	ratio,	and	the	unemployment	rate.	On	the	intensive	margin	I	examine	weekly	earnings,	hours	worked,	and	hourly	wages.	
                                                        33	This	is	also	known	as	the	“Annual	Earnings	File”	or	the	“Earner	Study”.	34	I	do	not	examine	younger	individuals	because	most	decriminalized	states	retain	criminal	punishments	for	possession	by	those	younger	than	21.	Because	of	this,	it	would	be	ideal	to	study	individuals	21	years	and	older,	however	the	Census	Population	Estimates,	which	I	use	to	generate	age-group	specific	arrest	rates,	is	not	granular	enough	to	identify	21-year	old	individuals.	
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All	respondents	in	the	CPS	ORG	files	are	asked	whether	they	are	part	of	the	labor	force.	Table	2.1,	Panel	II,	shows	that	about	77.8%	of	the	sample	participates	in	the	labor	force.	I	define	an	indicator	for	employment	that	equals	one	if	the	respondent	is	employed	and	zero	if	they	were	not	employed	(unconditional	on	whether	they	were	in	the	labor	force).	That	is,	the	employment	measure	I	use	is	equivalent	to	an	employment-to-population	ratio,	which	I	will	refer	to	simply	as	the	employment	rate.	I	also	define	an	indicator	for	unemployed	that	equals	one	if	the	respondent	is	unemployed,	and	zero	if	employed.	That	is,	this	indicator	measures	the	unemployment	rate	and	is	defined	only	for	individuals	who	are	part	of	the	labor	force.	
I	have	data	on	weekly	earnings	for	about	2.3	million	observations,	which	is	most	of	the	approximately	2.6	million	employed	respondents.	Weekly	earnings	are	calculated	in	the	CPS	from	the	question	“How	much	do	you	usually	earn	per	week	at	this	job	before	deductions?”	If	the	worker	is	paid	an	hourly	wage,	then	the	respondent	is	also	asked	“the	reported	number	of	hours	the	respondent	usually	worked	at	the	job,	multiplied	by	the	hourly	wage	rate	given	in	HOURWAGE.”	I	deflate	weekly	earnings	by	the	Consumer	Price	Index	to	2014	dollars.	On	average,	respondents	reported	earning	about	$900	a	week.	Data	on	hours	worked	in	the	past	week	was	reported	by	about	2.5	million	employed	respondents,	slightly	higher	than	for	weekly	earnings.	On	average,	respondents	worked	about	28.7	hours,	and	earned	an	inflation	adjusted	average	wage	of	$16.74	(available	for	about	1.3	million	respondents	who	report	earning	hourly	wages).	
Other	controls	
	 The	models	I	estimate	below	include	state-level	covariates	whose	exclusion	could	
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potentially	result	in	biasing	the	estimated	relationship	between	decriminalization	and	arrests	and	labor	market	outcomes.	These	controls	include:	state	Gross	Domestic	Product35	(Bureau	of	Economic	Analysis),	total	per	capita	state	and	local	expenditures	(Chantrill	2017),	number	of	police	officer	as	reported	in	the	FBI’s	Law	Enforcement	Officers	Killed	in	Action	data	(Kaplan	2018b),	and	state	minimum	wages36	(Vaghul	and	Zipperer	2016).		I	also	control	for	whether	states	distribute	criminal	history	records	over	the	internet	Finlay	(2008).	
	
Model	Specifications		
I	examine	the	first	stage	relationship	between	decriminalization	and	changes	in	the	arrest	rate	for	marijuana	possession	by	estimating	the	following	model	using	least	squares:	
𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑠vw = 	𝛼) +	𝛽)𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛vw +	𝑋vw𝛿) +𝑊vwψ) + 𝜙)v + 𝛾)w + 𝜙)vw ∗ 𝑡 +	𝜖)	vw			 (1)	
The	outcome	𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑠vw	is	the	number	of	marijuana	possession	arrests	per	100,000	in	state	𝑠	and	year	𝑡.	𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	is	an	indicator	that	equals	one	if	state	𝑠	has	a	decriminalization	law	in	year	𝑡,	and	zero	otherwise.37	The	matrix	X	contains	state-level	time	varying	controls	for	medical	marijuana	laws,	recreational	marijuana	legalization,	state	
                                                        35	Downloaded	from	https://www.bea.gov/iTable/iTable.cfm?reqid=70&step=1&isuri=1&acrdn=2#reqid=70&step=4&isuri=1&7003=200&7001=1200&7002=1&7090=70.	Last	accessed	on	December	4,	2017.	36	Downloaded	from	http://equitablegrowth.org/working-papers/historical-state-and-sub-state-minimum-wage-data/.	Last	accessed	on	December	4,	2017.	37	The	value	of	decriminalization	on	the	year	of	enactment	is	the	number	of	days	between	the	exact	date	of	enactment	and	December	31,	divided	by	365.	
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and	local	spending	per	capita,	state	Gross	Domestic	Product,	minimum	wages,	and	police	officers	per	100,000	residents.	Individual	level	controls	from	the	ORG	files,	represented	by	𝜓	and	include	race	(white,	black,	with	“other”	race	omitted),	marital	status,	age,	age	squared,	and	indicators	for	highest	education	(less	than	high	school,	high	school	graduate,	and	college.	State	and	year	fixed	effects	are	represented	by	𝜙)v	and	𝛾)w ,	respectively,	and	𝜙)vw ∗ 𝑡	is	a	linear-state	time	trend.	Standard	errors	are	clustered	by	state	to	account	for	correlation	of	errors	within	the	same	state	over	time	and	to	account	for	heteroscedasticity.	For	analyses	where	the	outcome	varies	at	the	state-by-year	level,	such	as	arrests	in	equation	(1),	I	use	state-by-year	mean	values	for	controls	from	the	ORG	files	weighted	to	be	nationally	representative.	
The	coefficient	of	interest,	𝛽),	identifies	the	relationship	between	changes	in	decriminalization	and	changes	in	arrests	for	marijuana	possession.	There	are	two	identifying	assumption	for	𝛽)	to	have	a	causal	interpretation.	First,	trends	in	marijuana	possession	arrests	must	be	similar	between	treated	and	control	states	prior	to	treatment.	Second,	there	must	be	no	unobservable	factors	that	are	correlated	with	both	decriminalization	and	the	outcome.		
The	first	assumption	would	be	violated	if,	for	example,	the	arrest	rate	evolves	differently	in	states	that	select	into	treatment	compared	to	controls	states.	This	would	bias	𝛽),	and	the	direction	of	the	bias	would	depend	on	the	differential	nature	of	the	pre-trends.	I	test	for	parallel	pre-trends	in	arrests	leading	up	the	enactment	of	decriminalization,	by	re-estimating	equation	(2)	using	leads	and	lags.	That	is,	I	estimate	the	following	model:	
𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑠vw = 	𝛼* +		∑ 𝛽*\*\ 𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛vwX + ∑ 𝛽*: 𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛vwX +
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	𝑋vw𝛿* +𝑊vwψ* +	𝜙*v + 𝛾*w+	𝜙*vw ∗ 𝑡 +	𝜖*vw					(2)	
	 The	coefficient	of	interest,	𝛽* 	is	interpreted	relative	to	one	year	prior	to	decriminalization	(the	omitted	group).	When	𝑙 = −5,	𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛v\	equals	one	for	treated	states	five	and	more	years	prior	to	decriminalization,	and	when	𝑙 = 3,	𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛v:	equals	one	for	treated	states	three	and	more	years	post	decriminalization.	I	test	for	pre-trends	by	examining	the	statistical	significance	in	the	policy	leads	relative	to	one-year	before	decriminalization,	i.e.,	𝛽*\	through	𝛽*\*	identify	mean	differences	between	treated	and	control	states	relative	to	one-year	prior	to	treatment.	
I	address	the	second	identifying	assumption	by	including	linear-state	time	trends	in	specifications	(1)	and	(2).	These	trends	control	for	variation	in	unobservable	characteristics	that	evolve	linearly	within	each	state	overtime.		
	 To	estimate	the	relationship	between	decriminalization	and	labor	market	outcomes,	I	use	a	model	similar	to	equation	(1),	except	I	run	the	model	at	the	level	of	individual	respondent	in	the	CPS.	That	is,	I	estimate	the	following	model	using	weights	from	the	CPS	to	generate	nationally	representative	estimates:	
𝑌"vw = 	𝛼: +	𝛽:𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛vw +	𝑋vw𝛿: +𝑊"vwψ: + 𝜙:v + 𝛾:w + 𝜙:vw ∗ 𝑡 +	𝜖:	"vw			 (3)	
The	outcome	𝑌"vw	is	either	an	indicator	for	whether	individual	𝑖	in	state	𝑠	in	year	𝑡	participates	in	the	labor	force,	is	employed,	is	unemployed,	or	represents	the	individual’s	weekly	earnings,	hours	worked,	or	hourly	wage.	The	coefficient	of	interest,	𝛽:,	identifies	the	average	change	in	the	outcome	𝑌"vw	before	and	after	a	state	enacts	a	decriminalization	
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law	relative	to	states	that	do	not.	The	threats	to	identifying	𝛽:	casually	are	the	same	as	for	𝛽),	and	therefore	equation	(3)	includes	a	linear-state	time	trend38	denoted	as	𝜙:vw ∗ 𝑡,	and	I	also	examine	whether	the	parallel	trends	assumption	holds	by	estimating	a	variation	of	equation	(3)	that	includes	leads	and	lags:	
𝑌"vw = 	𝛼 +		∑ 𝛽\*\ 𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛vwX + ∑ 𝛽: 𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛vwX +	𝑋vw𝛿 +𝑊"vwψ +	𝜙v + 𝛾w+	𝜙vw ∗ 𝑡 +	𝜖vw					(4)	
The	estimation	of	equation	(4)	is	similar	to	equation	(3)	except	that	the	former	is	estimated	at	the	individual	CPS	respondent	level	instead	of	the	state-by-year	level	to	allow	for	the	covariance	of	controls	to	vary	at	the	individual	level,	instead	of	the	state	level.	
	 While	it	would	be	mechanically	feasible	to	estimate	the	effect	of	changes	in	the	arrest	rate	on	labor	market	outcomes	by	instrumenting	for	variation	in	arrests	using	decriminalization,	I	do	not	formally	estimate	this	model	because	of	concerns	about	excludability.	Specifically,	in	order	for	decriminalization	to	satisfy	the	excludability	restriction	to	be	used	as	an	IV,	there	must	be	zero	correlation	between	decriminalization	and	any	other	factors	that	are	correlated	with	possession	arrests	and	labor	market	outcomes,	conditional	on	the	included	regressors.	For	example,	if	decriminalization	affects	labor	market	outcomes	through	changes	in	marijuana	use	conditional	on	controls,	then	the	instrument	would	not	satisfy	the	excludability	assumption.	Given	that	I	find	some	evidence	that	decriminalization	is	correlated	with	changes	in	marijuana	prices	and	marijuana	use,	I	do	not	instrument	for	arrests	using	decriminalization.	
                                                        38	It	is	of	course	possible	that	unobservable	trends	could	evolve	non-linearly	over	time	instead	of	linearly.	
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Results		
Relationship	between	decriminalization	and	arrests	for	possession	
	 Figure	2.3	presents	an	event	study	of	the	effects	of	decriminalization	on	the	arrest	rate	for	marijuana	possession	over	time.	.	The	event	study	plots	coefficient	estimates	and	their	standard	errors	from	equation	(2)	using	arrests	for	all	males	between	20-64	years	old.	Year	“0”	in	the	graph	is	the	year	in	which	decriminalization	is	enacted.	The	coefficient	estimates	are	interpreted	relative	to	the	difference	in	the	arrest	rate	between	decriminalized	and	non-decriminalized	states	in	the	year	before	decriminalization	is	enacted.	Prior	to	the	enactment	of	decriminalization,	the	difference	in	arrest	rates	for	treated	and	untreated	states	is	close	to	zero	and	not	statistically	significant.	This	suggests	that	the	parallel	trends	assumption	necessary	for	a	causal	interpretation	of	the	difference-in-differences	estimator	is	not	violated.	In	the	year	decriminalization	is	enacted,	arrest	rates	fall	substantially	for	the	treated	states	relative	to	the	control	states.	This	figure	provides	strong	evidence	that	decriminalization	resulted	in	large	and	statistically	significant	reductions	in	arrests	for	marijuana	possession	that	is	consistent	with	a	causal	interpretation.	
The	first	panel	of	Table	2.3	shows	estimates	of	𝛽),	the	effect	of	decriminalization	on	arrests	for	marijuana	possession,	from	equation	(1).	Column	(1)	includes	only	state	and	year	fixed	effects,	column	(2)	adds	demographic	controls	(𝑊vw),	column	(3)	adds	state-specific	controls	(𝑋vw),	and	column	(4)	adds	linear-state	time	trends	(𝜙vw ∗ 𝑡).	The	last	
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column	of	Table	2.3	shows	difference-in-differences	estimates	for	the	effects	illustrated	in	Figure	2.3.	Regardless	of	the	controls,	decriminalization	is	strongly	and	negatively	associated	with	lower	arrest	rates	for	marijuana	possession	and	is	highly	statistically	significant.	The	estimates	from	the	preferred	specification	in	column	(4),	which	includes	all	controls	and	linear-state	time	trends,	indicate	that	arrests	fall	on	average	by	about	118	per	100,000,	or	57.4	percent	relative	to	the	average	arrests	for	non-decriminalized	states	(-117.98	/	205.5).	Interpreting	this	coefficient	relative	to	the	average	level	of	arrests	for	possession		in	treated	states	one	to	two	years	prior	to	decriminalization,	which	is	about	175,	translates	to	a	decline	in	the	level	of	arrests	by	about	67%.The	second	panel	shows	the	coefficient	estimates	for	the	leads	and	lags	in	Figure	2.3	and	confirms	that	the	trends	in	arrest	rates	between	treated	and	control	states	prior	to	decriminalization	are	small	and	statistically	indistinguishable	from	zero,	which	suggests	the	estimates	in	Panel	1	are	consistent	with	a	causal	interpretation.		
Table	2.4	shows	difference-in-differences	estimates	of	arrests	on	decriminalization	by	age	and	gender.	Males	and	younger	individuals	are	arrested	at	higher	rates	compared	to	females	and	older	individuals,	which	is	consistent	with	differences	in	rates	of	marijuana	use	across	groups.	Despite	differences	in	levels	across	groups,	reductions	in	arrests	are	mostly.	For	example,	the	Panel	1	indicates	that	arrest	rates	fell	by	58%,	67%,	50%,	and	68%	for	20-29,	30-39,	40-49,	and	50-64-year	old	individuals	following	decriminalization,	respectively.	Declines	across	genders	were	also	similar.	For	example,	arrests	for	young	men	fell	by	58%	and	for	young	women	by	59%	following	decriminalization.	These	estimates	suggest	widespread	declines	in	arrests	for	all	individuals	following	decriminalization,	and	therefore	that	effects	of	decriminalization	on	labor	market	outcomes	could	potentially	
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directly	impact	individuals	regardless	of	age	or	sex.	
Reduced	form	estimates	of	decriminalization	on	labor	market	outcomes	
For	each	outcome,	I	first	discuss	visual	evidence	from	event	studies	showing	the	relationship	between	decriminalization	and	each	labor	market	outcome	followed	by	a	discussion	of	numerical	estimates.	The	coefficients	and	confidence	intervals	in	event	studies	are	all	estimated	using	equation	(4).39	I	show	event	studies	because,	in	addition	to	examining	pre-trends,	understanding	how	the	effects	of	decriminalization	evolve	is	useful.	The	number	of	compliers	likely	increases	over	time	because	decimalization	decreases	the	flow	of	individuals	who	have	a	criminal	record	but	does	not	affect	the	existing	stock	of	those	with	criminal	records	(i.e.,	those	who	had	criminal	records	due	to	marijuana	possession	prior	to	decriminalization).	Theoretically,	the	estimated	effect	of	decriminalization	will	increase	as	the	number	of	compliers	increases	over	time.	
The	relationship	between	decriminalization	and	labor	force	participation	is	shown	in	Figure	2.4.	There	appears	to	be	a	jump	in	labor	force	participation	in	the	year	that	decriminalization	is	enacted,	however	the	effect	does	not	persist	(and	the	estimate	becomes	small	and	negative	in	years	two	and	three),	and	the	95%	confidence	interval	just	barely	includes	zero.	Therefore,	I	conclude	that	there	is	not	a	strong	relationship	between	decriminalization	and	labor	force	participation.	The	estimates	in	column	1	of	Table	2.5	confirm	that	the	relationship	between	decriminalization	and	labor	force	participation	is	
                                                        39	Recall	that	reduced	form	estimates	of	relationship	between	decriminalization	and	labor	market	outcomes	is	estimated	at	the	individual	CPS	respondent	level,	whereas	the	relationship	between	decriminalization	and	arrests	is	estimated	at	the	state-by-year	level.	
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small	and	insignificant.	
	 Figure	2.5	shows	the	evolution	of	the	employment-to-population	ratio	before	and	after	the	enactment	of	decriminalization.	Employment	increases	steadily	following	decriminalization	with	lagged	estimates	being	statistically	significant	at	the	5%	level.	The	point	estimates	for	differences	in	employment	prior	to	decriminalization	between	treated	and	control	states	are	all	very	close	to	zero,	and	the	confidence	intervals	always	include	zero.	The	contemporaneous	estimate	of	the	effect	of	decriminalization	on	employment	in	Table	2.5,	column	2	suggests	about	a	0.6%	increase	in	employment	(0.00456/0.746),	however	is	not	statistically	significant,	because	of	the	large	confidence	interval	on	the	pretreatment	differences.	However,	Table	2.5	Panel	II	Column	2	confirms	that	all	lags	after	the	year	of	enactment	are	statistically	different	from	zero.	The	effect	grows	over	time	from	about	0.7%	in	year	one,	to	1.2%	in	year	two,	and	about	1.4%	in	year	three	and	more.	This	provides	suggestive	evidence	decriminalization	is	associated	with	increases	in	employment.	
	 Given	the	positive	relationship	between	decriminalization	and	the	employment-to-population	ratio,	it	is	unsurprising	that	Figure	2.6	shows	a	decline	in	unemployment	following	decriminalization.	After	decriminalization,	there	is	a	statistically	significant	fall	in	unemployment	in	the	treated	states	compared	to	the	controls.	Table	2.5	Panel	I	Column	3	shows	that	unemployment	falls	by	about	0.6	percentage	points	following	decriminalization,	however	this	large	point	estimate	may	be	driven	by	relatively	lower	unemployment	rates	in	decriminalized	states	leading	up	to	decriminalization	–	two-years	prior	to	decriminalization,	treated	states	had	a	decline	in	the	unemployment	rate	by	about	a	half	
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percentage	point	relative	to	control	states.	Although	it	is	unlikely	that	states	marijuana	decriminalization	is	endogenously	related	to	changes	in	the	unemployment	rate	(or	the	employment	rate),	the	existence	of	pre-treatment	differences	suggests	that	the	estimates	in	Panel	1	should	be	interpreted	cautiously.	
	 The	effect	of	decriminalization	–	and	higher	employment	–	on	average	earnings	depends	on	the	relative	earnings	distributions	of	the	marginal	workers	(i.e.,	compliers)	shifted	into	employment	by	decriminalization	and	the	pre-treatment	earnings	distribution	of	non-marginal	workers.	(It	also	depends	on	whether	decriminalization	affects	marijuana	use,	which	I	discuss	in	the	next	section)	Compliers	are	more	likely	to	be	marijuana	users,	and	if	marijuana	users	have	lower	productivity	than	average	workers,	then	higher	employment	induced	by	decriminalization	would	be	associated	with	lower	earnings.	Moreover,	an	increase	in	the	supply	of	qualified	workers	–	where	quality	is	defined	by	not	having	a	criminal	record	–	would	put	downward	pressure	on	wages.	In	Figure	2.6,	I	find	evidence	that	decriminalization	reduces	average	weekly	earnings	and	the	effect	grows	over	time	following	decriminalization.		All	of	the	pre-treatment	differences	are	not	statistically	significant	at	the	5%	level.	The	difference-in-differences	estimate	in	column	4	of	Table	2.5	indicates	that	weekly	earnings	fall	by	about	$22,	or	about	2.5%	following	decriminalization.	As	with	employment	and	unemployment,	the	effect	on	weekly	earnings	increases	over	time.	
The	decline	in	earnings	appears	to	be	driven	by	a	decline	in	hourly	wages	(Figure	2.9),	and	not	by	a	decline	in	hours	worked	(Figure	2.8).	The	estimate	in	the	last	column	of	Table	2.5	suggests	that	decriminalization	reduces	average	wages	by	about	42	cents,	or	
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about	2.5	percent,	suggesting	that	the	whole	decline	in	real	weekly	earnings	is	due	to	lower	hourly	wages.	This	is	consistent	with	either	lower	productivity	workers	finding	employment,	or	an	increase	in	the	number	of	workers	competing	for	jobs,	which	pushes	wages	lower.	As	discussed	in	Section	6,	it	is	also	possible	that	some	of	this	decline	can	be	attributed	to	changes	in	marijuana	use.	
Heterogeneity	by	age	
	 Tables	2.6	through	2.11	examine	the	effect	of	decriminalization	on	the	six	labor	market	outcomes,	by	age.	As	in	the	overall	sample,	Table	2.6	shows	that	there	is	no	evidence	that	decriminalization	affects	labor	force	participation	for	any	age	group.	Table	2.7	suggests	a	statistically	significant	increase	in	employment	following	decriminalization	for	40-49-year	old	individuals,	but	that	this	may	be	due	to	differences	in	pre-trends	for	this	group.	The	estimated	declines	in	unemployment	in	Table	2.8	appear	less	affected	by	pre-trends	and	are	therefore	likely	more	valid.	The	difference-in-differences	point	estimates	for	unemployment	are	largest	and	most	significant	for	older	workers	(Panel	1),	and	for	all	age	groups	the	effects	are	large	and	significant	for	two	year	and	three	plus	year	lags.	Table	2.9	shows	large	reductions	in	weekly	earnings	across	the	age	distribution,	with	largest	effects	for	20-29-year	old	and	40-49-year	old	individuals.	The	cleanest	evidence,	in	terms	of	parallel	pre-trends,	is	for	the	youngest	age	group,	which	experiences	a	2.75	percent	decline	in	weekly	earnings.	Similarly,	this	decline	appears	to	not	be	driven	by	changes	in	hours	worked	(Table	2.10),	and	instead	is	the	result	of	declines	hourly	wages	for	the	younger	cohorts.	The	relative	decline	in	unemployment	for	older	cohorts	compared	to	younger	cohorts	suggests	that	lower	average	wages	and	earnings	for	younger	cohorts	could	be	
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driven	by	greater	competition	in	the	labor	market	induced	by	increases	in	the	supply	of	employable	individuals	without	criminal	records.	
	
Mechanisms	
Decriminalization	and	Marijuana	Use/Demand	Marijuana	consumption	has	been	shown	to	decrease	academic	performance,	especially	for	cognitively	intensive	courses	requiring	numerical	and	mathematical	skills	(Marie	2017).	Given	that	many	of	these	same	skills	can	translate	directly	to	a	worker’s	marginal	productivity	of	labor,	a	potential	mechanism	through	which	decriminalization	may	affect	labor	market	outcomes	is	by	increasing	marijuana	use.	Becker’s	model	of	criminal	behavior	predicts	that	lowering	the	costs	associated	with	a	behavior	(i.e.,	decreasing	criminal	penalties)	will	increase	the	likelihood	of	the	behavior	(consuming	marijuana)	for	the	marginal	agent	(Becker	1974).	Therefore,	economic	theory	dictates	that	decriminalization	should	increase	marijuana	use,	and	this	could	be	an	important	channel	through	which	decriminalization	affects	labor	market	outcomes.	To	examine	this	channel,	I	use	data	on	past	month	marijuana	usage	rates	from	the	2003-2016	National	Survey	of	Drug	Use	and	Health	(NSDUH)	to	examine	whether	decriminalization	is	statistically	related	to	changes	in	marijuana	use.40	Table	2.12	shows	difference-in-differences	estimates	of	decriminalization	on	past-month	marijuana	use	rates	from	the	NSDUH.	I	include	the	full	set	of	controls	that	are	in	the	other	models,	including	
                                                        40	Because	the	NSDUH	is	available	for	only	a	portion	of	my	full	sample	and	because	I	examine	different	age	groups	than	in	my	main	analyses,	I	show	that	the	relationship	between	decriminalization	and	arrests	is	robust	to	this	truncated	sample	in	Appendix	Table	2.1.	
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linear-state	time	trends.	For	both	younger	(20-24)	and	older	individuals	(25+),	the	relationship	between	decriminalization	and	use	is	positive.		Given	that	other	studies	use	medical	marijuana	laws	(MMLs)	as	an	instrument	for	marijuana	use,	I	also	show	the	coefficient	for	MMLs,	which	is	also	positive	(Anderson,	Hansen,	and	Rees	2013;	Y.-W.	L.	Chu	2014;	J.	J.	Sabia,	Swigert,	and	Young	2017;	J.	Sabia	and	Nguyen	2014).	For	younger	individuals	(column	1),	the	point	estimate	for	decriminalization	and	MMLs	is	similar	–	0.0114	and	0.012	–	but	only	the	effect	of	MMLs	is	statistically	significant.	For	older	cohorts	(column	2),	the	effect	of	decriminalization	is	about	twice	as	large	as	the	coefficient	on	MMLs	and	is	statistically	significant,	whereas	the	coefficient	on	MMLs	is	not.	The	coefficient	in	column	2	suggest	that	decriminalization	is	associated	with	a	16.7	percent	(0.00886	/	0.053)	increase	in	reporting	marijuana	use	in	the	last	month.	
The	NSDUH	data	have	several	limitations	for	examining	state-by-year	changes	over	time.41	In	particular,	it	only	has	two-year	averages,	which	I	average	over	to	generate	annual	estimates.42	Therefore,	to	further	examine	whether	decriminalization	affects	the	market	for	marijuana,	I	examine	the	relationship	between	decriminalization	and	marijuana	prices	(Anderson,	Hansen,	and	Rees	2013).	A	limitation	of	the	marijuana	price	data	is	that	it	covers	only	a	portion	of	my	main	sample	period,	from	2000-2011.43	I	find	that	marijuana	prices	increase	by	about	16%	(55.33	/	341.3)	following	decriminalization,	and	that	effects	are	slightly	larger	for	high-grade	marijuana.	This	suggests	that	decriminalization	is	
                                                        41	Another	limitation	of	the	NSDUH	is	that	it	only	measures	extensive	margins	of	use,	and	not	intensive	margins,	which	may	affect	labor	market	outcomes	differently.	42	For	example,	the	NSDUH	provides	data	on	marijuana	use	for	2002-2003	and	2003-2004,	and	I	estimate	use	in	2003	by	taking	the	average	of	use	in	2002-2003	and	2003-2004.	43	I	show	that	the	relationship	between	decriminalization	and	arrests	is	robust	to	this	truncated	sample	in	Appendix	Table	2.2.	
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associated	with	increased	demand	for	marijuana,	which	is	consistent	with	the	increase	in	use	found	using	the	NSDUH	data.	These	two	results	taken	together	suggest	that	one	potential	mechanism	through	which	decriminalization	could	decrease	earnings	is	through	increased	marijuana	use,	which	could	decrease	worker	productivity.	
The	finding	that	decriminalization	increases	marijuana	use	is	at	odds	with	many	studies	that	examine	first	wave	decriminalization	laws	in	the	1970s	that	found	these	laws	were	not	associated	with	changes	in	marijuana	use	rates	(MacCoun	and	Reuter	1999;	Model	1993;	Single	1989).	One	explanation	put	forward	for	why	these	early	laws	did	not	affect	use	is	that	people	were	unaware	of	the	law	changes.	Maccoun	et	al.	(2009)	found	that	whether	a	person	believed	they	could	be	jailed	for	marijuana	possession	was	very	similar	regardless	of	whether	they	lived	in	a	decriminalized	and	non-decriminalized	state.	If	lack	of	information	is	the	main	explanation	for	the	null	effect	of	decriminalization	on	use	in	the	1970s,	then	the	advancement	of	technology	through	the	2000s	may	increase	the	saliency	of	decriminalization	laws	enacted	during	the	2000s.		
Decriminalization	and	other	arrests		 Finally,	I	examine	the	relationship	between	decriminalization	and	other	arrests.	Police	officers	may	reallocate	their	resources	to	focus	on	different	types	of	arrests	following	decriminalization,	which	could	be	an	additional	channel	through	which	decriminalization	affects	labor	market	outcomes.	That	is,	if	the	total	number	of	individuals	being	arrested	remains	the	same	after	decriminalization	–	only	the	types	of	arrests	are	changing	–	then	this	suggests	that	my	findings	are	not	due	to	changes	in	the	number	of	individuals	with	criminal	records,	and	instead	points	to	either	compositional	or	marijuana	use	as	the	mechanism.	In	Table	2.14,	I	separately	examine	the	relationship	between	
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decriminalization	and	nine	different	types	of	arrests	related	to	controlled	substances.	I	find	no	statistically	significant	relationship	for	any	outcome,	except	liquor	arrests,	which	increase	by	about	18%.	Given	that	I	am	examining	nine	different	outcomes,	it	is	not	surprising	that	at	least	one	relationship	would	be	statistically	significant,	since	that	would	be	expected	by	chance.	While	some	of	the	other	coefficients	are	relatively	large,	the	confidence	intervals	all	include	zero,	and	there	does	not	appear	to	be	a	consistent	pattern	to	the	sign	of	the	effects.	This	suggests	that	police	are	not	performing	systemic	substitution	away	from	marijuana	possession	arrests	towards	other	types	of	arrests.		
	
Conclusion		
	 Recently,	many	states	have	either	legalized,	or	considered	legalizing	possession	and	consumption	of	marijuana.	One	of	the	motivating	factors	for	states	to	reduce	penalties	for	marijuana	possession	is	that,	as	advocates	like	Bernie	Sanders	argue,	an	arrest	for	a	marijuana	offense	can	destroy	somebody’s	life.	This	paper	provides	evidence	that	decriminalization	is	effective	in	reducing	the	arrest	rate	for	marijuana	possession,	and	that	decriminalization	is	associated	with	lower	unemployment	and	average	earnings.	I	find	evidence	that	unemployment	falls,	which	is	consistent	with	fewer	individuals	having	criminal	records	as	a	result	of	decriminalization.	I	also	find	that	decriminalization	is	associated	with	lower	weekly	earnings,	which	is	driven	by	lower	wages,	with	no	change	in	hours	worked.	This	is	consistent	with	the	decline	in	earnings	being	driven	by	greater	competition	in	the	labor	market	as	a	result	of	relatively	more	employable	individuals,	and	
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an	increase	in	marijuana	use	which	could	decrease	productivity.	None	of	the	estimated	effects	of	decriminalization	appear	to	be	the	result	of	changes	in	other	arrests.			 This	is	the	first	paper	to	examine	the	effect	of	reduced	penalties	for	marijuana	possession	on	labor	market	outcomes.	In	a	recent	paper,	Sabia	and	Nguyen	(2019)	find	evidence	that	increases	in	marijuana	consumption	driven	by	medical	marijuana	laws	depresses	wages	among	young	men,	but	the	effects	are	small.	Given	that	I	find	broad	declines	in	unemployment	and	earnings	for	all	age	groups	–	not	just	younger	individuals	–	suggests	that	the	decline	in	earnings	I	find	is	only	in	part	driven	by	changes	in	marijuana	use,	and	that	much	of	the	reduction	is	more	likely	attributable	to	increased	competition	in	the	labor	market,	or	changes	in	worker	productivity	affected	by	changes	in	marijuana	use.	The	particular	mechanism	is	important	to	consider	for	policy	makers	deciding	on	whether	to	remove	penalties	for	marijuana	possession.		 Policy	makers	should	interpret	the	findings	in	this	paper	holistically.	The	reduction	in	earnings	may,	on	its	surface,	sound	like	a	negative	consequence	of	decriminalization.	However,	if	the	decline	in	earnings	is	due	to	low-productivity	individuals	becoming	employed	–	in	particular,	individuals	would	have	otherwise	had	difficulty	finding	employment	due	to	criminal	records	in	the	absence	of	decriminalization	–	then	the	net	welfare	effects	of	decriminalization	on	labor	market	outcomes	would	be	positive	if	the		employment	effects	are	sufficiently	large	to	overcome	the	decline	in	productivity	and	other	negative	externalities	related	to	marijuana	use,	such	as	potential	impacts	on	health.			 	
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Figure	2.1.	Comparing	arrests	for	marijuana	possession	between	decriminalized	and	
non-decriminalized	states	2000-2016	
Notes:	Marijuana	possession	arrests	are	measured	as	the	arrest	rate	per	100,000	using	FBI	UCR	data.	Treated	states	include	the	seven	states	that	enact	marijuana	decriminalization	laws	at	any	point	throughout	2000-2016	(see	Table	2.1).	Never	treated	states	are	states	that	do	not	enact	decriminalization	laws	at	any	point	throughout	2000-2016.	Vertical	lines	mark	enactments	of	decriminalization	laws.	 	
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Figure	2.2.	Marijuana	possession	arrest	rates	for	decriminalized	states	before	and	
after	decriminalization	
Notes:	Marijuana	possession	arrests	are	per	100,000	estimated	using	2000-2016	FBI	UCR	data.	Vertical	lines	mark	the	enactment	of	a	decriminalization	law.	
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Figure	2.3.	Event	study	of	the	effects	of	decriminalization	on	marijuana	possession	
arrests	
Notes:	Each	observation	is	a	state	and	year	outcome.	Marijuana	possession	arrests	are	measured	as	the	arrest	rate	per	100,000	using	2000-2016	FBI	UCR	data	(N	=	770).	Estimates	and	confidence	intervals	are	from	a	regression	of	marijuana	possession	arrests	per	100,000	on	dummy	variables	for	leads	and	lags	of	decriminalization	using	equation	2	(1-year	lead	is	omitted	to	avoid	collinearity),	state	fixed	effects,	year	fixed	effects,	the	full	set	of	demographic	and	state-level	controls	(described	in	Table	2.3),	and	linear-state	time	trends.	Standard	errors	are	clustered	by	state.	Year	“0”	is	the	year	in	which	decriminalization	is	passed.	The	5-year	lead	dummy	turns	on	for	all	years	5+	years	before	decriminalization,	and	the	3-year	lag	dummy	turns	on	for	all	3+years	after	decriminalization.			
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Figure	2.4.	Event	study	for	the	effects	of	decriminalization	on	labor	force	
participation	rate	
	Notes:	Sample	includes	the	population	of	respondents	from	the	2000-2016	ORG	files	(N	=	3,544,221).	Estimates	and	confidence	intervals	are	from	an	individual-level	regression	of	an	indicator	for	labor	force	participation	on	dummy	variables	for	leads	and	lags	of	decriminalization	using	equation	2	(1-year	lead	is	omitted	to	avoid	collinearity),	state	fixed	effects,	year	fixed	effects,	the	full	set	of	demographic	and	state-level	controls	(described	in	Table	2.3),	and	linear-state	time	trends	 	
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Figure	2.5.	Event	study	for	the	effects	of	decriminalization	on	employment	rate	
	Notes:	Sample	includes	the	population	of	respondents	from	the	2000-2016	ORG	files	(N	=	3,544,221).	Coefficients	and	confidence	intervals	are	estimated	from	a	weighted	individual-level	regression	of	an	indicator	for	employment	on	lead	and	lag	indicators	of	decriminalization	using	equation	2	(1-year	lead	is	omitted	to	avoid	collinearity),	state	fixed	effects,	year	fixed	effects,	the	full	set	of	demographic	and	state-level	controls	(described	in	Table	2.3),	and	linear-state	time	trends.	Standard	errors	are	adjusted	for	within	state	correlation.	 	
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Figure	2.6.	Event	study	for	the	effects	of	decriminalization	on	unemployment	rate	
	Notes:	Sample	includes	employed	and	unemployed	respondents	from	the	2000-2016	ORG	files	(N	=	2,778,661).	Coefficients	and	confidence	intervals	are	estimated	from	a	weighted	individual-level	regression	of	an	indicator	for	unemployment	on	lead	and	lag	indicators	of	decriminalization	using	equation	2	(1-year	lead	is	omitted	to	avoid	collinearity),	state	fixed	effects,	year	fixed	effects,	the	full	set	of	demographic	and	state-level	controls	(described	in	Table	2.3),	and	linear-state	time	trends.	Standard	errors	are	adjusted	for	within	state	correlation.	 	
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Figure	2.7.	Event	study	for	the	effects	of	decriminalization	on	weekly	earnings	
	Notes:	Sample	includes	the	employed	respondents	from	the	2000-2016	ORG	files	for	whom	weekly	earnings	data	are	available	(N	=	2,346,671)	.	Coefficients	and	confidence	intervals	are	estimated	from	a	weighted	individual-level	regression	of	an	indicator	for	employment	on	lead	and	lag	indicators	of	decriminalization	using	equation	2	(1-year	lead	is	omitted	to	avoid	collinearity),	state	fixed	effects,	year	fixed	effects,	the	full	set	of	demographic	and	state-level	controls	(described	in	Table	2.3),	and	linear-state	time	trends.	Standard	errors	are	adjusted	for	within	state	correlation.		 	
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Figure	2.8.	Event	study	for	the	effects	of	decriminalization	on	hours	worked	
Notes:	Sample	includes	the	employed	respondents	from	the	2000-2016	ORG	files	for	whom	weekly	earnings	data	are	available	(N	=	2,536,024)	.	Coefficients	and	confidence	intervals	are	estimated	from	a	weighted	individual-level	regression	of	an	indicator	for	employment	on	lead	and	lag	indicators	of	decriminalization	using	equation	2	(1-year	lead	is	omitted	to	avoid	collinearity),	state	fixed	effects,	year	fixed	effects,	the	full	set	of	demographic	and	state-level	controls	(described	in	Table	2.3),	and	linear-state	time	trends.	Standard	errors	are	adjusted	for	within	state	correlation.		 	
  89 
Figure	2.9.	Event	study	for	the	effects	of	decriminalization	on	hourly	wages	
	Notes:	Sample	includes	the	employed	respondents	from	the	2000-2016	ORG	files	for	whom	weekly	earnings	data	 are	 available	 (N	 =	 1,369,204)	 .	 Coefficients	 and	 confidence	 intervals	 are	 estimated	 from	 a	 weighted	individual-level	regression	of	an	indicator	for	employment	on	lead	and	lag	indicators	of	decriminalization	using	equation	2	(1-year	 lead	is	omitted	to	avoid	collinearity),	state	 fixed	effects,	year	 fixed	effects,	 the	full	set	of	demographic	and	state-level	controls	(described	in	Table	2.3),	and	linear-state	time	trends.	Standard	errors	are	adjusted	for	within	state	correlation.	 	
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Table	2.2.	Summary	statistics		 N	 Mean	 S.D.	 Min	 Max	
Panel	I:	State	level	data	(2000-2016)	
Arrest	rate	per	100,000	people	(FBI	UCR)		 Marijuana	possession	 770	 199.02	 90.71	 5.35	 536.57		 Marijuana	sales/manufacturing	 770	 23.40	 15.21	 0.253	 125.31	
Policy	variables	 	 	 	 	 		 Decriminalization	 770	 0.039	 0.191	 0	 1		 Medical	marijuana	laws	 770	 0.240	 0.423	 0	 1		 Recreational	marijuana	laws	 770	 0.016	 0.124	 0	 1		 State	database	for	criminal	records	 770	 0.294	 0.456	 0	 1	
State	level	controls	 	 	 	 	 		 State	GDP	($1,000,000)	 770	 280,540	 352,616	 22,326	 2,300,793		 Minimum	wage	 770	 7.32	 0.821	 5.84	 9.81		 State	and	local	spending	($1,000,000)	 770	 8,636.9	 2,028.6	 4,518.5	 17,314		 Officers	per	100,000	 770	 183.8	 42.82	 94.56	 543.6	
Other	outcomes	 	 	 	 	 		 Marijuana	use	in	last	30	days	(ages	18-24)	 665	 0.185	 0.050	 0.080	 0.384		 Marijuana	use	in	last	30	days	(ages	25+)	 665	 0.057	 0.033	 0.021	 0.264		 Marijuana	price	per	ounce	 456	 341.74	 86.33	 50	 700		 	 	 	 	 	
Panel	II:	CPS	ORG	individual	level	data	(2000-2016)	
Outcome	variables	 	 	 	 	 	Labor	force	participation	 3,544,221	 0.778	 0.416	 0	 1	Employed	 3,544,221	 0.734	 0.442	 0	 1	Unemployed	 2,778,661	 0.057	 0.232	 0	 1	Real	weekly	earnings	(2014	$)	 2,346,671	 897.9	 653.1	 0	 4,010	Hours	worked	|	employed	 2,536,024	 28.72	 20.60	 0	 164.0	Real	hourly	wage	(2014	$)	 1,369,204	 16.74	 9.59	 0	 137.6	
Demographic	controls	 	 	 	 	 	Age	 3,544,221	 41.23	 12.58	 20	 64	Male	 3,544,221	 0.491	 0.500	 0	 1	Race	-	black	 3,544,221	 0.121	 0.327	 0	 1	Race	-	white	 3,544,221	 0.799	 0.401	 0	 1	Race	-	other		 3,544,221	 0.080	 0.271	 0	 1	Married	 3,544,221	 0.575	 0.494	 0	 1	Education	–	Some	high	school	or	less		 3,544,221	 0.115	 0.318	 0	 1	Education	–	Graduated	high	school	(or	GED)	 3,544,221	 0.298	 0.457	 0	 1	Education	–	Some	college	or	more	 3,544,221	 0.587	 0.492	 0	 1	Notes:	In	Panel	I,	each	observation	is	a	state	and	year.	In	Panel	II,	each	observation	is	an	individual	in	the	Current	Population	Survey.	Estimates	in	Panel	II	are	weighted	using	earning	weights	in	the	CPS.	
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Table	2.3.	The	effect	of	decriminalization	on	the	marijuana	arrest	rate	per	100,000	for	
marijuana	possession			 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	
Panel	1.	Difference-in-differences	estimator	Decriminalization	 -96.08***	 -96.17***	 -104.45***	 -117.98***	(11.67)	 (12.53)	 (12.15)	 (12.12)	
	
Panel	2.	Leads	and	lags	Decriminalization	5-year	lead	(and	less)	 -15.40	 -17.64	 -7.75	 15.47		 (10.11)	 (11.46)	 (9.83)	 (18.84)	Decriminalization	4-year	lead	 -5.54	 -5.17	 0.57	 8.68		 (10.47)	 (10.94)	 (11.38)	 (13.12)	Decriminalization	3-year	lead	 -3.52	 -5.46	 0.18	 5.06		 (9.67)	 (9.90)	 (8.74)	 (8.90)	Decriminalization	2-year	lead	 -2.04	 -3.54	 1.68	 4.65		 (5.11)	 (5.85)	 (5.57)	 (5.94)	Year	of	decriminalization	 -89.83***	 -91.75***	 -90.32***	 -92.82***		 (10.56)	 (9.46)	 (10.52)	 (12.14)	Decriminalization	1-year	lag	 -111.31***	 -111.42***	 -111.16***	 -112.56***		 (9.89)	 (9.19)	 (9.52)	 (10.84)	Decriminalization	2-year	lag	 -107.65***	 -108.37***	 -108.18***	 -112.45***		 (12.58)	 (12.60)	 (14.92)	 (15.59)	Decriminalization	3-year	lag	(and	longer)	 -103.25***	 -104.83***	 -102.47***	 -121.71***		 (15.45)	 (16.40)	 (18.27)	 (21.14)		 	 	 	 	Outcome	mean	|	no	decriminalization	 205.5	 205.5	 205.5	 205.5	N	 770	 770	 770	 770		 	 	 	 	State	and	year	FE	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	Demographic	controls	 No	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	State-level	policies	 No	 No	 Yes	 Yes	Linear	state	time	trends	 No	 No	 No	 Yes			Notes:	Each	observation	is	a	state-by-year	measure	of	the	marijuana	possession	arrest	rate	per	100,000.	Demographic	controls	include	state-by-year	averages	for	the	racial	distribution	of	the	population	(black,	white,	and	other),	marital	status	(married,	not	married),	age,	and	age	squared.	State-level	policies	include	average	per-capita	state	and	local	government	spending,	state	GDP,	number	of	police	of	officers	per	100,000	residents,	 medical	 marijuana	 laws,	 recreational	 marijuana	 laws,	 and	 state	 minimum	wages.	 	 Standard	errors	in	parentheses	are	clustered	by	state.	Significance	levels	are	***	1%,	**	5%,	and	*	10%.				 	
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Table	2.4.	The	effect	of	decriminalization	on	arrests	for	marijuana	possession	2000-2016	
Outcome	is	the	marijuana	possession	arrest	rate	per	100,000			 20-29	 30-39	 40-49	 50-64	
Panel	I:	All	Decriminalization	 -710.45***	 -288.23***	 -104.50***	 -41.22***	(96.86)	 (54.34)	 (16.98)	 (6.83)		 	 	 	 	Outcome	mean	|	non-Decriminalized	 1,228	 431.4	 206.9	 60.38	N	 770	 770	 770	 770	
Panel	II:	Males	Decriminalization	 -594.73***	 -239.40***	 -86.41***	 -35.92***		 (87.29)	 (47.04)	 (13.45)	 (5.69)		 	 	 	 	Outcome	mean	|	non-Decriminalized	 1,025	 349.3	 165.6	 51.14	N	 770	 770	 770	 770	
Panel	III:	Females	Decriminalization	 -120.76***	 -45.35***	 -16.62***	 -5.64***		 (19.10)	 (10.30)	 (4.17)	 (1.23)		 	 	 	 	Outcome	mean	|	non-Decriminalized	 203.2	 82.04	 41.31	 9.24	N	 770	 770	 770	 770	Notes:	Each	observation	 is	 a	 state-by-year	measure	of	 the	marijuana	possession	arrest	 rate	per	100,000.	 All	 regressions	 include	 state	 and	 year	 fixed	 effects,	 demographic	 controls,	 state-level	policies,	 and	 linear-state	 time	 trends	 (See	 notes	 to	 Table	 2.3	 for	 details).	 Standard	 errors	 in	parentheses	are	clustered	by	state.	Significance	levels	are	***	1%,	**	5%,	and	*	10%.		
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Table	2.6.	Reduced	form	estimates	of	the	effect	of	decriminalization	on	labor	force	
participation,	by	age			 20-29	 30-39	 40-49	 50-64	
Panel	1.	Difference-in-differences	estimate	Decriminalization	 -0.00538	 -0.00177	 0.00352	 0.000506		 (0.00495)	 (0.00797)	 (0.00336)	 (0.00395)			 		 		 		 			Panel	II:	Leads	and	Lags	Decriminalization	5-year	lead	(and	less)	 -0.00757	 -0.00686	 -0.0123**	 -0.00737		 (0.00989)	 (0.00541)	 (0.00600)	 (0.00660)	Decriminalization	4-year	lead	 0.00635	 -0.00833**	 -0.0127***	 -0.00239		 (0.00752)	 (0.00387)	 (0.00379)	 (0.00534)	Decriminalization	3-year	lead	 0.0113*	 -0.00131	 -0.0134***	 -0.00126		 (0.00575)	 (0.00320)	 (0.00352)	 (0.00338)	Decriminalization	2-year	lead	 0.000421	 -0.00223	 -0.00787*	 0.00537		 (0.00415)	 (0.00393)	 (0.00427)	 (0.00367)	Year	of	decriminalization	 0.00534	 4.38e-05	 0.000237	 0.00907***		 (0.00679)	 (0.00589)	 (0.00265)	 (0.00318)	Decriminalization	1-year	lag	 0.00209	 -0.00107	 -0.00178	 0.00391		 (0.00583)	 (0.00588)	 (0.00281)	 (0.00505)	Decriminalization	2-year	lag	 -0.000938	 -0.000773	 0.00257	 -0.00391		 (0.00724)	 (0.00653)	 (0.00392)	 (0.00564)	Decriminalization	3-year	lag	(and	more)	 0.000184	 -0.00208	 -0.00900*	 0.00912*		 (0.00672)	 (0.00999)	 (0.00502)	 (0.00539)		 	 	 	 	Outcome	mean	|	no	decriminalization	 0.787	 0.835	 0.840	 0.707	N	 733,213	 792,277	 876,328	 1,142,403	Notes:	Each	observation	is	a	state-by-year	measure	of	the	marijuana	possession	arrest	rate	per	100,000.	All	regressions	include	state	and	year	fixed	effects,	demographic	controls,	state-level	policies,	and	linear-state	time	trends	(See	notes	to	Table	2.3	for	details).	Standard	errors	in	parentheses	are	clustered	by	state.	Significance	levels	are	***	1%,	**	5%,	and	*	10%.			 	
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Table	2.7.	Reduced	form	estimates	of	the	effect	of	decriminalization	on	employment,	by	age			 20-29	 30-39	 40-49	 50-64	
Panel	1.	Difference-in-differences	estimate	Decriminalization	 -0.000245	 0.00202	 0.0106**	 0.00411		 (0.00549)	 (0.00804)	 (0.00407)	 (0.00429)			 		 		 		 			Panel	II:	Leads	and	Lags	Decriminalization	5-year	lead	(and	less)	 0.00978	 0.00824	 -0.0133**	 -0.00269		 (0.00967)	 (0.00649)	 (0.00608)	 (0.00742)	Decriminalization	4-year	lead	 0.0203**	 0.000402	 -0.0148***	 0.000384		 (0.00961)	 (0.00450)	 (0.00479)	 (0.00730)	Decriminalization	3-year	lead	 0.0128	 0.00747*	 -0.0177***	 0.000329		 (0.00778)	 (0.00431)	 (0.00434)	 (0.00489)	Decriminalization	2-year	lead	 0.00851	 0.00576	 -0.00926**	 0.00626*		 (0.00617)	 (0.00487)	 (0.00450)	 (0.00366)	Year	of	decriminalization	 0.00768	 -0.000249	 -0.00350	 0.00703***		 (0.00649)	 (0.00650)	 (0.00394)	 (0.00254)	Decriminalization	1-year	lag	 0.00558	 0.00733	 0.000511	 0.00855		 (0.00849)	 (0.00589)	 (0.00293)	 (0.00518)	Decriminalization	2-year	lag	 0.0130	 0.0114	 0.0153***	 0.00237		 (0.00958)	 (0.00978)	 (0.00488)	 (0.00645)	Decriminalization	3-year	lag	(and	more)	 0.0106	 0.00989	 0.00627	 0.0194***		 (0.00911)	 (0.00997)	 (0.00609)	 (0.00588)		 	 	 	 	Outcome	mean	|	no	decriminalization	 0.726	 0.795	 0.805	 0.679	N	 733,213	 792,277	 876,328	 1,142,403	Notes:	Each	observation	is	a	state-by-year	measure	of	the	marijuana	possession	arrest	rate	per	100,000.	All	regressions	include	state	and	year	fixed	effects,	demographic	controls,	state-level	policies,	and	linear-state	time	trends	(See	notes	to	Table	2.3	for	additional	details).	Standard	errors	in	parentheses	are	clustered	by	state.	Significance	levels	are	***	1%,	**	5%,	and	*	10%.			 	
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Table	2.8.	Reduced	form	estimates	of	the	effect	of	decriminalization	on	unemployment,	by	
age			 20-29	 30-39	 40-49	 50-64	
Panel	1.	Difference-in-differences	estimate	Decriminalization	 -0.00541	 -0.00431	 -0.00871***	 -0.00433**		 (0.00647)	 (0.00337)	 (0.00213)	 (0.00197)			 		 		 		 			Panel	II:	Leads	and	Lags	Decriminalization	5-year	lead	(and	less)	 -0.0215*	 -0.0183***	 0.00154	 -0.00571		 (0.0112)	 (0.00355)	 (0.00557)	 (0.00521)	Decriminalization	4-year	lead	 -0.0193*	 -0.0109***	 0.00310	 -0.00339		 (0.00982)	 (0.00328)	 (0.00488)	 (0.00537)	Decriminalization	3-year	lead	 -0.00446	 -0.0112***	 0.00599*	 -0.00204		 (0.00849)	 (0.00310)	 (0.00329)	 (0.00380)	Decriminalization	2-year	lead	 -0.0109*	 -0.00951***	 0.00261	 -0.00192		 (0.00567)	 (0.00282)	 (0.00351)	 (0.00141)	Year	of	decriminalization	 -0.00350	 0.000423	 0.00477	 0.00226		 (0.00354)	 (0.00328)	 (0.00353)	 (0.00370)	Decriminalization	1-year	lag	 -0.00462	 -0.0102***	 -0.00226	 -0.00650**		 (0.00561)	 (0.00259)	 (0.00241)	 (0.00242)	Decriminalization	2-year	lag	 -0.0188***	 -0.0148***	 -0.0155***	 -0.00778**		 (0.00527)	 (0.00513)	 (0.00264)	 (0.00339)	Decriminalization	3-year	lag	(and	more)	 -0.0147**	 -0.0147***	 -0.0176***	 -0.0142***		 (0.00553)	 (0.00397)	 (0.00276)	 (0.00399)		 	 	 	 	Outcome	mean	|	no	decriminalization	 0.0774	 0.0482	 0.0411	 0.039	N	 574,687	 660,374	 735,116	 808,484	Notes:	Each	observation	is	a	state-by-year	measure	of	the	marijuana	possession	arrest	rate	per	100,000.	All	regressions	include	state	and	year	fixed	effects,	demographic	controls,	state-level	policies,	and	linear-state	time	trends	(See	notes	to	Table	2.3	for	additional	details).	Standard	errors	in	parentheses	are	clustered	by	state.	Significance	levels	are	***	1%,	**	5%,	and	*	10%.			 	
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Table	2.9.	Reduced	form	estimates	of	the	effect	of	decriminalization	on	real	weekly	
earnings,	by	age			 20-29	 30-39	 40-49	 50-64	
Panel	1.	Difference-in-differences	estimate	Decriminalization	 -16.70**	 -17.66	 -32.42**	 -18.78		 (6.50)	 (10.97)	 (12.93)	 (16.31)			 		 		 		 			Panel	II:	Leads	and	Lags	Decriminalization	5-year	lead	(and	less)	 14.32	 11.12	 -55.83***	 -34.55**		 (29.21)	 (12.50)	 (9.090)	 (12.92)	Decriminalization	4-year	lead	 -2.677	 14.41	 -48.58***	 -25.96*		 (20.51)	 (16.35)	 (8.871)	 (13.50)	Decriminalization	3-year	lead	 9.896	 18.06	 -28.34***	 -12.77		 (13.40)	 (11.84)	 (8.558)	 (15.36)	Decriminalization	2-year	lead	 -17.27	 7.926	 -5.849	 5.963		 (14.12)	 (9.588)	 (7.748)	 (15.07)	Year	of	decriminalization	 -19.09*	 9.771	 -25.44**	 -1.008		 (11.32)	 (12.77)	 (12.36)	 (8.818)	Decriminalization	1-year	lag	 -17.83**	 -6.210	 -24.13***	 4.458		 (7.562)	 (11.36)	 (8.843)	 (10.65)	Decriminalization	2-year	lag	 -32.08***	 0.277	 -34.16**	 -14.27		 (7.459)	 (12.55)	 (16.89)	 (11.13)	Decriminalization	3-year	lag	(and	more)	 -54.48***	 -4.980	 -30.15**	 -44.73***		 (7.758)	 (11.03)	 (13.23)	 (13.26)		 	 	 	 	Outcome	mean	|	no	decriminalization	 606.3	 912.4	 997	 990.5	N	 507,701	 569,403	 615,303	 654,264	Notes:	Each	observation	is	a	state-by-year	measure	of	the	marijuana	possession	arrest	rate	per	100,000.	All	regressions	include	state	and	year	fixed	effects,	demographic	controls,	state-level	policies,	and	linear-state	time	trends	(See	notes	to	Table	2.3	for	additional	details).	Standard	errors	in	parentheses	are	clustered	by	state.	Significance	levels	are	***	1%,	**	5%,	and	*	10%.	
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Table	2.10.	Reduced	form	estimates	of	the	effect	of	decriminalization	on	hours	worked	last	
week,	by	age			 20-29	 30-39	 40-49	 50-64	
Panel	1.	Difference-in-differences	estimate	Decriminalization	 0.19	 0.05	 0.37*	 0.23		 (0.32)	 (0.50)	 (0.19)	 (0.16)			 		 		 		 			Panel	II:	Leads	and	Lags	Decriminalization	5-year	lead	(and	less)	 0.269	 0.361	 -1.132***	 -0.0953		 (0.431)	 (0.246)	 (0.392)	 (0.382)	Decriminalization	4-year	lead	 0.595	 0.00360	 -1.235***	 -0.252		 (0.427)	 (0.278)	 (0.244)	 (0.310)	Decriminalization	3-year	lead	 0.242	 0.477***	 -0.881***	 -0.174		 (0.375)	 (0.172)	 (0.324)	 (0.287)	Decriminalization	2-year	lead	 -0.111	 0.358**	 -0.359	 0.167		 (0.326)	 (0.137)	 (0.297)	 (0.160)	Year	of	decriminalization	 0.331	 -0.0141	 -0.298*	 0.244**		 (0.350)	 (0.232)	 (0.174)	 (0.109)	Decriminalization	1-year	lag	 0.151	 0.240	 -0.0206	 0.329*		 (0.479)	 (0.275)	 (0.196)	 (0.180)	Decriminalization	2-year	lag	 0.221	 0.461	 1.106***	 0.0281		 (0.496)	 (0.415)	 (0.314)	 (0.189)	Decriminalization	3-year	lag	(and	more)	 0.108	 0.306	 0.429	 0.533**		 (0.471)	 (0.367)	 (0.308)	 (0.218)		 	 	 	 	Outcome	mean	|	no	decriminalization	 26.85	 31.75	 32.61	 26.74	N	 717,039	 769,206	 850,230	 1,106,932	Notes:	Each	observation	is	a	state-by-year	measure	of	the	marijuana	possession	arrest	rate	per	100,000.	All	regressions	include	state	and	year	fixed	effects,	demographic	controls,	state-level	policies,	and	linear-state	time	trends	(See	notes	to	Table	2.3	for	additional	details).	Standard	errors	in	parentheses	are	clustered	by	state.	Significance	levels	are	***	1%,	**	5%,	and	*	10%.		
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Table	2.11.	Reduced	form	estimates	of	the	effect	of	decriminalization	on	hourly	wages,	by	
age			 20-29	 30-39	 40-49	 50-64	
Panel	1.	Difference-in-differences	estimate	Decriminalization	 -0.66***	 -0.52***	 -0.52***	 0.08		 (0.23)	 (0.16)	 (0.15)	 (0.21)			 		 		 		 			Panel	II:	Leads	and	Lags	Decriminalization	5-year	lead	(and	less)	 0.170	 -0.481	 -0.945**	 -0.624*		 (0.317)	 (0.318)	 (0.427)	 (0.330)	Decriminalization	4-year	lead	 -0.0144	 -0.300	 -0.508*	 -0.459*		 (0.179)	 (0.371)	 (0.270)	 (0.258)	Decriminalization	3-year	lead	 0.0264	 -0.413	 -0.253	 -0.0684		 (0.153)	 (0.367)	 (0.253)	 (0.293)	Decriminalization	2-year	lead	 -0.0184	 -0.434	 -0.204	 -0.402**		 (0.133)	 (0.383)	 (0.192)	 (0.165)	Year	of	decriminalization	 -0.507**	 -0.239	 -0.172	 0.0442		 (0.243)	 (0.188)	 (0.164)	 (0.111)	Decriminalization	1-year	lag	 -0.554***	 -0.371	 -0.167	 0.447**		 (0.169)	 (0.250)	 (0.178)	 (0.177)	Decriminalization	2-year	lag	 -0.698***	 -0.778***	 -0.646	 -0.421**		 (0.129)	 (0.219)	 (0.396)	 (0.194)	Decriminalization	3-year	lag	(and	more)	 -1.144***	 -0.516	 -0.615*	 -0.476*		 (0.168)	 (0.379)	 (0.350)	 (0.278)		 	 	 	 	Outcome	mean	|	no	decriminalization	 13.20	 17.28	 18.50	 18.60	N	 365,948	 317,426	 334,017	 351,813	Notes:	Each	observation	is	a	state-by-year	measure	of	the	marijuana	possession	arrest	rate	per	100,000.	All	regressions	include	state	and	year	fixed	effects,	demographic	controls,	state-level	policies,	and	linear-state	time	trends	(See	notes	to	Table	2.3	for	additional	details).	Standard	errors	in	parentheses	are	clustered	by	state.	Significance	levels	are	***	1%,	**	5%,	and	*	10%.		
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Table	2.12.	Relationship	between	decriminalization	and	marijuana	use	in	the	
NSDUH	2003-2016			 18-24	 25+	Decriminalization	 0.0114	 0.00886**		 (0.00826)	 (0.00413)	Medical	marijuana	laws	 0.0112**	 0.00412		 (0.00533)	 (0.00362)		 	 	Outcome	mean	|	no	decriminalization	 0.180	 0.053	Observations	 637	 637	Notes:	In	each	panel,	each	column	presents	estimates	from	a	separate	regression	of	average	marijuana	use	rates	in	the	past	month	from	the	NSDUH	on	an	indicator	for	decriminalization	and	all	the	controls	in	Table	2.3	Column	4	(See	notes	to	Table	2.3	for	details).	Each	observation	is	a	state	and	year.	The	demographic	controls	from	the	ACS	aggregated	to	the	state-by-year	level	and	weighted	to	be	nationally	representative.	The	sample	period	covers	2003-2016	due	to	limited	availability	of	the	NSDUH	data.	The	NSDUH	data	are	originally	cover	2-year	windows	e.g.,	2002-2003,	2003-2004,	etc.	I	generate	annual	use	rates	by	taking	the	average	of	the	overlapping	two-year	rates.	i.e.,	I	calculate	the	use	rate	for	2003	as	the	average	between	the	use	rates	in	2002-2003,	and	2003-2004.	Standard	errors	(in	parentheses)	are	clustered	by	state.	***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1		 	
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Table	2.13.	Relationship	between	decriminalization	and	marijuana	prices		 Any	grade	 High-grade	Decriminalization	 55.33***	 71.06***		 (19.32)	 (19.42)	Medical	marijuana	laws	 26.23*	 43.90		 (15.50)	 (28.36)		 	 	Outcome	mean	|	no	decriminalization	 341.3	 380.84	Observations	 456	 439	Notes:	Each	column	presents	estimates	from	a	separate	regression	of	marijuana	prices	on	an	indicator	for	decriminalization	and	the	controls	described	in	the	note	to	Table	2.3.	Marijuana	prices	are	per	ounce	of	marijuana.	Sample	covers	2000-2011.	Standard	errors	in	parentheses	are	clustered	by	state.	***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1				
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CHAPTER	3.	FROM	LOCKED	UP	TO	LOCKED	OUT:	ACCESS	TO	AFFORDABLE	
RENTAL	HOUSING	AND	CRIMINAL	RECIDIVISM		
Introduction	In	2015,	over	600,000	prisoners	were	released	from	state	and	federal	correctional	facilities	 in	 the	 United	 States	 (Carson	 and	 Anderson	 2016).	 The	 majority	 of	 released	prisoners	will	reoffend	and	be	arrested:	in	2005,	over	two-thirds	were	rearrested	and	nearly	half	 were	 returned	 to	 prison	within	 three	 years	 of	 release	 (Durose,	 Cooper,	 and	 Snyder	2014).44	 Policy	 experts	 and	 ex-offenders	 frequently	 report	 that	 a	 lack	 of	 accessible	 and	affordable	housing	is	one	of	the	most	significant	barriers	for	recently	released	offenders	to	successfully	reenter	society	(Fontaine	2013;	Fontaine	and	Biess	2012;	Gouvis	Roman	et	al.	2004).	In	addition	to	budget	and	credit	limitations,	attaining	rental	housing	is	difficult	for	many	 ex-offenders	 because	 of	 the	 discrimination45	 they	 face	 from	 landlords—especially	property	management	companies	(Evans	and	Porter	2015).46	Moreover,	black	ex-offenders	may	 face	 relatively	 more	 discrimination	 than	 white	 ex-offenders	 in	 the	 housing	 market	because	even	law-abiding	black	people	face	housing	market	discrimination	(Yinger	1986).	There	 are	 several	 reasons	 why	 estimating	 the	 effect	 of	 access	 and	 availability	 of	affordable	housing	on	recidivism	is	challenging.	First,	an	ideal	experiment	would	randomly	
                                                        44	These	estimates	are	based	on	the	Bureau	of	Justice	Statistics	(BJS)’s	most	recent	report	on	reentry	trends	in	the	U.S.	Although	I	cannot	estimate	arrest	rates	among	released	offenders	in	my	data,	the	recidivism	rates	I	estimate	between	2005	and	2015	are	very	similar	to	those	published	by	BJS.	45	By	“discrimination,”	I	mean	the	differential	treatment	by	landlords	of	two	identical	applicants	who	differ	only	with	respect	to	their	criminal	history.	The	Equal	Employment	Opportunity	Commission	discrimination	is	defined	by	preference	given	to	an	otherwise	identically	qualified	applicant	because	of	race,	color,	religion,	sex,	disability,	familial	status,	or	national	origin	however,	felons	are	not	a	protected	class.	Therefore,	I	use	the	term	“discrimination”	to	describe	differential	treatment	of	ex-offenders	with	the	caveat	that	not	renting	to	ex-offenders	is	legal	and	may	be	rational.	46	This	is	based	on	anecdotal	experiences	and	advice	provided	to	ex-offenders.	See	footnote	8	for	specific	examples.	
  105 
 
 
 
assign	 affordable	 housing	 to	 ex-offenders	 upon	 release,	 for	 example,	 through	 random	assignment	 of	 section	 8	 housing	 vouchers.47	 Unfortunately,	 not	 only	 has	 there	 been	 no	randomization	of	vouchers	to	ex-offenders,	most	ex-offenders	who	qualify48	never	receive	section-8	vouchers	or	access	to	public	housing,	because	of	the	discretion	exercised	by	public	housing	 authorities	 and	 private	 landlords	 (Tran-Leung	 2015).	 	 Even	 ex-offenders	 who	receive	a	voucher	may	be	unable	to	find	housing	if	the	marginal	landlord	has	a	sufficient	level	of	prejudice	against	them	(Charles	and	Guryan	2008).49	 	Second,	estimating	differences	in	recidivism	 rates	 between	 ex-offenders	 who	 succeed	 and	 fail	 to	 secure	 housing	 would	produce	biased	estimates	if	unobservable	characteristics	are	correlated	with	one’s	ability	to	secure	housing	and	the	probability	of	recidivating.	Longitudinally	studying	recently	released	offenders	for	such	a	study	is	especially	challenging	because	of	the	high	survey	attrition	rates	among	 these	 individuals	 (Harding	 et	 al.	 2014;	 La	 Vigne	 and	 Parthasarathy	 2005).	While	several	studies	have	evaluated	reentry	programs	that	provide	housing	to	recently	released	felons	they	fail	to	isolate	the	effect	of	housing	on	recidivism	because	they	either	suffer	from	selection	bias	(Bae,	DiZerega,	et	al.	2016)	or	they	confound	the	effect	of	housing	with	other	wraparound	services	integrated	with	the	program	(Lutze,	Rosky,	and	Hamilton	2014).		I	address	these	challenges	by	exploiting	temporal	and	geographic	variation	in	rental	markets	 to	 which	 ex-offenders	 are	 released.	 I	 use	 the	 National	 Corrections	 Reporting	Program	(NCRP),	a	large	offender-level	administrative	panel	dataset	on	prison	admissions	
                                                        47	With	section	8	vouchers,	recipients	can	use	the	vouchers	to	help	subsidize	or	fully	cover	(depending	on	income)	the	cost	of	renting	a	unit	in	public	housing,	or	in	a	private	residence	and	includes	single-family	homes,	townhomes,	and	apartments.	48	Federal	mandate	only	explicitly	and	permanently	prohibits	Federally	assisted	housing	programs	for	ex-offenders	convicted	of	manufacturing	methamphetamine	on	federally	assisted	property	(e.g.,	public	housing),	or	those	who	are	required	to	register	as	sex	offenders	for	life.	49	Even	non-offenders	with	section	8	vouchers	face	differential	treatment	and	discrimination	from	landlords	(Beck	1996).	
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and	releases,	to	identify	the	effect	of	being	released	into	communities	with	different	costs,	availability,	and	types	of	rental	housing	on	the	probability	a	released	ex-offender	recidivates.		In	particular,	I	address	the	endogeneity	of	correlation	between	rental	markets	and	labor	 markets	 by	 leveraging	 differences	 in	 rental	 markets	 for	 single-	 and	 multi-family	structures.	According	to	reentry	advice	published	in	blogs	and	in	guides	by	non-profits	for	finding	felon-friendly	housing,	ex-offenders	are	much	more	likely	to	find	landlords	of	single-family	structures	who	are	willing	to	rent	to	them,	as	opposed	to	landlords	of	multi-family	structures	who	are	more	likely	to	be	property	management	groups	that	generally	prohibit	renting	to	ex-felons.50	Assuming	that	labor	markets	affect	the	rental	market	for	single-	and	multi-family	homes	similarly51	allows	me	to	use	multi-family	rental	markets	as	a	placebo	to	which	 I	 can	 compare	 estimates	 for	 single-family	 rental	 markets	 and	 boosts	 the	 causal	interpretation	of	my	estimates.	I	control	for	a	rich	set	of	offender-level	characteristics	such	as	race,	age	at	release,	and	type	of	offense.	I	also	control	for	county-level	covariates	that	could	be	 correlated	 with	 local	 rental	 market	 conditions,	 such	 as	 labor	 market	 conditions	 and	criminal	activity.	Using	these	data,	which	contain	the	universe	of	released	offenders	 from	state	correctional	facilities	in	23	states	from	2005-2014,	I	examine	the	relationship	between	housing	and	recidivism	using	arguably	more	causal	methods	and	a	much	larger	scale	than	previous	studies.	I	show	that	black	ex-offenders	released	into	communities	with	a	greater	share52	of	affordable	 vacant	 rental	 units	 in	 single-family	 structures	 are	 significantly	 less	 likely	 to	
                                                        50	See,	for	example	https://helpforfelons.org/felon-friendly-apartments-housing/	and	https://www.forrent.com/blog/tips/renting-apartment-felony-conviction/,	both	accessed	August	31,	2018.	51	I	show	evidence	consistent	with	this	assumption	being	valid	in	Appendix	Table	3.5	52	I	define	the	share	of	affordable	vacant	rental	units	as	the	number	of	single-family	rental	units	with	rent	less	than	35%	of	median	income	that	are	available	for	rent	divided	by	the	total	number	of	single-family	rental	units	(See	equation	2).	
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recidivate,	 where	 I	 define	 recidivism	 as	 returning	 to	 prison	 within	 one	 year	 of	 release.	Specifically,	I	find	that	black	ex-offenders	who	return	to	areas	with	a	one-standard	deviation	higher	 share	of	vacant	and	affordable	 single-family	 rental	units	have	a	1.5	percent	 lower	probability	of	recidivism.	However,	 I	 find	no	evidence	that	black	ex-offenders	released	to	communities	 with	 higher	 shares	 of	 affordable	 and	 vacant	 rental	 units	 in	 multi-family	structures	are	less	likely	to	recidivate.	I	find	small	and	statistically	insignificant	effects	for	white	 ex-offenders,	 which	 is	 consistent	 with	 these	 individuals	 broadly	 facing	 lower	discrimination	than	black	people	in	the	housing	market.	This	paper	contributes	to	several	strands	of	literature.	First,	it	contributes	to	recent	work	 that	 examines	 the	 relationship	between	 local	 community	 conditions	 into	which	ex-offenders	are	released	and	the	probability	they	recidivate.	Both	Yang	(2016)	and	Schnepel	(2017)	show	that	 the	 labor	market	 into	which	an	ex-offender	 is	 released	 is	an	 important	predictor	of	recidivism.	Similarly,	policies	aimed	at	increasing	income	or	public	assistance,	such	 as	 the	 Earned	 Income	 Tax	 Credit,	 minimum	 wages,	 or	 Supplemental	 Nutrition	Assistance	Program	 (SNAP)	 in	 the	 community	 into	which	 an	 ex-offender	 is	 released	 also	reduces	 recidivism	 (Agan	 and	Makowsky	2018;	 Yang	2017).	 Increasing	 income,	 financial	resources,	and	access	to	good	paying	jobs	can	reduce	recidivism	because	they	increase	the	opportunity	 cost	 of	 illegal	 behavior.	 Similarly,	 housing	 for	 ex-offenders	 can	 increase	 the	opportunity	cost	of	illegal	behavior,	because	committing	a	crime	could	result	in	an	eviction	and	 loss	of	housing.	Reduced	housing	 costs	 could	also	 create	an	 income	effect,	 similar	 in	spirit	 to	 the	 income	effect	 from	 increases	 in	 the	minimum	wage,	 that	 lowers	 the	 relative	payoff	from	illegal	behavior	(Agan	and	Makowsky	2018).	
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Second,	it	contributes	to	work	on	discrimination	against	felons	in	housing,	which	is	often	performed	using	audit	and	correspondence	studies.	My	findings	are	consistent	with	those	of	Evans,	Blount-Hill,	and	Cubellis	(2018)	who	find	that	ex-felons	are	significantly	less	likely	to	be	considered	as	prospective	tenants.	Specifically,	I	find	that	ex-offenders	released	into	areas	with	less	tight	rental	markets,	where	landlords	may	be	less	likely	to	discriminate	(Hanson	and	Hawley	2014),	are	less	likely	to	recidivate.	Last,	this	paper	is	related	to	work	on	discrimination	against	black	people	in	housing,	which,	as	with	race,	is	often	measured	using	audit	and	correspondence	studies.	Hanson	and	Hawley	(2011)’s	matched	pair	audit	study	finds	that	black	people	face	greater	discrimination	by	 landlords	 for	units	 in	multi-family	buildings	however,	 they	do	not	 test	 for	differences	across	 felony	 status.	My	 findings	 tie	 together	 these	 two	 strands	 of	 literature	 on	 housing	discrimination	by	examining	the	effect	of	housing	discrimination	at	the	intersection	of	race	and	felony	status.53	I	find	no	evidence	that	the	share	of	affordable	housing	affects	recidivism	rates	for	white	ex-offenders,	which	is	consistent	with	Hanson	and	Hawley	(2011)’s	finding	that	landlords	discriminate	less	against	white	applicants.54	The	remainder	of	this	paper	is	organized	as	follows:	Section	2	provides	background	on	 the	 relationship	 between	 housing	 and	 recidivism	 and	 discusses	 previous	 studies	 that	examine	the	effect	of	housing	provision	on	recidivism.	Section	3	presents	the	data	and	the	
                                                        53	Using	an	audit	study,	Evans,	Blount-Hill,	and	Cubellis	(2018)	do	not	find	statistical	differences	in	consideration	by	landlords	between	black	and	white	testers	pretending	to	be	felons,	but	the	study	does	not	have	a	large	enough	sample	size	to	detect	even	moderate	differences.	The	raw	differences	they	report	are	consistent	with	landlords	exercising	greater	discrimination	against	black	felons	compared	to	white	felons.	Moreover,	they	do	not	examine	differences	across	units	in	single-	and	multi-family	housing	structures.		54	An	alternative	explanation	may	be	that	black-white	differences	in	family	structure,	support,	and	resources	upon	release	affects	one’s	reliance	on	the	rental	market.	
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identification	strategy.	Section	4	presents	the	model	used	to	estimate	the	results	presented	in	section	5,	and	Section	6	concludes.		
Background	
The	Link	Between	Housing	Instability	and	Reoffending	I	model	an	ex-offender’s	decision	 to	 recidivate	using	a	 simple	Becker	 (1974)	 style	framework.	Ex-offender	i	will	reoffend	if	w∗ < w	where	w∗	is	the	net	payoff	from	legal	activity	and	w	is	the	expected	net	payoff	from	illegal	activity.	An	increase	in	income	or	employment	 increases	 w∗,	 which	 decreases	 the	 marginal	 ex-offender’s	 probability	 of	reoffending	and	recidivism.	Similarly,	there	are	several	ways	in	which	housing	can	increase	w∗	and	subsequently	reduce	recidivism.		First,	 if	 housing	 is	 complementary	 to	 finding	 and	 maintaining	 employment,	 then	increasing	the	likelihood	of	securing	housing	could	increase	w∗	solely	through	its	effect	on	employment.	Housing	is	a	basic	necessity	for	sleeping	comfortably,	showering,	and	storing	clean	clothes	and	compromising	any	of	these	necessities	increases	the	difficulty	of	finding	and	maintaining	employment.	Without	a	stable	address,	ex-offenders	face	additional	hurdles	in	 filling	 out	 job	 applications,	 even	 in	 states	 that	 have	banned-the-box55	 (Agan	 and	 Starr	2016).	And,	in	some	cases,	employment	may	be	conditional	on	having	a	reliably	permanent	living	arrangement	(Bradley	et	al.	2001).	Programs	like	“housing	first”56	are	designed	around	the	complementarity	between	housing	and	achieving	other	goals	correlated	with	successful	
                                                        55	Ban-the-box	policies	make	it	unlawful	for	employers	to	ask	job	applicants	about	their	criminal	history	until	they	make	an	offer	to	the	applicant.	It	effectually	removes	the	box	on	job	applications	that	asks	if	the	applicant	has	been	convicted	of	a	felony.	56	“Housing	first”	policies	are	human	services	programs	based	around	the	idea	that	it	is	necessary	to	establish	stable	housing	as	a	foundation	before	providing	any	other	social	services	to	rehabilitate	individuals,	such	as	job	finding	assistance.	The	application	of	these	policies	is	not	limited	to	ex-offenders,	but	any	at-risk	group.	
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reentry,	like	employment	(Fontaine	and	Biess	2012;	Meredith	et	al.	2003;	La	Vigne,	Visher,	and	 Castro	 2004).	 In	 a	 randomized	 experiment	 that	 allocated	 “Housing	 first”	accommodations57	 for	extremely	at-risk	homeless	 individuals,	Somers	et	al.	 (2013)	 found	that	 housing	 first	 accommodations	 significantly	 reduced	 the	 number	 of	 convictions	 per	person.	There	are	 two	primary	differences	between	Somers	et	 al.	 (2013)	 and	 this	paper.	First,	 I	 focus	 on	 felons	 released	 from	 prison,	 whereas	 Somers	 et	 al.	 (2013)	 focuses	 on	individuals	who	were	homeless	or	precariously	housed	and	suffered	from	a	mental	health	disorder.	Second,	I	focus	on	recidivism,	defined	as	returning	to	prison	whereas	Somers	et	al.	(2013)	 examines	 convictions.	 Moreover,	 the	 treatments	 in	 this	 study	 provided	 other	psychiatric	care,	primary	healthcare,	and	social	and	vocational	rehabilitation	programs.		Second,	returning	to	an	area	with	lower	rental	housing	costs	can	have	a	direct	income	effect	that	increases	w∗.	Increases	in	public	assistance	for	ex-offenders	and	increases	in	the	minimum	wage,	which	 increases	 income	 for	many	of	 the	 jobs	available	 to	 low-skilled	ex-offenders,	 have	both	been	 shown	 to	 reduce	 recidivism	 (Agan	and	Makowsky	2018;	Yang	2017).	Therefore,	ex-offenders	returning	to	areas	where	housing	is	less	of	a	financial	burden	may	be	less	likely	to	recidivate.	Third,	attaining	stable	housing	may	increase	the	non-monetary	payoff	to	legal	activity	by	decreasing	the	psychological	stress	associated	with	residential	instability	or	by	enabling	ex-offenders	 to	 escape	 risky	 living	 environments,	 especially	 if	 these	 environments	contributed	to	previous	offending.	These	risky	living	environments	may	include	things	like	living	with	other	ex-offenders	who	are	struggling	with	reentry,	drug	users,	or	 individuals	
                                                        57	Somers	et	al.	(2013)	characterize	Housing	first	accommodations	as	“rapid	rehousing	in	permanent,	market	accommodations	without	requirements	around	sobriety	or	treatment	adherence	and	facilitating	access	to	specific	resources	(e.g.,	health,	social,	vocational)	to	support	the	attainment	of	client	centered	goals.”	
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engaging	in	criminal	activity.	Ex-offenders	who	are	able	to	escape	these	environments	and	live	on	their	own,	or	with	other	better	individuals,	may	have	more	success	reentering	society.	Many	ex-offenders	suffer	from	mental	health	and	substance	abuse	issues	that	require	long-term	treatment	before	and	after	release,	and	the	stress	of	residential	 instability	can	place	additional	burdens	that	can	compromise	these	treatments	(Bradley	et	al.	2001).		
Barriers	to	Finding	Housing	Ex-offenders	 face	 high	 rates	 of	 residential	 instability	 following	 release	 from	 a	correctional	facility.	A	2004	report	by	the	Urban	Institute	that	followed	400	male	inmates	found	that	31	percent	of	respondents	did	not	have	a	place	to	live	upon	release	(La	Vigne,	Visher,	and	Castro	2004).	Three	quarters	of	these	individuals	reported	needing	some	help	or	a	lot	of	help	finding	housing.	Upon	release,	60-80	percent	of	ex-offenders	rely	on	living	with	parents,	family	members,	or	intimate	partners	(Durose,	Cooper,	and	Snyder	2014;	Roman	et	al.	2006;	La	Vigne	and	Parthasarathy	2005;	La	Vigne,	Visher,	and	Castro	2004).		Many	ex-offenders	are	financially	burdened	by	debt	accrued	while	incarcerated	and	with	fines	associated	with	their	offense	that	make	it	challenging	to	afford	housing	(Bannon,	Nagrecha,	and	Diller	2010;	Beckett	and	Harris	2011).	As	discussed	above,	ex-offenders	who	are	able	to	 find	housing	that	 is	relatively	more	affordable	may	be	 less	 likely	to	recidivate	because	it	would	increase	w∗.	
Housing	Discrimination	Against	Ex-Offenders	There	 are	 two	main	 types	 of	 discrimination	 that	 ex-offenders	 face	 in	 the	 housing	market:	customer	discrimination	and	direct	discrimination.58	When	faced	with	two	potential	
                                                        58	Discrimination	against	ex-offenders	in	housing	is	not	illegal,	because	ex-offenders	are	not	a	protected	group	under	the	Fair	Housing	Act.	On	April	4,	2016,	Housing	of	Urban	Development	(HUD)	issue	guidance	to	
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tenants	 who	 differ	 only	 in	 ex-offender	 status,	 a	 landlord	 who	 practices	 customer	discrimination	would	choose	the	non-offender	because	the	landlord	believes	his	or	her	other	existing	 or	 future	 tenants	 will	 be	 uncomfortable	 living	 near	 an	 ex-offender.	 Customer	discrimination	is	most	frequently	exercised	by	landlords	who	manage	rental	units	in	multi-family	structures,59	because	of	the	close	proximity	of	neighbors	and	potential	future	tenants	who	may	have	a	distaste	for	living	near	members	of	an	undesirable	or	minority	group,	such	as	 black	 people	 or	 ex-offenders	 (Yinger	 1986).	 Landlords	 may	 also	 practice	 direct	discrimination	 against	 ex-offenders,	 which	 is	 defined	 as	 landlords	 choosing	 to	 rent	 to	relatively	less	qualified	non-ex-offenders	instead	of	a	more	qualified	ex-offender	because	of	personal	distaste	for	ex-offenders.	Unlike	with	customer	discrimination,	there	is	little	reason	to	think	that	 the	distribution	of	direct	discriminating	 landlords	varies	significantly	across	single-	and	multi-family	housing,.	A	 number	 of	 information	 guides	 produced	 to	 aid	 newly	 released	 offenders	 find	housing	suggest	that	property	management	companies,	as	opposed	to	private	landlords,	are	much	more	likely	to	discriminate	against	ex-offenders.	Because	most	units	in	multi-family	structures	are	managed	by	property	management	companies,	ex-offenders	are	advised	to	look	 for	units	 in	 single-family	 structures	because	 they	are	more	 likely	 to	be	managed	by	individuals	instead	of	property	management	companies.	This	is	a	critical	difference	because	individual	land	lords	are	reportedly	more	flexible	with	applicants	with	criminal	convictions,	whereas	property	management	companies	frequently	have	strict	guidelines	that	restrict	ex-
                                                        landlords	to	reduce	discrimination	against	applications	with	felony	convictions.	See:	https://www.hud.gov/sites/documents/HUD_OGCGUIDAPPFHASTANDCR.PDF	accessed	September	3,	2018.	59	Multi-family	structures	are	defined	as	structures	with	two	or	more	rental	units,	like	a	duplex	(two	units)	or	an	apartment	building	(more	than	two	units).	
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offenders	as	potential	tenants.60	One	such	guide	says	“Don’t	waste	your	time	with	Property	Management	Groups”	and	to	“stay	away	from	large	apartment	complexes.”	(Felon	Friendly	Apartments,	2018)	Recent	audit	studies	provide	evidence	consistent	with	landlords	exercising	customer	discrimination	 against	 minorities.	 In	 particular,	 they	 find	 that	 rental	 discrimination	 is	highest	against	black	people	for	units	that	are	part	of	a	larger	building,	 like	an	apartment	complex	(Hanson	and	Hawley	2011,	2014).	They	also	find	that	discrimination	against	black	people	 is	 higher	 in	 areas	with	 low-vacancy	 rates,	which	 is	 consistent	with	 tighter	 rental	markets	enabling	landlords	to	discriminate	more	against	minorities.	To	the	extent	that	both	ex-offenders	and	other	minorities	face	discrimination	in	the	housing	market,	this	pattern	of	discrimination	may	be	generalizable	to	ex-offenders	as	well,	particularly	black	ex-offenders.		In	addition	to	customer	discrimination,	there	are	other	reasons	that	landlords	could	refuse	to	rent	to	an	ex-offender	that	would	not	necessarily	result	in	an	inefficient	allocation	of	resources.	For	example,	landlords	may	accurately	believe	that	applicants	with	felony	drug	convictions	are	more	likely	to	use,	distribute,	or	manufacture	drugs	in	their	residence	and	therefore	choose	not	to	rent	to	them.	Landlord	discrimination	becomes	inefficient	when	fully	rehabilitated	ex-offenders	receive	lower	consideration	than	otherwise	less-qualified	non-ex-offender	applicants,	everything	else	held	constant,	especially	in	single-family	housing	where	customer	discrimination	should	play	little	or	no	role	in	rental	decisions.	
Local	Housing	Interventions	for	Ex-offenders	
                                                        60	For	examples	of	these	guides,	see	https://helpforfelons.org/felon-friendly-apartments-housing/,		https://homeguides.sfgate.com/rental-housing-felony-8428.html,	and	for	a	question	and	answer	on	the	topic	from	Trulia,	see	https://www.trulia.com/voices/Property_QandA/i_have_felonies_on_my_record_how_do_i_find_a_place-331961		
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Within	 the	 past	 decade,	 there	 have	 been	 several	 local	 interventions	 aimed	 at	 ex-offenders	 that	 have	 included	 housing	 provisions,	 but	 none	 of	 the	 evaluations	 of	 these	programs	have	been	able	 to	 isolate	 a	 treatment	 effect	 for	housing	on	 recidivism	without	being	 confounded	 by	 wraparound	 services	 or	 selection	 bias.	 The	 Reentry	 Housing	 Pilot	Program	 (RHPP)	 in	Washington	 state	provided	housing	and	wraparound	 services	 to	208	high	 risk/need	 ex-offenders	 leaving	 prison	 without	 a	 place	 to	 live.	 Lutze	 et	 al.	 (2014)	estimated	the	program’s	effect	using	propensity	score	matching	and	found	that	participants	were	14	percentage	points	less	likely	to	recidivate.	However,	this	estimated	treatment	effect	does	 not	 isolate	 the	 impact	 of	 housing,	 because	 the	 program	 also	 provided	 targeted	treatment	 services,	 offender	 accountability	 strategies,	 and	 coordinated	 reentry	 services	between	law	enforcement	agencies	and	corrections	departments	at	each	pilot	site.	Moreover,	assignment	to	the	pilot	was	voluntary	and	may	suffer	from	sample	selection.61		Studies	 by	 the	 Vera	 Institute	 of	 Justice	 have	 also	 focused	 on	 housing	 as	 part	 of	 a	successful	reentry	program.	The	most	relevant	to	my	paper	is	a	study	that	evaluates	the	New	York	City	Housing	Authority’s	Family	Reentry	Pilot	Program	(FRPP)	(Bae,	et	al.	2016).	But,	as	with	Lutze	et	al.	(2014),	Bae,	et	al.	(2016)	fails	to	isolate	the	effect	of	FRPP	on	recidivism	from	other	wrap	around	services	and	the	treatment	is	not	randomized	across	participants.	Therefore,	to	date,	there	have	been	no	local	housing	interventions	that	focus	solely	on	the	effect	of	housing	on	recidivism.		
                                                        61	If	participants	positively	selected	into	the	program	based	on	unobservable	characteristics	that	were	correlated	with	lower-than-average	recidivism	rates	in	the	absence	of	treatment	(e.g.,	they	could	have	been	highly	motivated	to	successfully	reenter	society),	then	appropriate	counterfactuals	using	propensity	score	matching	using	only	observed	characteristics	would	result	in	the	program’s	effect	being	biased	upward.	The	selection	bias	could	be	negative	if	those	with	higher-than-average	risk	of	recidivism	choose	to	volunteer	for	the	program,	because	they	think	they	need	more	assistance	than	other	ex-offenders.	
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Data		
National	Corrections	Reporting	Program	(NCRP)	I	measure	recidivism	using	 the	National	Corrections	Reporting	Program	(NCRP)–a	large	offender-level	administrative	dataset	produced	by	the	Bureau	of	Justice	Statistics	(BJS).	Until	several	years	ago,	the	NCRP	was	cross-sectional,	which	made	it	impossible	to	precisely	identify	when	or	 if	previously	released	offenders	returned	to	the	prison	system.	Over	the	past	several	years,	BJS	has	partnered	with	ABT	Associates	to	create	“term	record”	files	with	unique	inmate	identification	numbers.	Each	term	record	lists	a	prisoner’s	date	of	admittance,	and	if	applicable,	their	date	of	release.62	Pooling	annual	term	record	files	creates	a	panel	of	prisoner	releases	for	which	I	observe63	recidivism	between	2005-201464	(Bureau	of	Justice	Statistics,	2016).	In	addition	to	having	term	record	files	for	a	large	number	of	offenders	over	time,	 the	NCRP	data	are	well	 suited	 to	 study	recidivism	because	 they	 identify	 the	county	where	sentences	are	imposed,	which	for	over	ninety	percent	of	offenders	is	the	county	to	which	offenders	return	and	reside	(Sabol,	Couture,	and	Harrison	2007;	Schnepel	2017;	Yang	2016).		I	define	an	ex-offender	as	recidivating	within	one	year	of	being	released	if	the	offender	is	released	from	prison	at	time	t	and	is	readmitted	to	prison	at	a	date	on	or	after	their	release	date,65	and	before	time	t + n	where	n ≤ 	365	days.	For	recidivism	within	two	years,	I	replace	
                                                        62	In	these	data,	some	offenders	are	admitted	but	not	released	from	a	correctional	facility	(i.e.,	they	are	still	incarcerated).	For	these	offenders,	their	date	of	release	is	not	populated.		63	To	observe	whether	an	offender	recidivates	within	one	year,	data	on	admissions	through	one-year	post	release	are	required.	Therefore,	even	though	the	NCRP	data	extend	through	2015,	I	cannot	examine	1-year	recidivism	outcomes	for	those	released	in	2015	because	I	do	not	observe	whether	they	are	reincarcerated	in	2016.	64	The	NCRP	data	is	available	starting	in	2000,	but	I	only	examine	data	from	2005-2014	because	the	ACS	only	contain	county	identifiers	beginning	in	2005.	65	In	some	cases,	a	release	date	for	a	prisoner’s	term	will	be	the	same	as	the	admittance	date	for	the	prisoner’s	subsequent	term.	This	almost	always	occurs	when	the	date	of	release	and	admittance	are	coded	as	the	“15th”	of	the	month,	so	I	interpret	these	as	imprecise,	possibly	imputed,	dates.	I	code	such	instances	as	a	recidivism.	
  116 
 
 
 
365	with	730,	and	for	three	years,	with	1,095.66	Table	3.1	Panel	1	shows	average	one-,	two-,	and	three-year	recidivism	rates.	On	average,	29.5	percent	of	released	offenders	recidivate	within	one	year,	40.9	percent	within	two	years,	and	46.6	percent	within	three	years.	The	probability	that	an	offender	recidivates	is	highest	when	first	released	and	steadily	declines	over	time	(see	Figure	3.1).	In	addition	to	tracking	each	inmate’s	date	of	release	and	admission	to	prison	within	a	state	over	time,	the	NCRP	also	contains	rich	sentencing,	offense,	and	demographic	data.	I	use	admission	and	release	date	data	to	calculate	the	amount	of	time	the	offender	actually	serves	before	being	released	and	 include	this	as	a	control	 in	 the	models	 I	estimate.	 I	also	define	controls	for	the	type	of	facility	an	offender	is	released	from,	such	as	state	prison	or	a	halfway	house.	 The	 majority	 of	 offenders	 in	 my	 sample	 are	 released	 are	 from	 state	 prison	 (87	percent)	and	about	4	percent	are	from	local	jails.	The	primary	offense	of	conviction	carrying	the	 longest	sentence	is	provided	for	all	offenders.	There	are	165	different	categories	of	offenses	in	the	NCRP.	Because	some	offense	categories	have	very	few	observations,	I	generate	indicator	variables	for	each	inmate’s	most	serious	offense67	by	aggregating	offenses	to	six	broad	classifications:	violent,	property	crime,	drug	possession,	drug	 trafficking,	 sexual,	 and	other.	These	six	 classifications	 fully	 classify	each	inmate’s	offense	for	all	of	the	165	original	offense	categories.	Coding	offenses	in	this	way	 is	 also	 useful	 for	 performing	 offense	 heterogeneity	 analyses.	 The	 modal	 offense	 is	
                                                        66	As	a	result	of	how	recidivism	is	defined,	an	additional	year	of	data	on	releases	from	the	end	of	each	state’s	sample	is	lost	for	every	additional	year	added	to	the	recidivism	window.	67	An	inmate’s	most	serious	offense	is	defined	as	the	offense	for	which	he	or	she	is	serving	the	longest	sentence.	
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property,	which	constitutes	36.7	percent	of	offenders,	 followed	by	drug	 trafficking	(12.8)	and	drug	possession	offenders	(12.8).		Offender-level	demographic	data	in	the	NCRP	includes	date	of	birth	(which	I	use	to	calculate	age	at	release),	race,	education,	Hispanic	ethnicity,	and	sex	(see	Table	3.1	Panel	1).	I	create	indicator	variables	for	the	following	races:	white,	black,	Asian,	and	other.	The	highest	degree	 achieved	by	 an	 inmate	 is	 available	 for	 1,198,124	 term	 records,	which	 constitutes	about	half	the	sample.	Because	education	is	missing	frequently,	I	do	not	include	it	as	a	control	in	my	main	specifications,	but	I	do	show	that	my	main	estimates	are	robust	to	including	it	(Appendix	Table	3.8).	I	implement	several	sample	restrictions	to	the	raw	NCRP	data.	First,	I	drop	data	from	California	after	October	1,	2011,	because	of	the	enactment	of	AB109	and	AB117,	commonly	referred	to	as	realignment.	Realignment	resulted	in	non-serious	offenders	being	moved	from	state	prison	to	local	correctional	facilities.68	In	the	NCRP,	offenders	who	were	transferred	to	local	correctional	facilities	appear	in	the	data	as	releases,	but	because	they	were	not	in	fact	being	released	to	the	public	–	they	were	being	transferred	to	local	facilities	–	the	estimated	recidivism	 rate	 is	 substantially	 lower	 in	 California	 after	 October	 1,	 2011.	 Second,	 I	 drop	counties	with	fewer	than	one-hundred	releases	to	eliminate	treatments	(i.e.,	counties)	with	small	sample	sizes.	Third,	I	drop	all	releases	due	to	death	of	the	offender.	Fourth,	I	drop	all	term	 record	 files	where	 the	 county	of	 sentencing	 identifier	 is	missing,	 because	 these	 are	required	to	link	rental	market	characteristics	to	released	offenders.	Fifth,	I	limit	the	sample	to	 complete	 cases	 by	 dropping	 observations	 with	 missing	 data	 on	 controls	 (except	education).	In	my	final	sample,	I	have	2,131,127	term	record	files	for	which	I	can	estimate	
                                                        68	I	retain	records	from	California	prior	to	the	enactment	of	realignment.	
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recidivism	within	one-year.	Appendix	Table	3.1	tabulates	the	states	and	years	for	which	data	on	recidivism	rates	for	released	offenders	are	available	in	the	NCRP	from	2005-2014	after	imposing	these	sample	restrictions,	and	Appendix	Table	3.2	shows	average	recidivism	rates	by	state	and	year.		
American	Community	Survey	(ACS)	I	 use	American	Community	 Survey	 (ACS)69	 data	 from	2005-2014	 for	 two	primary	categories	 of	 county-by-year	 level	 data:	 rental	 market	 indicators	 and	 labor	 market	conditions.	For	all	ACS	variables,	I	calculate	the	mean	by	county	and	year	before	combining	this	data	with	the	NCRP.	
Rental	market	indicators	I	generate	rental	market	indicators–the	regressors	of	interest–for	different	types	of	rental	units	and	the	share	of	units	that	are	affordable	and	vacant	(i.e.,	currently	available	for	rent).	Monthly	rent	is	measured	in	the	ACS	by	responses	to	“What	is	the	monthly	rent	for	this	house,	apartment,	or	mobile	home?”	I	generate	an	inflation	adjusted	measure	of	rent	for	all	units	and	for	a	subset	of	units	that	are	vacant,	identified	as	“for	rent	or	for	sale.”70	The	ACS	also	asks	respondents	“Which	best	describes	this	building?”	I	identify	rental	units	in	single-family	structures	when	the	response	is	either	“A	one-family	house	detached	from	any	other	house,”	“A	one-family	house	attached	to	one	or	more	houses,”	or	“Mobile	home	or	trailer.”	I	identify	units	in	multi-family	structures	when	the	building	has	two	or	more	units	(e.g.,	2+	family	building).	I	calculate	the	share	of	affordable	rental	units	as	follows:	
                                                        69	ACS	data	was	accessed	and	downloaded	through	IPUMS	(Ruggles	et	al.	2017).	70	Ideally,	I	want	to	examine	only	units	available	for	rent,	but	the	ACS	does	not	separate	units	for	rent	and	those	for	sale.	
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ShareAffordableª« = 	 ¬­®¯	|	±²³´¯µ.:∗¶·¸¹Q¹º®¯¬­®¯ 	 	 	 (1)	Where	Nª«	 is	 the	number	of	 rental	units	 in	county	c	 and	year	 t	 in	s	 is	 the	 type	of	structure	(single-family,	multi-family,	or	any).	The	numerator	is	the	number	of	rental	units	with	rent	below	35	percent	of	median	income,	which	I	define	as	the	threshold	of	affordability.	This	 is	 five-percentage	 points	 higher	 than	 the	 Housing	 and	 Urban	 Development	 (HUD)	definition	of	“affordable”,	because	HUD’s	definition	includes	utilities	in	the	price	of	rent.7172	Therefore,	to	be	consistent	in	the	rental	price	measures	I	use	for	vacant	and	occupied	units,	I	use	the	rental	measure	that	excludes	utility	costs.	The	calculation	of	affordable	housing	defined	in	equation	(1)	does	not	account	for	the	vacancy	status	(i.e.,	whether	a	unit	is	available	for	rent)	of	each	affordable	unit.	The	vacancy	status	of	an	affordable	unit	is	important	because	ex-offenders	who	return	to	an	area	with	a	high	rate	of	affordable	housing	may	still	be	unable	to	find	housing	if	the	market	is	sufficiently	tight.	Therefore,	I	calculate	the	share	of	affordable	and	vacant	units:	ShareAffordableVacantª« = 	 ¬­®¯	|	±²³´¯µ.:∗¶·¸¹Q¹º®¯	&	À¸¸¹«¬­®¯ 	 (2)	The	only	difference	between	equation	(1)	and	equation	(2)	is	that	the	latter	restricts	the	number	of	affordable	units	in	the	numerator	to	be	vacant	units.	I	also	use	equation	(2)	to	define	 shares	 of	 vacant	 affordable	 rental	 housing	 separately	 for	 single-family	 and	multi-family	rental	units.	This	indicator	captures	rental	market	tightness	for	affordable	units.	The	
                                                        71	HUD	defines	affordable	housing	as	“In	general,	housing	for	which	the	occupant(s)	is/are	paying	no	more	than	30	percent	of	his	or	her	income	for	gross	housing	costs,	including	utilities.”	https://www.huduser.gov/portal/glossary/glossary_a.html	Accessed	August	27,	2018.	Because	the	rental	cost	for	vacant	units	in	the	ACS	does	not	include	utilities,	I	add	5	percent	to	HUD’s	baseline	definition	of	affordability.	72	While	the	ACS	does	provide	a	measure	of	rent	called	gross	rent	that	includes	utilities,	this	measure	is	not	provided	for	vacant	rental	units.	
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average	share	of	affordable	vacant	rental	units	in	my	sample	is	about	4	percent	(Table	3.1	Panel	2).	It	is	lowest	for	single-family	units	(2	percent),	and	highest	for	multi-family	units	(4.8	percent),	which	is	consistent	with	the	distribution	of	rent	for	vacant	single-family	units	being	to	the	right	of	the	distribution	of	rent	for	multi-family	units	(Appendix	Figure	3.2).	Labor	Market	Controls.	To	help	disentangle	 the	simultaneity	between	rental	markets	and	 labor	markets,	 I	include	 labor	market	controls	 from	the	ACS	for	the	 four	 industries	most	 likely	to	hire	ex-offenders	 (the	 estimated	 share	 of	 firms	 within	 each	 industry	 that	 hire	 ex-offenders	 as	reported	 in	 Lichtenberger	 (2006)	 are	 in	 parentheses):	 manufacturing	 (21.66%),	construction	 (19.89%),	 food	 service	 (16.62%),	 and	 administrative	 and	 support	 services	(14.28%).	For	each	industry	i	and	county	c,	I	calculate	the	share	of	employed	workers	who	report	working	 in	 industry	 i,	 the	unemployment	rate	 for	workers	who	report	working	 in	industry	i,	and	the	inflation-adjusted	monthly	income	of	workers	employed	in	industry	i.73	Table	 3.1	 Panel	 2	 presents	 summary	 statistics	 for	 these	 labor	 market	 controls.	 All	 four	industries	combined	account	for	over	20	percent	of	the	overall	labor	force.	Unemployment	rates	within	each	industry	vary	from	a	low	of	5.7	percent	in	administrative	jobs	to	a	high	of	12.2	in	construction.74	Average	income	also	differs	substantially	across	the	four	industries.	Workers	in	the	food	service	industry	earn	about	$1,100	a	month,	which	is	less	than	half	of	average	earnings	in	the	other	three	industries.	The	highest	income	is	reported	by	those	in	administrative	work	who	earn	$2,474	per	month	on	average.		
                                                        73	I	determine	industry	using	the	variable	“occ2010,”	which	harmonizes	the	coding	of	occupations	using	the	Census	Bureau’s	2010	ACS	occupational	classification.		74	The	high	unemployment	rate	for	the	construction	industry	is	not	surprising	considering	the	sample	includes	the	Great	Recession.	
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Identification	and	Methodology	I	 estimate	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 rental	 market	 into	 which	 an	 offender	 is	released	and	the	probability	the	offender	returns	to	prison	by	estimating	the	following	model	by	least	squares:	𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒8Áw = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒Áw + 𝛿𝑋8Áw + 𝛾𝑊Áw + 𝜅Á + 𝜓w + 𝑒8Áw	 			(3)	The	left-hand	side	of	(3)	is	an	indicator	equal	to	one	if	offender	𝑗	who	is	released	from	a	 correctional	 facility	 in	 county	𝑐	 in	year	𝑡	 reenters	prison	within	one	year.	The	variable	𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒Áw	 represents	 the	 rental	market	 indicator	 in	 equation	 (1)	 and	 (2).	When	it	equals	the	measure	in	equation	(1),	𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒	is	included	in	separate	estimations	of	equation	(3).	When	it	equals	the	measure	in	equation	(2),	both	single-	and	multi-family	measures	are	used	in	the	same	model,	to	capture	the	complete	rental	market.	It	is	potentially	important	to	control	for	multi-family	housing	in	the	same	model	that	estimates	effects	for	single-family	housing	because	both	measures	are	needed	account	for	changes	in	general	 housing	 availability.75	 The	 coefficient	 of	 interest	 is	 𝛽.	 It	 is	 interpreted	 as	 the	percentage	point	difference	in	the	expected	probability	that	an	offender	will	return	to	prison	given	a	one-unit	change	in	𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒.	When	𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒	is	defined	by	equation	(1)	or	(2),	I	interpret	𝛽	as	the	expected	change	in	recidivism	for	a	one-standard	deviation	change	in	𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒,	because	of	the	differences	in	moments	across	measures.76		
                                                        75	My	estimates	are	very	similar	regardless	of	whether	these	two	measures	are	included	in	the	same	model	or	in	separate	models.	Results	are	available	from	the	author	upon	request.	76	For	example,	when	𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒	is	the	share	of	affordable	rental	units,	interpreting	𝛽	based	on	a	five-percentage	point	change	𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒	implies	a	0.05 ∗ 𝛽-percent	change	in	recidivism	given	a	7.26%	(0.05/0.689)	change	in	the	share	of	affordable	rental	units.		However,	when	𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒	is	
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The	vector	𝑋8Áw	contains	offender-level	demographic	data	from	the	NCRP	and	includes	race,	an	indicator	for	Hispanic	ethnicity,	sex,	age	at	release,	type	of	facility	from	which	the	offender	is	released,	time	served	during	most	recent	prison	term,	and	dummy	variables	for	the	most	serious	offense	of	conviction.	While	𝑋	varies	at	the	individual	level,	the	𝑐𝑡	subscripts	are	 necessary	 because	 repeat	 offenders	 who	 appear	 multiple	 times	 in	 the	 data	 have	individual	characteristics	that	are	not	fixed	over	time,	such	as	the	age	at	release,	offense	of	conviction,	and	time	served	during	most	recent	prison	spell.	The	vector	𝑊Áw	contains	county-by-year	varying	controls	from	the	ACS,	which	include	the	labor	market	controls	described	in	Section	 III.	 It	 also	 includes	 logged	 counts	 of	 total	 part-I	 offenses,	 violent	 offenses,	 and	property	offenses	from	the	Federal	Bureau	of	 Investigation’s	(FBI)	Uniform	Crime	Report	(UCR),	 and	 logged	 total	 sworn	 law	enforcement	officers	 from	 the	FBI’s	Law	Enforcement	Officers	Killed	in	Action	(LEOKA)	data	(Table	3.1	Panel	3).	Finally,	𝜅Á 	and	𝜓w	are	county-	and	year-fixed	effects,	respectively.		Two	identifying	assumptions	are	necessary	for	interpreting	𝛽	as	the	causal	effect	of	𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒	on	the	probability	a	released	offender	recidivates.	First,	there	must	be	no	reverse	causality	between	recidivism	and	𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒.	This	assumption	would	be	violated	if,	for	example,	parole	boards	select	offenders	to	be	released	because	of	contemporaneous	rental	market	conditions.		This	would,	however,	require	parole	boards	to	have	data	on	 rental	market	 conditions	when	 they	decide	whether	 to	 release	an	offender,	which	is	unlikely	given	the	lags	in	publishing	the	rental	market	indicators	used	in	this	study.	Some	parole	boards	require	that	ex-offenders	have	housing	accommodations	in	place	prior	
                                                        the	share	of	affordable	vacant	rental	units,	a	five-percentage	point	change	𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒	implies	a	0.05 ∗ 𝛽-percent	change	in	recidivism	given	a	125%	(0.05/0.04)	change	in	the	share	of	affordable	rental	units.	
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to	release–because	this	would	increase	the	share	of	ex-offenders	with	housing	upon	release,	it	would	attenuate	estimates	of	𝛽.		Second,	𝑒8Áw	must	be	uncorrelated	with	𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒.	That	is,	estimates	of	𝛽	would	be	inconsistent	if	𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒	is	correlated	with	unobservable	county-by-time	varying	characteristics	 that	are	also	correlated	with	 recidivism.	For	example,	 ex-offenders	 released	 into	 counties	with	 higher	 than	 average	 rent	may	 have	 lower	 rates	 of	recidivism	if	high	rent	areas	are	correlated	with	higher	quantities	of	social	services	and	other	local	amenities	that	attract	residents	and	increase	rental	market	demand,	but	also	reduce	recidivism.	A	priori,	𝛽	should	be	biased	downwards	because	rents	are	likely	to	be	positively	related	to	local	amenities	that	are	correlated	with	reduced	recidivism.		Because	offender-level	housing	data	do	not	exist,	I	rely	on	county-level	rental	market	indicators.	 But,	 these	 data	 introduce	 potential	 measurement	 error	 issues.	 For	 example,	average	 county	 rents	 may	 poorly	 capture	 rental	 market	 conditions	 faced	 by	 individuals	seeking	rental	housing,	because	the	cost	of	units	currently	available	for	rent	may	not	be	the	same	as	what	the	average	renter	occupying	a	unit	currently	pays.	Average	rent	for	vacant	units	 is	 about	 5	 percent	 higher	 than	 all	 vacant	 and	 occupied	 units	 (Table	 3.1)	 and	 the	distributions	are	rather	similar	(Appendix	Figure	3.1).		While	rent	 for	vacant	units	may	more	accurately	measure	the	market	 faced	by	the	average	renter,	it	may	be	less	accurate	for	ex-offenders–especially	black	ex-offenders–who	face	greater	discrimination	by	landlords.	This	may	especially	be	true	in	tight	rental	markets	characterized	by	low	vacancy	rates	(Hanson	and	Hawley	2014).		
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Because	of	 the	potential	measurement	 issues	 inherent	 in	analyzing	rental	prices,	 I	instead	focus	much	of	my	analysis	on	identifying	the	effect	of	being	released	into	areas	with	different	shares	of	rental	units	that	are	available	and	affordable,	as	defined	in	equation	(2).		There	 may	 still	 be	 bias	 in	 estimating	𝛽	 if	 affordable	 housing	 market	 tightness	 is	correlated	with	𝑒" ,	however,	a	priori,	we	would	expect	a	decrease	in	market	tightness	(i.e.,	an	increase	in	the	share	of	vacant	and	affordable	units	relative	to	all	units)	to	reflect	a	decline	in	neighborhood	quality	that	would	be	positively	correlated	with	recidivism.	Importantly,	this	measure	is	likely	better	at	capturing	the	ease	with	which	ex-offenders,	who	have	lower	than	average	income,	are	exposed	to	rental	units	within	their	budget.	Analyzing	differences	between	 units	 in	 single-family	 structures	 and	 multi-family	 structures	 should	 more	accurately	reflect	the	share	of	units	accessible	to	ex-offenders,	because	of	the	differences	in	landlord	 discrimination	 across	 these	 different	 types	 of	 units	 described	 in	 Section	 II.	Comparing	 these	 two	 types	 of	 units	 boosts	 the	 causal	 interpretation	 if	 unobservable	confounding	trends	are	similar	across	the	two	types	of	structures.		
Results	Below,	I	present	the	empirical	results.	First,	I	discuss	the	main	estimation	results	on	the	 relationship	 between	 the	 share	 of	 affordable	 vacant	 rental	 housing	 and	 recidivism.	Second,	I	examine	heterogenous	effects	across	offender	characteristics,	including	sentence	length,	 education,	 and	 offense	 type.	 Third,	 I	 examine	 the	 robustness	 of	 my	 findings	 to	including	 county	 time	 trends,	 various	 sample	 restrictions,	 and	 expanding	 the	window	 of	recidivism.	Main	Results	
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In	Table	3.2,	 I	 show	estimates	of	 the	 relationship	between	 the	 share	of	 affordable	vacant	 rental	 units	 and	 recidivism	 rates	 from	 equation	 (3).77	 The	 first	 column	 shows	estimates	conditional	on	county	and	year	fixed	effects,	and,	moving	from	left	to	right,	each	subsequent	column	adds	additional	controls	to	the	model,	including	offender	demographics,	sentencing	characteristics,	initial	offense,	local	labor	market	conditions	at	time	of	release	of	release,	and	logged	counts	of	arrests	and	police	officers.	The	estimates	in	Panel	1	are	for	the	full	sample,	and	estimates	for	black	and	white	offenders	separately	are	in	Panels	2	and	3.	On	average,	conditioning	on	only	county	and	year	fixed	effects,	felons	released	to	areas	with	a	one-standard	deviation	higher	share	of	affordable	vacant	rental	housing	are	about	0.8%	less	likely	to	recidivate.78	The	estimate	is	very	similar	when	all	controls	are	included	in	the	model	(column	6),	however	none	of	the	coefficients	are	statistically	significant.	The	estimated	relationship	between	vacant	affordable	rental	units	and	recidivism	for	the	sample	in	Panel	1	appears	to	be	driven	by	black	offenders.	Black	ex-offenders	who	return	to	areas	with	a	one-standard	deviation	higher	 the	share	of	affordable	vacant	housing	are	about	 1.25-1.5	 percent	 less	 likely	 to	 return	 to	 prison	 within	 one	 year	 however	 the	coefficients	are	statistically	 insignificant.	The	estimates	 for	white	ex-offenders	are	always	small,	statistically	insignificant,	and	flip	sign,	suggesting	no	clear	relationship	between	rental	markets	and	recidivism.	
                                                        77	I	begin	with	estimates	using	my	measure	of	market	tightness.	For	estimates	of	the	relationship	between	average	rental	prices	for	different	types	of	units,	see	Appendix	Table	3.3,	and	for	the	share	of	affordable	rental	units	(which	include	occupied	units),	see	Appendix	Table	3.4.	78	I	calculate	percent	changes	per	one-standard	deviation	change	as	follows:	ÅÆ(Ç)∗ÈÉÇÊ .	I	interpret	estimates	in	terms	of	standard	deviations	because	the	variances	between	the	variance	in	the	share	of	affordable	vacant	single-	and	multi-family	are	different,	making	raw	coefficients	somewhat	misleading.	
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In	Table	3.3,	I	estimate	a	model	similar	to	that	in	Table	3.2,	but	now	focus	on	the	share	of	affordable	rental	units	in	single-	and	multi-family	structures.79	As	discussed	previously,	a	significant	body	of	anecdotal	evidence	suggests	that	landlords	who	are	the	most	willing	to	rent	to	ex-offenders	are	landlords	of	single-family	structures.	For	the	overall	sample	in	Panel	1,	ex-offenders	released	to	areas	with	a	one-standard	deviation	higher	share	of	affordable	vacant	units	for	rent	in	structures	with	only	a	single-family	unit	are	0.89	to	0.96	percent	less	likely	 to	 recidivate	 and	 is	 significant	 at	 the	 five-percent	 level.	 The	 relationship	 between	recidivism	and	multi-family	units,	however,	is	a	small	and	statistically	insignificant	0.1	and	0.4	 percent	 per	 one	 standard	 deviation.	 If	 county-by-year	 trends	 in	 unobservable	characteristics	 that	 affect	 recidivism	 through	 rental	 markets	 operate	 similarly	 through	single-	 and	multi-family	 units,	 then	 the	 lack	 of	 a	 strong	 statistically	 significant	 effect	 for	multi-family	 units,	 which	 is	 effectively	 a	 placebo	 test,	 lends	 validity	 to	 interpreting	 the	relationship	between	single-family	rental	units	and	recidivism	casually.		Panels	 2	 and	 3	 of	 Table	 3.3	 show	 estimates	 for	 black	 and	 white	 ex-offenders	separately.	The	estimates	for	black	ex-offenders	in	Panel	2	are	about	1.5	times	as	large	(1.4	to	1.5	percent,	per	one-standard	deviation	increase)	as	the	full	sample	and	are	statistically	significant	at	the	five-percent	level	regardless	of	what	controls	are	included.	The	effects	are	much	smaller	(about	a	tenth	of	the	magnitude)	and	statistically	insignificant	for	white	ex-offenders	 in	 Panel	 3,	 which	 suggests	 important	 racial	 differences	 in	 how	 rental	 housing	
                                                        79	In	Appendix	Table	3.4,	I	replicate	the	estimates	in	Table	3.3,	but	instead	use	the	share	of	affordable	rental	units	that	includes	both	occupied	and	vacant	units.	Ex-offenders	who	return	to	areas	with	a	higher	share	of	affordable	rental	units	is	strongly	positively	related	to	recidivism,	which	suggests	this	measure	is	capturing	other	area-specific	shocks	that	are	correlated	with	recidivism	and	rental	markets.	These	results	highlight	the	importance	of	using	a	measure	of	vacant	housing	since	these	are	the	units	actually	available	to	ex-offenders	upon	release.	
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markets	 affect	 recidivism.	 Again,	 the	 estimated	 relationship	 between	multi-family	 rental	housing	and	recidivism	is	small	for	both	groups.	A	primary	concern	with	interpreting	the	estimates	on	the	share	of	affordable	vacant	single-family	rental	units	in	Table	3.3	causally	is	that	labor	markets	may	differentially	affect	single-	 and	 multi-family	 rental	 markets.	 That	 is,	 if	 better	 labor	 markets	 are	 positively	correlated	with	a	higher	share	of	affordable	vacant	single-family	rental	units,	which	could	occur	 if	wages	rise	 faster	 than	rents	(because	 the	effective	size	of	 the	rental	stock	 that	 is	considered	 affordable	 would	 increase),	 then	 it	 is	 possible	 that	 some	 of	 the	 variation	 in	recidivism	that	 is	explained	by	single-family	rental	markets	could	be	due	to	 labor	market	conditions.	In	Appendix	Table	3.5,	I	regress	the	difference	between	the	share	or	affordable	vacant	 single-	 and	 multi-family	 rental	 units	 on	 the	 twelve	 measures	 of	 labor	 market	conditions	 that	 I	 include	 as	 controls	 in	 other	 tables.	 I	 find	 no	 evidence	 that	 any	 of	 the	measures	of	labor	market	conditions	are	correlated	with	differences	between	the	share	of	affordable	vacant	single-	and	multi-family	rental	markets	within	a	county.		 In	Tables	3.2	and	3.3,	I	only	define	affordability	as	a	rental	unit	with	monthly	rent	less	than	 or	 equal	 to	 35	 percent	 of	 the	 county	median	 income.	 In	 Figure	 3.2,	 I	 examine	 how	changing	the	definition	of	affordability	affects	recidivism	by	redefining	affordability	for	each	decile	 of	 median	 income.	 Each	 point	 in	 Figure	 3.2	 is	 an	 estimate	 of	 𝛽	 from	 a	 separate	regression	of	equation	(3)	where	𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒	is	replaced	with:	
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝐴𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑉𝑎𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑃𝑐𝑡ÌÍ = 𝑁Áw|	𝑣𝑎𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑁Áw	 |	(𝑥 < 	𝑃ÐiÑw ≤ 𝑌)	Where	𝑥 ∈ [0,90]	and	𝑦 ∈ [10,100]	and	corresponds	to	each	decile	of	median	income	and	is	calculated	for	single-family	rental	units.	Therefore,	𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝐴𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑉𝑎𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑃𝑐𝑡	)	 is	the	
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share	of	vacant	single-family	rental	units	with	rent	between	zero	and	ten	percent	of	median	county	 income	divided	by	 the	number	of	 single-family	 rental	units	with	rent	at	 the	same	decile.	 For	black	ex-offenders,	 the	expected	 change	 in	 recidivism	 from	an	 increase	 in	 the	share	 of	 vacant	 single-family	 rental	 units	 is	 largest	 for	 rents	 priced	 below	40	 percent	 of	median	 income.	 The	 magnitudes	 of	 the	 estimates	 are	 very	 close	 to	 zero	 and	 always	statistically	insignificant	for	rents	above	40	percent	of	median	income,	which	suggests	higher	shares	of	vacant	units	are	not	enough	to	reduce	recidivism–the	units	must	also	be	affordable.	The	estimates	on	recidivism	for	white	offenders	differ	 little,	which	 is	consistent	with	this	group’s	risk	of	recidivism	being	relatively	unaffected	by	the	share	of	affordable	single-family	units.	
Heterogeneity		 In	Figure	3.3,	I	examine	in	more	detail	the	effects	of	changes	in	the	share	of	vacant	and	 affordable	 rental	 units	 across	 different	 types	 of	 structures.	 The	 first	 three	 structure	types	listed	beginning	with	“1-fam”	fully	constitute	what	I	define	as	single-family	structures,	and	 the	 remaining	 six	 structure	 types	 beginning	with	 “multi-fam”	 fully	 constitute	what	 I	define	as	multi-family	housing	(the	number	in	parentheses	refers	to	the	number	of	units	per	structure).	These	nine	classifications	are	as	detailed	as	ACS	data	permits.	It	is	striking	that	the	only	large	and	statistically	significant	effect	on	recidivism	occurs	for	changes	in	the	share	of	vacant	and	affordable	housing	for	detached	single-family	units.	The	estimates	for	attached	single-family	units	are	very	close	to	zero,	and	the	confidence	intervals	always	include	zero.	Only	finding	a	statistically	significant	relationship	among	detached	single-family	homes,	but	not	attached	single-family	homes,	which	have	close	proximity	neighbors,	is	highly	suggestive	
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that	 customer	 discrimination	 against	 black	 ex-offenders	 plays	 an	 important	 role	 in	 their	access	to	rental	housing	and	consequently	the	probability	they	recidivate.	Next,	in	Table	3.4,	I	examine	how	the	estimates	in	Table	3.3	differ	by	how	long	the	ex-offender	 was	 incarcerated	 during	 their	 most	 recent	 prison	 sentence.	 Time	 spent	incarcerated	may	erode	social	connections	that	are	beneficial	for	helping	ex-offenders	find	housing.	Ex-offenders	who	spend	relatively	more	time	away	from	their	community	may	have	fewer	 social	 connections	 that	 can	 assist	 them	with	 finding	 affordable	 housing,	 and	 thus	offenders	returning	to	society	after	serving	longer	sentences	may	rely	more	on	local	rental	markets	to	find	a	place	to	live.	Additionally,	local	rental	markets	may	affect	recidivism	rates	more	 for	 those	 who	 served	 longer	 sentences	 if	 landlords	 believe	 that	 ex-offenders	 who	served	longer	sentences	are	more	likely	to	be	fully	rehabilitated	and	less	likely	to	reoffend	than	those	who	served	shorter	sentences.80	On	the	other	hand,	landlords	may	discriminate	against	ex-offenders	who	served	longer	sentences	if	they	believe	these	offenders	committed	more	severe	offenses.	Indeed,	a	positive	correlation	between	offense	severity	and	sentence	served	may	 reflect	 other	 undesirable	 characteristics	 that	 enter	 a	 landlords’	 decision.	 	 In	Table	3.4,	 I	estimate	 the	model	used	 in	Table	3.3,	but	 fully	 interact	all	covariates	with	an	indicator	for	whether	the	ex-offender’s	most	recent	sentence	was	less	than	one-year,	or	one-year	 or	 more.	 The	 coefficient	 on	 the	 interaction	 term	 is	 positive,	 suggesting	 that	 rental	markets	affect	recidivism	less	for	ex-offenders	with	sentences	longer	than	one	year	however,	the	difference	is	not	statistically	significant.		
                                                        80	Indeed,	the	mean	recidivism	rates	in	Table	3.8	show	that	ex-offenders	who	serve	one-year	or	more	are	about	half	as	likely	to	recidivate	as	those	who	serve	less	than	one-year,	but	this	certainly	could	be	driven	by	selection	into	different	types	and	severity	of	crime.	
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	 Because	differences	in	ex-offenders’	educational	attainment	may	reflect	differences	in	their	post-release	family	resources,	education	may	also	be	correlated	with	ex-offenders’	ability	 to	 find	work	and	housing.	Those	with	more	education	may	be	 less	affected	by	 the	affordability	and	availability	of	 local	housing	if	their	family	or	personal	resources	make	it	easier	for	them	to	find	rental	housing.	Additionally,	education	is	positively	related	to	how	one	speaks,	writes,	and	presents	themselves,	which	has	been	shown	to	reduce	differences	in	housing	discrimination	between	black	people	and	white	people	(Hanson	and	Hawley	2011).	In	Table	3.5,	I	estimate	the	same	model	in	Table	3.3	and	fully	interact	all	covariates	with	an	indicator	 for	 whether	 the	 ex-offender	 is	 a	 high	 school	 graduate.	 The	 coefficient	 on	 the	interaction	 term	 of	 education	 and	 the	 share	 of	 affordable	 vacant	 single-family	 units	 is	positive,	 suggesting	 higher	 education	 attenuates	 some	 of	 the	 effects	 of	 rental	 housing	markets	 on	 recidivism,	 but	 the	 standard	 errors	 are	 too	 large	 to	 statistically	 infer	 any	significant	differences.		 Next,	I	examine	whether	the	effect	of	housing	on	recidivism	differs	by	offense	type.	For	 example,	 ex-offenders	 who	 committed	 financially	 motivated	 crimes,	 like	 property	offenders,	may	be	more	sensitive	to	increases	in	𝑤"∗	from	reductions	in	relative	rental	costs.	Table	 3.6	 presents	 estimates	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 share	 of	 affordable	 vacant	single-	and	multi-family	housing	and	recidivism	by	offense.	Recidivism	rates	for	ex-offenders	convicted	 of	 property	 crimes	 are	 the	 most	 impacted	 by	 rental	 housing	 markets.	 Black	offenders	convicted	of	property	offenses	who	are	released	into	neighborhoods	with	a	one-standard	deviation	higher	share	of	affordable	vacant	single-family	units	are	2.6	percent	less	likely	 to	 recidivate.	 This	 effect	 is	 highly	 statistically	 significant	 (over	 four	 standard	deviations).	The	estimates	for	black	violent	offenders,	and	black	offenders	convicted	of	other	
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offenses81	 are	 also	 large:	 2.2	 percent	 and	 1.4	 percent	 respectively.	 Estimates	 for	 drug	offenders	(both	possession	and	trafficking),	and	sex	offenders	are	smaller	and	statistically	insignificant.	These	null	estimates	are	not	surprising,	because	being	convicted	of	either	of	offense	 can	 result	 in	 a	 lifetime	ban	 to	 accessing	public	 housing,	 and	 recent	 experimental	work	 shows	 that	 drug	 and	 sex	 offenders	 (especially	 black	 drug	 offenders82)	 receive	extremely	 low	 consideration	 from	 landlords	 (Evans,	 Blount-Hill,	 and	 Cubellis	 2018).83	Landlords	may	 be	 especially	 hesitant	 to	 rent	 to	 ex-drug-offenders	 because	 a	 rental	 unit	provides	a	location	from	which	drug	distribution	and	manufacturing	can	take	place.	On	the	contrary,	rental	units	are	less	likely	to	enter	the	production	function	of	property	and	violent	crimes.	
Robustness		 I	perform	a	number	of	robustness	checks	 to	confirm	the	validity	of	 the	 findings	 in	Table	 3.3.	 First,	 in	Table	 3.7,	 I	 include	Census	 region-by-year	 fixed	 effects	 to	 account	 for	annual	regional	shocks	that	could	be	correlated	with	rental	markets	and	recidivism.84	It	is	important	 to	 note	 that	 when	 region-by-year	 fixed	 effects	 are	 included	 in	 the	 model,	identification	 comes	 only	 from	 within-region	 variation	 in	 county	 rents,	 which	 may	 not	necessarily	be	better	variation	 if,	 for	 instance,	a	better	counterfactual	 for	rents	 in	Seattle,	Washington	is	rents	in	San	Francisco,	California	versus	Spokane,	Washington.	Nonetheless,	the	effect	for	black	ex-offenders	(Panel	2)	is	robust;	a	one-standard	deviation	increase	in	the	
                                                        81	“Other	offenses”	consist	of	all	offenses	other	than	violent,	property,	drug,	and	sex	offenses.	82	The	difference	in	call	back	rates	for	black	and	white	drug	offenders	was	1five-percentage	points,	but	was	not	statistically	significant	because	of	a	low-powered	sample.	83	Unfortunately,	this	paper	does	not	examine	landlord	consideration	of	other	types	of	offenders	like	violent	or	property.		84	There	are	nine	Census	regions	for	the	continental	U.S.,	and	I	include	a	Census	region	indicator	for	Alaska	(Hawaii	is	not	in	the	data).	
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share	of	vacant	affordable	single-family	units	is	associated	with	a	reduction	in	recidivism	of	about	1.0	percent.85		In	Appendix	Table	3.6,	I	estimate	the	same	models	as	Table	3.3	but	include	county-by-year	linear	time	trends.86	These	county-by-year	linear	time	trends	account	for	any	linear	trends	in	unobservable	characteristics	over	time	that	could	be	correlated	with	local	rental	markets	and	recidivism.	The	estimates	fall	in	magnitude	and	precision	when	county-by-year	linear	 trends	 are	 included.	 However,	 these	 trends	 may	 simply	 account	 for	 much	 of	 the	variation	of	 interest	(i.e.,	natural	variation	in	rental	markets),	 instead	of	simply	capturing	linear	 trends	 in	 county-level	 unobservable	 characteristics	 over	 time.	 Moreover,	 when	attempting	 to	 control	 for	 unobserved	 trends,	 it	 is	 impossible	 to	 determine	 the	 correct	functional	form	of	the	unobservable	characteristics	for	which	one	is	trying	to	control.		Another	 potential	 concern	 is	 that	 racial	 differences	 between	 ex-offenders	 are	correlated	with	the	probability	an	offender	leaves	their	county	of	release	in	a	way	that	biases	the	estimates.	For	example,	 if	white	ex-offenders	are	more	 likely	 to	 leave	 their	 county	of	release	 and	 move	 to	 a	 county	 with	 better	 affordable	 housing	 options	 then	 this	 would	attenuate	the	estimates	and	explain	the	null	effects	I	find	for	white	offenders.	If	probability	of	 moving	 in	 response	 to	 local	 rental	 markets	 across	 groups	 varies	 significantly	 across	different	 types	 of	 ex-offenders,	 then	 the	 county	 rental	 market	 data	 I	 assign	 to	 each	 ex-
                                                        85	Alternatively,	I	could	more	flexibly	control	for	confounding	shocks	at	the	state	and	year	level	by	including	state-by-year	fixed	effects	instead	of	region-by-year	fixed	effects.	I	show	the	results	for	this	in	Appendix	Table	3.9.	The	estimates	for	the	share	of	single-vacant	affordable	single-family	units	are	qualitatively	similar.	The	relative	reduction	in	variance	by	using	state-by-year	instead	of	region-by-year	fixed	however,	is	low.	Region-by-year	fixed	effects	explain	65	and	80	percent	of	the	variation	in	the	share	of	vacant	single-	and	multi-family	units,	respectively.	State-by-year	fixed	effects	explain	only	slightly	more	variation:	70	and	82	percent,	respectively.	86	In	Appendix	Table	3.7,	I	show	estimates	using	county-specific	quadratic-time	trends.	The	results	are	similar.	
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offender	would	be	inaccurate.	In	Table	3.8,	I	test	for	potential	mobility	across	observables	by	comparing	rates	of	recidivism	for	offenders	by	whether	they	reoffend	in	the	same	county	into	which	 they	were	 released.	 For	 the	 full	 sample	 of	 reoffenders,	 over	 95	 percent	who	reoffend	do	so	in	the	same	county	in	which	they	were	released.	This	differs	very	little	by	race,	or	any	other	observable	dimension,	including	offense	type,	sex,	and	length	of	time	served.	This	 is	 strongly	 suggestive	 that	mobility	 across	 counties	 is	 uncorrelated	with	 observable	characteristics,	at	least	for	those	who	reoffend.	The	means	in	Table	3.8	however,	do	not	test	whether	the	treatment	is	associated	with	the	probability	that	an	ex-offender	stays	or	leaves	the	county	into	which	they	are	released.	Ex-offenders	released	into	counties	with	less	favorable	housing	markets	may	be	more	likely	to	leave	an	area	if	they	have	difficulty	finding	housing.	To	test	this,	I	regress	an	indicator	for	reoffending	 in	 the	 same	 county	 as	 release	 on	 the	 same	 covariates	 used	 in	 Table	 3.3,	conditional	 on	 ex-offenders	 who	 reoffend.	 Table	 3.9	 shows	 that	 there	 is	 no	 statistically	significant	evidence	of	a	relationship	between	the	share	of	affordable	vacant	single-family	units	 and	 the	probability	 that	 recidivism	occurs	 in	 a	 different	 county	 from	 the	 county	of	release.	The	coefficient	for	black	ex-offenders,	0.0209,	is	relatively	small	and	implies	that	a	one-standard	deviation	increase	in	the	share	of	affordable	vacant	single-family	rental	units	is	associated	with	an	increase	probability	of	recidivating	within	the	same	county	of	release	of	 0.037%.	 The	 percent	 change	 for	 white	 ex-offenders	 is	 higher	 but	 still	 a	 small	 and	statistically	 insignificant	 0.17%.	 Therefore,	 I	 find	 no	 strong	 evidence	 that	 suggests	 ex-offenders	who	return	to	areas	with	a	lower	share	of	vacant	affordable	rental	units	are	more	or	less	likely	to	move	and	reoffend	in	a	different	county.	However,	even	if	offenders	released	
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into	 worse	 rental	 markets	 move	 to	 better	 areas	 with	 better	 rental	 markets,	 then	 my	estimates	in	Table	3.3	would	be	lower	bounds.	In	 Table	 3.10	 I	 expand	 the	 window	 for	 how	 recidivism	 is	 defined	 by	 looking	 at	recidivism	within	2-	and	3-years.	I	find	that	the	point	estimates	are	similar	when	expanding	the	 window	 of	 recidivism	 to	 two-years,	 although	 they	 become	 less	 precise.	 Because	 the	sample	for	which	I	can	estimate	changes	in	2-year	recidivism	is	smaller	than	for	1-year,	 I	estimate	1-year	recidivism	using	the	sample	from	Panel	1.	These	results,	in	Panel	2,	show	that	 the	 relationship	 between	 rental	 markets	 and	 1-year	 recidivism	 is	 still	 statistically	significant.	 In	Panel	3,	 I	examine	recidivism	within	three-years	and	the	estimates	become	small	and	statistically	insignificant.	In	Panel	4,	I	show	that	much,	but	not	all,	of	the	decline	in	the	 relationship	 is	 due	 to	 a	 smaller	 and	different	 sample	on	which	 I	 can	 estimate	3-year	recidivism.		A	potential	explanation	for	the	null	findings	when	expanding	the	recidivism	window	to	three	years	is	reversion	to	the	mean	in	rental	markets.	In	these	models,	I	assume	that	the	rental	market	in	the	first	year	of	release	is	the	same	as	in	the	second	and	third	year.	However,	if	the	shock	associated	with	higher	than	average	shares	of	affordable	vacant	single-family	rental	housing	in	the	first	year	of	release	subsides	in	years	two	and	three,	then	ex-offenders	faced	with	an	affordable	and	accessible	rental	market	in	year	one	may	be	faced	with	a	very	different	 market	 in	 year	 2	 and	 3.	 If	 rental	 markets	 are	 sufficiently	 dynamic,	 examining	recidivism	outcomes	by	the	third	year	could	attenuate	the	estimates.		I	examine	whether	rental	markets	are	sufficiently	dynamic	to	generate	a	null	finding	by	 replacing	 the	 rental	 market	measures	 in	 the	 first	 year	 of	 release	with	 rental	 market	indicators	for	the	rental	market	in	the	second	year	following	release	and	run	this	model	on	
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the	 sample	 of	 ex-offenders	 who	 do	 not	 recidivate	 within	 the	 first	 year.	 The	 findings,	presented	in	Table	3.11,	show	that	black	ex-offenders	who	did	not	recidivate	during	the	first	year	of	release	are	still	about	1.2%	less	likely	to	recidivate	in	their	second	year	of	release	if	they	 returned	 to	 areas	 with	 a	 one-standard	 deviation	 higher	 share	 of	 affordable	 vacant	single-family	units	in	the	second	year.	The	effects	for	recidivism	in	the	third	year,	however,	are	still	not	robust.		Another	explanation	for	this	null	finding	in	year	three	is	consistent	with	a	first-day	recidivism	 narrative	 where	 ex-offenders	 are	 most	 likely	 to	 reoffend	 shortly	 following	release.	 If	 they	 are	 able	 to	 overcome	 the	 initial	 threshold	 of	 liquidity	 constraints	 shortly	following	release	because	of	a	more	affordable	and	accessible	rental	market,	they	may	end	up	on	a	different	path	on	the	probability	of	recidivism	over	time.		After	the	first	year,	they	may	also	be	less	affected	by	the	local	rental	market	because	they	have	been	able	to	secure	housing,	which	makes	it	easier	to	secure	it	again	going	forward.	Last,	 I	show	that	my	primary	findings	from	Table	3.3	are	robust	to	several	sample	exclusions.	 In	 Appendix	 Table	 3.10,	 I	 show	 the	 point	 estimates	 remain	 unchanged	when	California	 is	 removed	 from	 the	 analysis.	 This	 is	 robustness	 check	 is	 important	 to	 show	because	 it	 alleviates	 concerns	 that	 the	 results	 are	 being	 driven	 by	 pre-realignment	idiosyncrasies.	 In	Appendix	Table	3.11,	 I	show	the	estimates	are	unchanged	when	female	felons	are	excluded	from	the	sample.	I	do	this	because	some	evidence	suggests	female	felons	experience	 different	 levels	 of	 discrimination	 in	 the	 rental	 market	 compared	 with	 men	(Evans,	Blount-Hill,	and	Cubellis	2018;	Ondrich	et	al.	1999),	and	because	of	differences	in	post	release	programs	available	to	them.	The	results	are	practically	unchanged	from	those	in	Table	3.3	when	female	felons	are	omitted	from	the	analysis.	In	Appendix	Table	3.12,	I	show	
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that	the	estimates	remain	unchanged	when	looking	only	at	first-time	offenders.	This	ensures	that	my	findings	are	not	driven	to	frequent	repeat	offenders	being	more	likely	to	be	released	into	areas	with	worse	rental	markets.		
Conclusion	In	this	paper,	I	examine	how	the	rental	market	into	which	an	offender	is	released	is	related	to	their	probability	of	recidivism.		In	particular,	using	data	from	the	NCRP	and	the	ACS,	I	compare	variation	in	recidivism	rates	to	the	share	of	affordable	vacant	units.	My	main	findings	indicate	that	black	ex-offenders	are	significantly	less	likely	to	recidivate	when	they	return	to	areas	with	a	higher	share	of	affordable	and	available	units	in	single-family	rental	units	 but	 find	 no	 effects	 for	 multi-family	 rentals.	 This	 result	 is	 consistent	 with	 advice	provided	to	recently	released	offenders	looking	for	housing	that	landlords	of	single-family	homes	are	more	willing	to	rent	to	ex-offenders,	and,	assuming	that	labor	markets	conditions	affect	single-	and	multi-family	rental	units	similar,	boosts	 the	causal	 interpretation	of	my	findings.	Moreover,	the	effect	is	concentrated	among	non-drug	and	non-sex	offenders.	This	is	consistent	with	experimental	evidence	that	these	two	types	of	offenders	receive	very	low	consideration	 from	 landlords	 (Evans,	 Blount-Hill,	 and	 Cubellis	 2018).	 Further,	 I	 show	evidence	that	the	effect	 is	driven	by	detached	single-family	units	and	not	attached	single-family	units,	which	provides	evidence	that	customer	discrimination	plays	an	important	role	in	the	relationship	between	housing	and	recidivism.	One	of	 the	mechanisms	through	which	housing	can	affect	recidivism	is	 through	its	complementary	 effect	 on	 employment	 and	 wages.	 It	 is	 difficult	 for	 ex-offenders	 to	 find	employment,	but	even	more	so	without	a	stable	address.	Landlords	are	often	unwilling	to	
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rent	to	unemployed	applicants	and,	for	many,	being	able	to	afford	rent	is	impossible	without	first	securing	employment.	Therefore,	it	is	natural	to	compare	my	findings	to	those	on	the	effect	 of	 labor	market	 policies	 or	 public	 assistance	 on	 recidivism.	My	 finding	 that	 a	 one-standard	deviation	increase	in	the	share	of	vacant	and	affordable	housing	reduces	recidivism	for	black	ex-offenders	by	about	1.5	percent	is	slightly	lower	than	the	labor	market	and	public	assistance	effects	estimated	in	other	studies.	Yang	(2016)	finds	that	the	typical	growth	in	wages	that	occurs	over	a	business	cycle	can	reduce	the	probability	of	recidivism	within	1-year	by	2.3-4.0	percent	and	Agan	and	Makowsky	(2018)	find	that	an	average	increase	in	the	minimum	wage	reduces	recidivism	by	2.8	percent.	All	of	these	estimates	are	lower	than	Yang	(2017)’s	 finding	 that	 eligibility	 for	 public	 assistance	 (welfare	 and	 food	 stamps)	 reduces	recidivism	by	as	much	as	10	percent.	However,	it	should	be	noted	that	my	estimates	are	most	likely	lower	bounds,	considering	shocks	that	increase	the	share	of	affordable	vacant	housing	may	be	 correlated	with	 other	 factors	 that	 decrease	 the	 probability	 of	 successful	 reentry.	More	 research	 is	 required	 to	 better	 understand	 the	 complementary	 effects	 of	 securing	housing	and	labor	market	success	on	recidivism.	The	 primary	 policy	 implication	 of	 this	 paper	 is	 to	 highlight	 the	 importance	 of	accessible	and	affordable	housing	in	helping	ex-offenders	successfully	reenter	society.	For	decades,	 policy	 makers	 at	 federal	 and	 local	 levels	 have	 enacted	 programs	 designed	 to	increase	 the	 stock	 of	 affordable	 housing	 and	 lower	 rental	 prices,	 like	 the	 Low-Income	Housing	Tax	Credit	 (LIHTC),	 and	 rent	 control.	Unfortunately,	 there	 is	 little	 evidence	 that	these	interventions	increase	the	stock	of	low-income	housing	(Freedman	and	Owens	2011),	and	even	if	they	did,	ex-offenders,	in	particular	black	ex-offenders,	may	still	be	unable	to	find	landlords	willing	 to	 rent	 to	 them,	 especially	when	development	 is	 focused	 on	 apartment	
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buildings	instead	of	single-family	homes.	That	is,	my	findings	suggest	that	ex-offenders	need	more	than	just	affordable	housing–they	need	accessible	housing.	Of	course,	 in	tight	rental	markets,	policies	that	enable	an	ex-offender	to	access	and	afford	housing	may	mean	that	a	non-ex-offender	 is	 unable	 to	 find	 affordable	 housing.	 In	 this	 instance	 where	 affordable	housing	is	a	zero-sum	game	the	only	obvious	solution	is	to	increase	the	stock	of	housing.		A	back	of	the	envelope	calculation	suggests	the	total	cost	savings	from	a	one	standard	deviation	 increase	 in	 the	share	of	vacant	affordable	single-family	housing,	which	 I	 find	 is	related	to	a	one	percent	decline	in	recidivism,	would	be	about	$212	million.87	This	implies	that	a	policy	designed	to	assist	ex-offenders	with	housing,	whether	that	is	rent	subsidies	or	enforcement	of	policies	that	encourage	landlords	to	rent	to	ex-offenders	(like	bonding	and	insuring	them	against	loss),	would	pass	a	cost-benefit	test	if	it	costs	less	than	$212	million.		Ban-the-box	 policies	 in	 housing,	 which	 make	 it	 illegal	 for	 employers	 to	 screen	applicants	by	felony	status,	may	be	an	attractive	solution	to	decrease	discrimination	against	black	 ex-offenders.	 Most	 ban-the-box	 policies	 address	 behavior	 of	 employers,	 but	 policy	makers	are	beginning	to	ban-the-box	in	housing	as	well.	In	late	2016,	Richmond,	CA	enacted	an	ordinance	that	prevents	providers	of	public	or	subsidized	housing	from	inquiring	about	criminal	history.88	However,	ban-the-box	policies,	which	decrease	the	information	otherwise	available	to	landlords,	may	result	in	statistical	discrimination	against	applicants	who	they	perceive	as	having	a	higher	probability	of	being	an	ex-offender,	notably	black	people	(Agan	and	 Starr	 2016).	 Instead,	 a	 better	 policy	 may	 be	 to	 simply	 ensure	 that	 landlords,	 and	especially	property	management	companies,	do	not	impose	blanket	bans	on	ex-offenders.		
                                                        87	This	assumes	a	30%	recidivism	rate,	600,000	offenders	released	each	year,	and	the	cost	of	each	recidivism	event	being	valued	at	$118,000	(Barickman	et	al.	2015)	88	See	https://www.ci.richmond.ca.us/ArchiveCenter/ViewFile/Item/7690	(accessed	September	26,	2018)	
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Figure	3.1.	Number	of	years	until	released	offenders	are	readmitted	to	prison,	
conditional	on	recidivating,	2005-2015	
	Note:	Data	from	are	from	the	2005-2015	National	Corrections	Reporting	Program.	 	
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Figure	3.2.	Heterogeneous	relationship	between	the	share	of	single-family	rental	
housing	that	is	vacant	and	1-year	recidivism,	by	units	with	rent	in	each	decile	of	
median	income	
Note:	Each	estimate	is	from	a	separate	regression	of	equation	3	that	replaces	the	share	of	housing	below	35	percent	of	median	income	with	the	share	of	affordable	single-family	housing	that	is	vacant	with	 rent	within	 each	decile	 of	 county-by-year	median	 income.	 Each	model	 includes	 all	 controls,	county	fixed	effects,	year	fixed	effects,	and	standard	errors	clustered	at	the	county	level.		
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Figure	3.3.	Estimates	of	the	share	of	rental	housing	that	is	vacant	and	affordable	by	
structure	type	
	Note:	 Each	 estimate	 is	 from	 a	 separate	 regression	 of	 equation	 (3)	with	 all	 controls,	 county	 fixed	effects,	year	fixed	effects,	and	standard	errors	clustered	at	the	county	level.		 	
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Table	3.1.	Summary	Statistics	(2005-2014)	 	 	 		 N	 Mean	 Standard	deviation	Panel	I:	Offender-level	variables	(National	Corrections	Reporting	Program)	 		 		Offense,	recidivating,	and	sentencing	variables	 		 		 		Recidivism	within	1	year	 2,131,127	 0.295	 0.456	Recidivism	within	2	years	 1,893,330	 0.409	 0.492	Recidivism	within	3	years	 1,623,238	 0.466	 0.499	Actual	length	of	sentence	served	 2,131,127	 1.57	 2.71	Release	from	state	prison	 2,131,127	 0.869	 0.337	Release	from	local	jail	 2,131,127	 0.039	 0.193	Release	from	other	 2,131,127	 0.067	 0.250	Release	from	halfway	house	 2,131,127	 0.010	 0.100	Release	from	work	release	center	 2,131,127	 0.0065	 0.081	Release	from	pre-release	center	 2,131,127	 0.0088	 0.093	Release	from	federal	prison	 2,131,127	 0.000064	 0.0080	Violent	offense	 2,131,127	 0.106	 0.308	Property	offense	 2,131,127	 0.366	 0.482	Drug	trafficking	offense	 2,131,127	 0.128	 0.335	Drug	possession	offense	 2,131,127	 0.128	 0.333	Sexual	offense	 2,131,127	 0.035	 0.184	Other	offense	 2,131,127	 0.237	 0.425	Demographic	variables	 	 	 	Male	 2,131,127	 0.885	 0.319	Age	at	release	 2,131,127	 36.08	 10.47	Hispanic	 2,131,127	 0.286	 0.452	White	 2,131,127	 0.372	 0.483	Black	 2,131,127	 0.448	 0.497	Asian	 2,131,127	 0.0044	 0.066	Another	race	 2,131,127	 0.175	 0.380	Less	than	high	school	 1,198,124	 0.092	 0.289	Some	high	school	 1,198,124	 0.388	 0.487	High	school	graduate	 1,198,124	 0.437	 0.496	College	 1,198,124	 0.083	 0.276			 		 		 		Panel	II:	Explanatory	variables	(American	Community	Survey)			 	 	 	County-level	rental	market	conditions	 	 	 	Rent	($)	 2,131,127	 661.9	 182.2	Rent	for	vacant	units	($)	 2,131,127	 693.2	 228.7	Rent	for	vacant	single-family	units	($)	 2,018,952	 814.5	 318.4	Rent	for	vacant	multi-family	units	($)	 2,124,112	 662.6	 217.1	Total	rental	units	 2,131,127	 3,007	 3,869	Total	affordable	rental	units	 2,131,127	 1,752	 1,829	Share	of	affordable	rental	units	 2,131,127	 0.689	 0.176	Total	affordable	vacant	rental	units		 2,131,127	 95.98	 116.3	Share	of	affordable	vacant	rental	units	 2,131,127	 0.040	 0.026	Total	single-family	rental	units	 2,131,127	 806.2	 1,077	
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Total	vacant	affordable	single-family	rental	units		 2,131,127	 11.95	 13.74	Share	of	affordable	vacant	single-family	rental	units		 2,131,127	 0.020	 0.018	Total	multi-family	rental	units	 2,131,127	 2,200	 2,873	Total	affordable	vacant	multi-family	rental	units		 2,131,127	 82.37	 104.0	Share	of	affordable	vacant	multi-family	rental	units		 2,131,127	 0.048	 0.032		 	 	 	County-level	labor	market	conditions	 	 	 	Manufacturing:	Share	of	labor	force	 2,131,127	 0.058	 0.023	Manufacturing:	Unemployment	rate	 2,131,127	 0.090	 0.047	Manufacturing:	Average	monthly	income	($)	 2,131,127	 2,148	 391.9	Administrative:	Share	of	labor	force	 2,131,127	 0.035	 0.0066	Administrative:	Unemployment	rate	 2,131,127	 0.057	 0.036	Administrative:	Average	monthly	income	($)	 2,131,127	 2,474	 388.0	Food-service:	Share	of	labor	force	 2,131,127	 0.053	 0.013	Food-service:	Unemployment	rate	 2,131,127	 0.104	 0.045	Food-service:	Average	monthly	income	($)	 2,131,127	 1,092	 204.7	Construction:	Share	of	labor	force	 2,131,127	 0.057	 0.019	Construction:	Unemployment	rate	 2,131,127	 0.122	 0.068	Construction:	Average	wage	($)	 2,131,127	 2,326	 482.3			 		 		 		Panel	III:	County-level	variables	(FBI	Uniform	Crime	Report)			 	 	 	Logged	total	part-I	arrests	 2,131,127	 8.89	 1.25	Logged	part-I	violent	arrests	 2,131,127	 7.65	 1.43	Logged	part-I	property	arrests	 2,131,127	 8.49	 1.21	Logged	total	law	enforcement	officers	 2,131,127	 7.90	 1.47		 	 	 	Note:	Each	observation	 is	 a	 “term-record,”	which	 is	 an	offender’s	 spell	 spent	 incarcerated.	The	 sample	 is	conditional	on	offenders	who	are	released	during	the	sample.	 If	 the	same	offender	returns	to	prison	after	being	released,	then	that	offender	will	have	another	“term-record.”	The	sample	only	includes	offenders	for	whom	data	on	correctional	admissions	in	the	same	state	as	the	offender’s	release	is	available	for	at	least	one	year	 following	 the	 date	 of	 release	 (or	 two	 and	 three	 years	 for	 recidivism	 within	 two	 to	 three	 years	respectively).	This	results	in	(r+1)	observations	for	each	offender,	where	r	is	the	number	of	times	the	offender	recidivates.	See	section	3	for	a	detailed	description	of	how	each	variable	is	constructed.	There	are	248	unique	counties	in	the	full	sample.			 	
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Table	3.2.	Estimates	of	the	relationship	between	share	of	affordable	vacant	rental	units	and	1-year	
recidivism			 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	Panel	1:	Share	of	vacant	affordable	rental	units	(SD	=	0.0263)	Outcome:	1-year	recidivism	 -0.0916	 -0.0689	 -0.0586	 -0.0595	 -0.0660	 -0.0904		 (0.101)	 (0.109)	 (0.112)	 (0.112)	 (0.0107)	 (0.106)		 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	Mean	1-year	recidivism	rate	 0.295	 0.295	 0.295	 0.295	 0.295	 0.295	N	 2,131,127	 2,131,127	 2,131,127	 2,131,127	 2,131,127	 2,131,127	Panel	2:	Share	of	vacant	affordable	rental	units,	black	only	(SD	=	0.0272)	Outcome:	1-year	recidivism	 -0.143	 -0.143	 -0.131	 -0.129	 -0.130	 -0.161		 (0.112)	 (0.108)	 (0.105)	 (0.103)	 (0.101)	 (0.103)		 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	Mean	1-year	recidivism	rate	 0.280	 0.280	 0.280	 0.280	 0.280	 0.280	N	 955,307	 955,307	 955,307	 955,307	 955,307	 955,307	Panel	3:	Share	of	vacant	affordable	rental	units,	white	only	(SD	=	0.0251)	Outcome:	1-year	recidivism	 -0.00205	 0.0126	 0.00530	 0.00119	 -0.0101	 -0.0226		 (0.0931)	 (0.0954)	 (0.0952)	 (0.0960)	 (0.0943)	 (0.0957)		 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	Mean	1-year	recidivism	rate	 0.283	 0.283	 0.283	 0.283	 0.283	 0.283	N	 793,806	 793,806	 793,806	 793,806	 793,806	 793,806		 	 	 	 	 	 	County	&	year	fixed	effects	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	Offender	demographic	controls	 No	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	Sentencing	controls	 No	 No	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	Offense	controls	 No	 No	 No	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	Labor	market	controls	 No	 No	 No	 No	 Yes	 Yes	Crime	and	police	controls	 No	 No	 No	 No	 No	 Yes			 		 		 		 		 		 		Note:	The	outcome	is	whether	a	released	felon	returns	to	prison	(in	the	same	state	as	release)	within	1	year.	Each	cell	is	an	estimate	from	a	different	linear	probability	model.	Offender	demographic	controls	include	age	at	release,	sex,	race,	ethnicity	(Hispanic),	and	education.	Sentencing	controls	include	the	spell	length	of	the	offender's	 most	 recent	 incarceration	 and	 facility	 from	 which	 the	 prisoner	 was	 released	 (state	 prison,	halfway-house,	work	release,	etc.).	Offense	controls	include	dummy	variables	for	the	most	serious	offense	for	which	the	released	prisoner	was	most	recently	incarcerated.	Labor	market	controls	include	are	county-level	average	wage,	employment,	and	share	of	labor	force	in	the	following	industries	most	likely	to	employ	ex-offenders:	manufacturing,	transportation,	food	service,	and	construction.	Crime	and	police	controls	are	county-level	logged	counts	of	total	arrests,	arrests	for	property	crime,	arrests	for	violent	crime,	and	total	number	of	police	officers.	Standard	errors	are	clustered	at	the	county	level.	1The	share	of	affordable	vacant	rental	units	is	the	number	of	units	that	are	available	for	rent	with	rent	less	than	35	percent	of	median	county	income	divided	by	the	total	number	of	rental	units	available	for	rent.	***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.10.			 	
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Table	3.4.	Comparing	estimates	of	the	relationship	between	share	of	affordable	vacant	single-	and	
multi-family	rental	units	and	1-year	recidivism	for	ex-offenders	by	sentence	length			 All	 Black	only		 White	only	Share	of	affordable	vacant	single-family	units	 -0.190**	 -0.244**	 -0.0674		 (0.0850)	 (0.104)	 (0.0793)	Share	of	affordable	vacant	multi-family	units	 -0.0557	 -0.0639	 -0.0402		 (0.0776)	 (0.0752)	 (0.0686)	>	1-year	sentence	 -0.00675	 -0.358	 0.0427		 (0.197)	 (0.268)	 (0.162)	Share	of	affordable	vacant	single-family	units	*	>	1-year	sentence	 0.0989	 0.120	 0.0720		 (0.0678)	 (0.0919)	 (0.0779)	Share	of	affordable	vacant	multi-family	units	*	>	1-year	sentence	 0.0816	 0.0837	 0.0829		 (0.0600)	 (0.0729)	 (0.0662)		 	 	 	Standard	deviation	of	share	of	affordable	vacant	single-family	units	 0.0182	 0.0196	 0.0179	Standard	deviation	of	share	of	affordable	vacant	multi-family	units	 0.0323	 0.0331	 0.0315	Mean	recidivism	rate	for	<	1-year	sentence	sample	 0.295	 0.280	 0.283	N	 2,131,127	 955,307	 793,806	Note:	See	notes	to	Table	3.3.	The	models	estimated	in	this	table	contain	all	of	the	covariates	in	column	6	of	Table	3.3.	All	covariates	are	fully	interacted	with	an	indicator	variable	equal	to	one	if	the	ex-offenders	most	recent	incarceration	spell	was	one	year	or	more,	and	zero	otherwise.	***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.10.			 	
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Table	3.5.	Estimates	of	the	relationship	between	share	of	affordable	vacant	single-family	rental	
units	and	1-year	recidivism	for	ex-offenders	by	education			 All	 Black	only	 White	only	Share	of	affordable	vacant	single-family	units	 -0.0650	 -0.179**	 0.0435	(0.0641)	 (0.0843)	 (0.0901)	Share	of	affordable	vacant	multi-family	units	 0.0754	 0.0595	 0.0203		 (0.0507)	 (0.0792)	 (0.0601)	High	school	graduate	or	more	 -0.245	 -0.289	 -0.299	(0.154)	 (0.189)	 (0.224)	Share	of	affordable	vacant	single-family	units	*	High	school	graduate	or	more	 0.0647	 0.0235	 0.0636	(0.0786)	 (0.0872)	 (0.0965)	Share	of	affordable	vacant	multi-family	units	*	High	school	graduate	or	more	 -0.0296	 -0.0338	 0.00829	(0.0530)	 (0.0715)	 (0.0865)		 	 	 	Standard	deviation	of	share	of	affordable	vacant	single-family	units	 0.0182	 0.0196	 0.0179	Mean	recidivism	rate	for	low	education	sample	 0.208	 0.220	 0.196	N	 1,198,124	 612,796	 476,946	Note:	See	notes	to	Table	3.3.	The	models	estimated	in	this	table	contain	all	of	the	covariates	in	column	6	of	Table	3.3.	***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.10.		
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Table	3.6.	Estimates	of	the	relationship	between	share	of	affordable	vacant	single-	and	multi-family	
rental	units	and	1-year	recidivism	for	ex-offenders	by	offense	type	Outcome:	1-year	recidivism	 All	 Black	only	 White	only	Panel	1:	Violent	offenders		Share	of	affordable	vacant	single-family	rental	units	 -0.248**	 -0.258**	 -0.0318		 (0.102)	 (0.130)	 (0.141)	Share	of	affordable	vacant	multi-family	rental	units	 -0.118	 -0.123	 -0.0618		 (0.0804)	 (0.111)	 (0.0964)		 	 	 	Standard	deviation	of	share	of	affordable	vacant	single-family	units	 0.0183	 0.0211	 0.0173	Standard	deviation	of	share	of	affordable	vacant	multi-family	units	 0.0319	 0.0338	 0.0307	Mean	recidivism	rate	 0.287	 0.251	 0.278	N	 226,008	 93,432	 77,859	Panel	2:	Property	offenders	Share	of	affordable	vacant	single-family	rental	units	 -0.264***	 -0.394***	 -0.0827		 (0.0879)	 (0.0964)	 (0.0815)	Share	of	affordable	vacant	multi-family	rental	units	 -0.0839	 -0.115	 -0.0750		 (0.0797)	 (0.0788)	 (0.0803)		 	 	 	Standard	deviation	of	share	of	affordable	vacant	single-family	units	 0.0184	 0.0199	 0.0179	Standard	deviation	of	share	of	affordable	vacant	multi-family	units	 0.0329	 0.0341	 0.0315	Mean	recidivism	rate	 0.329	 0.301	 0.322	N	 779,933	 336,987	 310,678	Panel	3:	Drug	possession	offenders	Share	of	affordable	vacant	single-family	rental	units	 0.00789	 0.0425	 -0.0803		 (0.102)	 (0.122)	 (0.153)	Share	of	affordable	vacant	multi-family	rental	units	 -0.0301	 -0.00545	 -0.0455		 (0.0955)	 (0.110)	 (0.0998)		 	 	 	Standard	deviation	of	share	of	affordable	vacant	single-family	units	 0.0178	 0.0178	 0.0173	Standard	deviation	of	share	of	affordable	vacant	multi-family	units	 0.0328	 0.0311	 0.0324	Mean	recidivism	rate	 0.266	 0.226	 0.274	N	 272,000	 136,677	 103,515	Panel	4:	Drug	trafficking	offenders	Share	of	affordable	vacant	single-family	rental	units	 -0.158	 -0.110	 -0.0446		 (0.120)	 (0.154)	 (0.153)	Share	of	affordable	vacant	multi-family	rental	units	 0.0313	 -0.0372	 0.132		 (0.0934)	 (0.107)	 (0.130)		 	 	 	Standard	deviation	of	share	of	affordable	vacant	single-family	units	 0.0179	 0.0193	 0.0173	Standard	deviation	of	share	of	affordable	vacant	multi-family	units	 0.0310	 0.0320	 0.0308	Mean	recidivism	rate	 0.274	 0.28	 0.259	N	 273,639	 157,852	 68,271	Panel	5:	Sex	offenders	Share	of	affordable	vacant	single-family	rental	units	 0.148	 0.342	 0.0310		 (0.130)	 (0.213)	 (0.162)	
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Share	of	affordable	vacant	multi-family	rental	units	 0.319**	 0.275	 0.265*		 (0.143)	 (0.236)	 (0.145)		 	 	 	Standard	deviation	of	share	of	affordable	vacant	single-family	units	 0.0192	 0.0207	 0.0194	Standard	deviation	of	share	of	affordable	vacant	multi-family	units	 0.0316	 0.0329	 0.0309	Mean	recidivism	rate	 0.269	 0.322	 0.229	N	 74,682	 25,547	 35,940	Panel	6:	Other	offenders	Share	of	affordable	vacant	single-family	rental	units	 -0.104	 -0.219**	 0.0457		 (0.0946)	 (0.107)	 (0.108)	Share	of	affordable	vacant	multi-family	rental	units	 -0.0129	 -0.0105	 -0.0423		 (0.0749)	 (0.0878)	 (0.0782)		 	 	 	Standard	deviation	of	share	of	affordable	vacant	single-family	units	 0.0176	 0.0189	 0.0181	Standard	deviation	of	share	of	affordable	vacant	multi-family	units	 0.0314	 0.0315	 0.0311	Mean	recidivism	rate	 0.279	 0.290	 0.247	N	 504,865	 204,812	 197,543	Note:	See	notes	to	Table	3.2.	The	models	estimated	in	this	table	contain	all	of	the	covariates	in	column	6	of	Table	3.2.		***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.10.	
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Table	3.7.	Estimates	of	the	relationship	between	share	of	affordable	vacant	single-	and	multi-
family	rental	units	and	1-year	recidivism	including	region-by-year	fixed	effects	Outcome:	1-year	recidivism	 All	 Black	only	 White	only	Share	of	affordable	vacant	single-family	rental	units	 -0.0622	 -0.135**	 0.0423		 (0.0528)	 (0.0616)	 (0.0614)	Share	of	affordable	vacant	multi-family	rental	units	 -0.00279	 -0.0499	 0.0411		 (0.0499)	 (0.0628)	 (0.0493)		 	 	 	Standard	deviation	of	share	of	affordable	vacant	single-family	units	 0.0183	 0.0211	 0.0173	Standard	deviation	of	share	of	affordable	vacant	multi-family	units	 0.0319	 0.0338	 0.0307	Mean	recidivism	rate	 0.295	 0.280	 0.283	N	 2,131,127	 955,307	 793,806	Note:	See	notes	to	Table	3.3.	The	models	estimated	in	this	table	contain	all	of	the	covariates	in	column	6	of	Table	3.3.	***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.10.			
  158 
 
		
Table	3.8.	Percent	of	released	prisoners	who	reoffend	in	the	same	county	of	
sentencing		 Reoffend	in	Same	County	 Reoffend	in	Different	County			 Count	 Percent	 Count	 Percent	All	 602,091	 95.96	 25,381	 4.04	Black	 256,558	 96.26	 9,974	 3.74	White	 211,403	 94.46	 12,393	 5.54	Last	sentence	served	<	1	year	 453,332	 96.18	 17,989	 3.82	Last	sentence	served	>	1	year	 148,759	 95.27	 7,392	 4.73	Violent	offenders	 62,862	 97.16	 1,838	 2.84	Property	offenders	 243,547	 95.34	 11,899	 4.66	Drug	possession	offenders	 68,726	 95.30	 3,387	 4.70	Drug	trafficking	offenders	 72,985	 97.51	 1,862	 2.49	Other	offenders	 134,460	 95.78	 5,924	 4.22	Sex	offenders	 19,511	 97.64	 471	 2.36	Males	 548,363	 95.96	 23,080	 4.04	Note:	Sample	consists	only	of	released	felons	who	reoffend	between	2005–2014	in	the	NCRP.					
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Table	3.9.	Estimates	of	the	relationship	between	the	share	of	affordable	vacant	rental	units	and	
the	probability	that	recidivism	occurs	in	same	county	as	release	Outcome:	1-year	recidivism	 All	 Black	only	 White	only	Share	of	affordable	vacant	single-family	rental	units	 0.0600	 0.0209	 0.104		 (0.0505)	 (0.0593)	 (0.0718)	Share	of	affordable	vacant	multi-family	rental	units	 0.0538	 0.0574	 0.0261		 (0.0357)	 (0.0462)	 (0.0556)		 	 	 	Standard	deviation	of	share	of	affordable	vacant	single-family	units	 0.0156	 0.0172	 0.0159	Standard	deviation	of	share	of	affordable	vacant	multi-family	units	 0.0285	 0.0299	 0.0286	Mean	rate	of	recidivating	in	same	county	as	release	 0.960	 0.963	 0.945	N	 627,471	 266,532	 223,794	Note:	See	notes	to	Table	3.3.	The	models	estimated	in	this	table	contain	all	of	the	covariates	in	column	6	of	Table	3.3.	The	sample	consists	of	ex-offenders	who	recidivate.	The	outcome	is	whether	an	offender	recidivates	(i.e.,	is	sentenced	to	a	correctional	facility)	in	the	same	county	as	release.	***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.10.		
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Table	3.10.	Estimates	of	the	relationship	between	share	of	affordable	vacant	single-	and	multi-
family	rental	units	and	recidivism	within	2-	and	3-years			 All	 Black	only	 White	only	Panel	1:	Outcome	is	recidivism	within	2-years	Share	of	affordable	vacant	single-family	rental	units	 -0.0834	 -0.111	 0.0226		 (0.0781)	 (0.0907)	 (0.0739)	Share	of	affordable	vacant	multi-family	rental	units	 0.00160	 -0.00213	 -0.0183		 (0.0613)	 (0.0596)	 (0.0723)		 	 	 	Standard	deviation	of	share	of	vacant	affordable	single-family	units	 0.0185	 0.0199	 0.0182	Standard	deviation	of	share	of	vacant	affordable	multi-family	units	 0.0331	 0.0336	 0.0323	Mean	2-year	recidivism	rate	 0.409	 0.406	 0.390	N	 1,893,330	 867,534	 701,481	Panel	2:	Outcome	is	recidivism	within	1-year,	using	Panel	1	sample	Share	of	affordable	vacant	single-family	rental	units	 -0.0876	 -0.145**	 0.0390		 (0.0579)	 (0.0722)	 (0.0666)	Share	of	affordable	vacant	multi-family	rental	units	 -0.0175	 -0.0319	 -0.0133		 (0.0519)	 (0.0544)	 (0.0568)		 	 	 	Standard	deviation	of	share	of	vacant	affordable	single-family	units	 0.0185	 0.0199	 0.0182	Standard	deviation	of	share	of	vacant	affordable	multi-family	units	 0.0331	 0.0336	 0.0323	Mean	1-year	recidivism	rate	 0.294	 0.280	 0.280	N	 1,893,330	 867,534	 701,481	Panel	3:	Outcome	is	recidivism	within	3-years	Share	of	affordable	vacant	single-family	rental	units	 -0.00248	 0.00368	 0.0422		 (0.0652)	 (0.0863)	 (0.0736)	Share	of	affordable	vacant	multi-family	rental	units	 0.0403	 0.0201	 0.0332		 (0.0612)	 (0.0826)	 (0.0702)		 	 	 	Standard	deviation	of	share	of	vacant	affordable	single-family	units	 0.0189	 0.0202	 0.0184	Standard	deviation	of	share	of	vacant	affordable	multi-family	units	 0.0338	 0.0341	 0.0328	Mean	3-year	recidivism	rate	 0.466	 0.473	 0.440	N	 1,623,238	 758,332	 602,052	Panel	4:	Outcome	is	recidivism	within	1-year,	using	Panel	3	sample	Share	of	affordable	vacant	single-family	rental	units	 -0.0290	 -0.0809	 0.0592		 (0.0559)	 (0.0769)	 (0.0644)	Share	of	affordable	vacant	multi-family	rental	units	 -0.00670	 -0.0247	 0.00409		 (0.0461)	 (0.0601)	 (0.0540)		 	 	 	Standard	deviation	of	share	of	vacant	affordable	single-family	units	 0.0189	 0.0202	 0.0184	Standard	deviation	of	share	of	vacant	affordable	multi-family	units	 0.0338	 0.0341	 0.0328	Mean	1-year	recidivism	rate	 0.289	 0.276	 0.273	N	 1,623,238	 758,332	 602,052	Note:	See	notes	to	Table	3.3.	The	models	estimated	in	this	table	contain	all	of	the	covariates	in	column	6	of	Table	3.3.		***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.10.	
  161 
 
Table	3.11.	Estimates	of	the	relationship	between	share	of	affordable	vacant	single-	and	multi-
family	rental	units	and	recidivism	within	2-years	(3-years)	of	release	including	lagged	rental	
market	indicators	and	conditional	on	not	recidivating	within	1-year	(2-years)	of	release			 All	 Black	only	 White	only	Panel	1:	Outcome	is	recidivism	in	second	year	post	release	Share	of	affordable	vacant	single-family	rental	units	–	2nd	year	 -0.110**	 -0.111*	 -0.0972		 (0.0535)	 (0.0664)	 (0.0618)	Share	of	affordable	vacant	multi-family	rental	units	–	2nd	year	 -0.0147	 -0.0263	 -0.0310		 (0.0513)	 (0.0530)	 (0.0493)		 	 	 	Standard	deviation	of	share	of	vacant	affordable	single-family	units	 0.0183	 0.0193	 0.0179	Standard	deviation	of	share	of	vacant	affordable	multi-family	units	 0.0335	 0.0340	 0.0322	Mean	recidivism	rate	in	second	year	post	release	 0.164	 0.176	 0.153	N	 1,297,533	 601,316	 493,825	Panel	2:	Outcome	is	recidivism	in	third	year	post	release	Share	of	affordable	vacant	single-family	rental	units	–	3rd	year	 0.0118	 0.0600	 -0.0787		 (0.0484)	 (0.0648)	 (0.0697)	Share	of	affordable	vacant	multi-family	rental	units	–	3rd	year	 -0.0135	 -0.0172	 -0.0466		 (0.0387)	 (0.0537)	 ((0.0569)		 	 	 	Standard	deviation	of	share	of	vacant	affordable	single-family	units	 0.0182	 0.0193	 0.0176	Standard	deviation	of	share	of	vacant	affordable	multi-family	units	 0.0339	 0.0345	 0.0326	Mean	recidivism	rate	in	third	year	post	release	 0.101	 0.115	 0.232	N	 915,149	 422,471	 421,427	Note:	See	notes	to	Table	3.3.	The	models	estimated	in	this	table	contain	all	of	the	covariates	in	column	6	of	Table	3.3.		***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.10.			 	
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APPENDIX	FIGURES	
	
	
Appendix	Figure	2.1.	Marijuana	arrest	rates	for	decriminalized	states	before	and	
after	decriminalization	–	excluded	states	
	 	Notes:	See	notes	to	Figure	2.2.			 	
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Appendix	Figure	3.1.	Distribution	of	average	rent	faced	by	released	prisoners	at	time	of	release	
	
	Note:	Each	observation	is	an	estimate	of	the	average	rent	in	the	county	to	which	an	ex-offender	is	released	in	a	given	year.	Rent	is	estimated	as	the	average	price	of	rent	in	a	county	for	each	year	in	the	2005-2014	American	Community	Survey.			 	
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Appendix	Figure	3.2.	Distribution	of	average	rent	for	vacant	units	faced	by	released	prisoners	at	time	
of	release,	by	structure	type	
	
	Note:	Note:	Each	observation	is	the	average	rent	in	the	county	to	which	an	ex-offender	is	released	in	a	given	year.	In	the	top	panel	(bottom	panel),	rent	is	estimated	as	the	average	price	of	rent	for	vacant	units	in	single-family	(multi-family)	structures	in	a	county	for	each	year	in	the	2005-2014	American	Community	Survey.			
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APPENDIX	TABLES	
	
	
Appendix	Table	2.1.	Relationship	between	decriminalization	and	marijuana	possession	
arrests	per	100,000	using	same	sample	as	NSDUH	analysis	(Table	2.11)			 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	
Panel	I.	Ages	18-24		Decriminalization	 -782.8***	 -784.8***	 -883.2***	 -848.2***		 (121.3)	 (120.0)	 (122.3)	 (117.5)	Medical	marijuana	laws	 -	 -	 249.3*	 79.49		 -	 -	 (131.3)	 (87.17)		 	 	 	 	Outcome	mean	|	no	decriminalization	 1576.83	 1576.83	 1576.83	 1576.83	Observations	 637	 637	 637	 637	
Panel	II.	Ages	25+	Decriminalization	 -132.0***	 -137.7***	 -155.0***	 -169.9***		 (19.89)	 (21.67)	 (21.43)	 (29.29)	Medical	marijuana	laws	 -	 -	 39.28*	 -1.034		 -	 -	 (20.95)	 (17.67)		 	 	 	 	Outcome	mean	|	no	decriminalization	 301.24	 301.24	 301.24	 301.24	Observations	 637	 637	 637	 637		 	 	 	 	State	and	year	FE	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	Demographic	controls	 No	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	State-level	policies	 No	 No	 Yes	 Yes	Linear	state	time	trends	 No	 No	 No	 Yes			 		 		 		 		Notes:	In	each	panel,	each	column	presents	estimates	from	a	separate	regression	of	average	marijuana	use	rates	in	the	past	month	from	the	NSDUH	on	an	indicator	for	decriminalization.	Each	observation	is	a	state	and	year.	The	demographic	controls	from	the	ACS	aggregated	to	the	state-by-year	level	and	weighted	to	be	nationally	representative.	The	sample	period	covers	2003-2016	due	to	limited	availability	of	the	NSDUH	data.	The	NSDUH	data	are	originally	cover	2-year	windows	e.g.,	2002-2003,	2003-2004,	etc.	I	generate	annual	use	rates	by	taking	the	average	of	the	overlapping	two-year	rates.	i.e.,	I	calculate	the	use	rate	for	2003	as	the	average	between	the	use	rates	in	2002-2003,	and	2003-2004.	Standard	errors	(in	parentheses)	are	clustered	by	state.	***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1			 	
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Appendix	Table	2.2.	Relationship	between	decriminalization	and	
marijuana	arrests	using	marijuana	price	sample		 Any	grade	sample	 High-grade	sample	Decriminalization	 -99.52***	 -100.7***		 (12.86)	 (13.50)	Medical	marijuana	laws	 13.47	 11.86		 (15.04)	 (15.42)		 	 	Mean	of	outcome	|	no	decriminalization	 207.23	 206.18	Observations	 456	 439	Notes:	Each	column	presents	estimates	from	a	separate	regression	of	marijuana	prices	on	an	indicator	for	decriminalization	and	the	controls	in	Table	2.3	Column	4	(described	in	the	note	to	Table	2.3).	Marijuana	prices	are	per	ounce	of	marijuana.	Sample	covers	1990-2011.	Standard	errors	in	parentheses	are	clustered	by	state.	***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1			
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Appendix	Table	3.2.	Tabulation	of	average	1-year	recidivism	rates	for	prisoners	released	by	state	
and	year			 2005	 2006	 2007	 2008	 2009	 2010	 2011	 2012	 2013	 2014	Alaska	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 0.35	 	 	Arizona	 0.27	 0.28	 0.23	 0.23	 0.23	 0.23	 0.21	 0.22	 0.23	 0.24	California	 0.52	 0.52	 0.49	 0.50	 0.45	 0.41	 	 	 	 	Colorado	 0.32	 0.31	 0.30	 0.35	 0.36	 0.36	 0.31	 0.30	 0.39	 0.31	Georgia	 0.10	 0.11	 0.09	 0.10	 0.09	 0.09	 0.09	 0.08	 0.09	 0.09	Illinois	 0.36	 0.30	 0.27	 0.28	 0.32	 0.31	 	 0.25	 	 	Indiana	 0.19	 0.23	 0.23	 0.22	 0.20	 0.19	 0.20	 0.21	 0.24	 0.20	Iowa	 	 0.24	 0.19	 0.23	 0.20	 0.21	 0.14	 0.15	 0.17	 0.21	Kansas	 	 	 	 	 	 	 0.08	 0.15	 0.15	 0.19	Kentucky	 0.05	 0.02	 0.24	 0.19	 0.20	 0.23	 0.22	 0.32	 0.35	 0.34	Massachusetts	 	 	 	 	 0.13	 0.14	 0.10	 0.08	 0.07	 0.05	Minnesota	 0.38	 0.38	 0.37	 0.36	 0.34	 0.35	 0.35	 0.36	 0.36	 0.37	Missouri	 0.37	 0.36	 0.35	 0.30	 0.24	 0.25	 0.24	 0.23	 0.25	 0.27	Montana	 	 	 	 	 	 1.00	 0.33	 	 	 	Nebraska	 0.00	 	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.01	 	 	 	Nevada	 	 	 	 0.12	 0.13	 0.14	 0.16	 0.17	 0.16	 0.15	New	Hampshire	 	 	 	 	 	 	 0.44	 	 	 	New	Jersey	 0.23	 0.23	 0.20	 0.17	 0.15	 0.17	 0.17	 0.17	 0.15	 0.14	New	York	 0.22	 0.24	 0.24	 0.24	 0.24	 0.24	 0.23	 0.25	 0.30	 0.28	North	Carolina	 0.13	 0.13	 0.12	 0.12	 0.12	 0.11	 0.10	 0.12	 0.17	 	Tennessee	 0.25	 0.24	 0.23	 0.23	 0.20	 0.19	 0.20	 0.19	 0.18	 0.19	Texas	 0.20	 0.19	 0.16	 0.18	 0.17	 0.17	 0.16	 0.17	 0.18	 0.17	Utah	 0.39	 0.40	 0.36	 0.35	 0.33	 0.30	 0.27	 0.30	 0.31	 0.32	Note:	Data	are	 from	the	National	Correction	Reporting	Program	term	record	 files	 from	2005-2014.	Each	observation	is	a	release	from	a	correctional	facility.			
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Appendix	Table	3.4.	Estimates	of	the	relationship	between	share	of	affordable	rental	units	and	1-
year	recidivism			 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	Panel	1:	Share	of	affordable	rental	units	(SD	=	0.176)	Outcome:	1-year	recidivism	 0.109**	 0.118***	 0.122***	 0.123***	 0.123***	 0.121***		 (0.0455)	 (0.0445)	 (0.0430)	 (0.0423)	 (0.0411)	 (0.0395)		 	 	 	 	 	 	Mean	1-year	recidivism	rate	 0.295	 0.295	 0.295	 0.295	 0.295	 0.295	N	 2,131,127	 2,131,127	 2,131,127	 2,131,127	 2,131,127	 2,131,127	Panel	2:	Share	affordable	of	rental	units,	Black	only	(SD	=	0.158)	Outcome:	1-year	recidivism	 0.151**	 0.149**	 0.142**	 0.141**	 0.148**	 0.145**		 (0.0693)	 (0.0693)	 (0.0649)	 (0.0635)	 (0.0629)	 (0.0610)		 	 	 	 	 	 	Mean	1-year	recidivism	rate	 0.280	 0.280	 0.280	 0.280	 0.280	 0.280	N	 955,307	 955,307	 955,307	 955,307	 955,307	 955,307	Panel	3:	Share	of	affordable	rental	units,	White	only	(SD	=	0.173)	Outcome:	1-year	recidivism	 0.0729**	 0.0753**	 0.0850***	 0.0864***	 0.0786***	 0.0765**		 (0.0290)	 (0.0296)	 (0.0297)	 (0.0297)	 (0.0294)	 (0.0296)		 	 	 	 	 	 	Mean	1-year	recidivism	rate	 0.283	 0.283	 0.283	 0.283	 0.283	 0.283	N	 793,806	 793,806	 793,806	 793,806	 793,806	 793,806		 	 	 	 	 	 	County	&	year	fixed	effects	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	Offender	demographic	controls	 No	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	Sentencing	controls	 No	 No	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	Offense	controls	 No	 No	 No	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	Labor	market	controls	 No	 No	 No	 No	 Yes	 Yes	Crime	and	police	controls	 No	 No	 No	 No	 No	 Yes			 		 		 		 		 		 		Note:	See	notes	to	Table	3.2.	The	share	of	affordable	rental	units	is	the	number	of	units	with	rent	less	than	35	percent	of	median	county	income	divided	by	the	total	number	of	rental	units.		
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Appendix	Table	3.5.	Estimates	of	the	relationship	between	labor	market	conditions	on	the	share	
of	affordable	vacant	single-	and	multi-family	rental	units	Outcome:	Difference	between	share	of	affordable	vacant	single-	and	multi-family	units			 Observation	is	an	ex-offender	 Observation	is	county-by-year	Wage	-	Manufacturing	 0.00000151	 -0.000000243		 (0.00000215)	 (0.00000273)	Wage	-	Administrative	and	support	services	 0.000000268	 0.00000313		 (0.00000267)	 (0.00000288)	Wage	-	Food	service	 -0.00000139	 0.000000829		 (0.00000433)	 (0.00000449)	Wage	-	Construction	 -0.000000406	 -0.00000146		 (0.00000204)	 (0.00000237)	Unemployment	-	Manufacturing	 -0.00613	 0.00255		 (0.0137)	 (0.0163)	Unemployment	-	Administrative	and	support	services	 0.00717	 0.0166		 (0.0191)	 (0.0216)	Unemployment	-	Food	service	 0.00497	 -0.00720		 (0.0150)	 (0.0175)	Unemployment	-	Construction	 -0.0205	 -0.0148		 (0.0130)	 (0.0159)	Share	of	workers	in	manufacturing	 0.108	 0.114		 (0.0788)	 (0.0818)	Share	of	workers	in	administrative	and	support	services	 -0.120	 -0.156		 (0.116)	 (0.137)	Share	of	workers	in	food	service	 -0.0391	 -0.0907		 (0.0594)	 (0.0753)	Share	of	workers	in	construction	 -0.0147	 -0.0484		 (0.0762)	 (0.0871)		 	 	N	 2,131,127	 1,747	Note:	In	column	1,	each	observation	is	an	ex-offender	and	in	column	2	each	observation	is	a	county-by-year.	Models	include	county	and	year	fixed	effects,	and	crime	controls	discussed	in	Table	3.2.	Standard	errors	are	clustered	by	county.	
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Appendix	Table	3.6.	Estimates	of	the	relationship	between	share	of	affordable	vacant	single-	and	
multi-family	rental	units	and	1-year	recidivism	for	ex-offenders	with	county-specific	linear-time	
trends	Outcome:	1-year	recidivism	 All	 Black	only	 White	only	Share	of	affordable	vacant	single-family	rental	units	 0.00135	 -0.00722	 0.0341		 (0.0416)	 (0.0485)	 (0.0617)	Share	of	affordable	vacant	multi-family	rental	units	 -0.0480	 -0.0450	 -0.0660		 (0.0355)	 (0.0518)	 (0.0416)		 	 	 		 	 	 	Standard	deviation	of	share	of	affordable	vacant	single-family	units	 0.0182	 0.0196	 0.0179	Standard	deviation	of	share	of	affordable	vacant	multi-family	units	 0.0323	 0.0331	 0.0315	Mean	recidivism	rate	 0.295	 0.280	 0.283	N	 2,131,127	 955,307	 793,806	Note:	See	Notes	to	Table	3.3.	The	models	estimated	in	this	table	contain	all	of	the	covariates	in	column	6	of	Table	3.3.	The	share	of	affordable	vacant	single-	and	multi-family	rental	units	are	the	number	of	units	that	are	available	for	rent	in	single-	and	multi-	family	buildings	with	rent	less	than	35	percent	of	median	county	income	divided	by	the	total	number	of	rental	single-	and	multi-family	units	available	for	rent,	respectively.				 	
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Appendix	Table	3.7.	Estimates	of	the	relationship	between	share	of	affordable	vacant	single-	and	
multi-family	rental	units	and	1-year	recidivism	for	ex-offenders	including	county-specific	
quadratic-time	trends	Outcome:	1-year	recidivism	 All	 Black	only	 White	only	Share	of	affordable	vacant	single-family	rental	units	 0.00703	 -0.00946	 0.0514		 (0.0407)	 (0.0470)	 (0.0617)	Share	of	affordable	vacant	multi-family	rental	units	 -0.0402	 -0.0559	 -0.0412		 (0.0371)	 (0.0572)	 (0.0413)		 	 	 	Standard	deviation	of	share	of	affordable	vacant	single-family	units	 0.0182	 0.0196	 0.0179	Standard	deviation	of	share	of	affordable	vacant	multi-family	units	 0.0323	 0.0331	 0.0315	Mean	recidivism	rate	 0.295	 0.280	 0.283	N	 2,131,127	 955,307	 793,806	Note:	See	notes	to	Table	3.3.	Each	regression	includes	all	the	controls	in	column	6	of	Table	3.2.				
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Appendix	Table	3.8.	Estimates	of	the	relationship	between	share	of	affordable	vacant	single-	and	
multi-family	rental	units	and	1-year	recidivism	for	ex-offenders	including	education	controls	Outcome:	1-year	recidivism	 All	 Black	only	 White	only	Share	of	affordable	vacant	single-family	rental	units	 -0.0494	 -0.179***	 0.0847		 (0.0534)	 (0.0657)	 (0.0708)	Share	of	affordable	vacant	multi-family	rental	units	 0.0556	 0.0366	 0.000700		 (0.0424)	 (0.0577)	 (0.0493)		 	 	 	Standard	deviation	of	share	of	affordable	vacant	single-family	units	 0.0189	 0.0197	 0.0185	Standard	deviation	of	share	of	affordable	vacant	multi-family	units	 0.0312	 0.0321	 0.0305	Mean	recidivism	rate	 0.208	 0.220	 0.196	N	 1,198,124	 612,796	 476,946	Note:	Each	regression	includes	all	the	controls	in	Column	6	of	Table	3.2	(see	Notes	to	Table	3.2)	and	indicators	for	whether	the	offender	has	some	high	school	or	less,	graduated	from	high	school,	or	has	some	college	(the	omitted	category	is	less	a	high	school	education).				
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Appendix	Table	3.9.	Estimates	of	the	relationship	between	share	of	affordable	vacant	single-	and	
multi-family	rental	units	and	1-year	recidivism	including	state-by-year	fixed	effects	Outcome:	1-year	recidivism	 All	 Black	only	 White	only	Share	of	affordable	vacant	single-family	rental	units	 -0.0646	 -0.0827	 -0.00567		 (0.0439)	 (0.0563)	 (0.0470)	Share	of	affordable	vacant	multi-family	rental	units	 -0.0418	 -0.0637	 -0.0208		 (0.0420)	 (0.0559)	 (0.0345)		 	 	 	Standard	deviation	of	share	of	affordable	vacant	single-family	units	 0.0182	 0.0196	 0.0179	Standard	deviation	of	share	of	affordable	vacant	multi-family	units	 0.0323	 0.0331	 0.0315	Mean	recidivism	rate	 0.295	 0.280	 0.283	N	 2,131,127	 955,307	 793,806	Note:	Each	regression	includes	all	the	controls	in	Column	6	of	Table	3.2	(see	Notes	to	Table	3.2)	and	state-by-year	fixed	effects.				 	
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Appendix	Table	3.10.	Estimates	of	the	relationship	between	share	of	affordable	vacant	single-	
and	multi-family	rental	units	and	1-year	recidivism	excluding	California	Outcome:	1-year	recidivism	 All	 Black	only	 White	only	Share	of	affordable	vacant	single-family	rental	units	 -0.0413	 -0.136*	 0.0604		 (0.0558)	 (0.0751)	 (0.0618)	Share	of	affordable	vacant	multi-family	rental	units	 0.0241	 0.00325	 0.00269		 (0.0420)	 (0.0497)	 (0.0490)		 	 	 	Standard	deviation	of	share	of	affordable	vacant	single-family	units	 0.0191	 0.0198	 0.0187	Standard	deviation	of	share	of	affordable	vacant	multi-family	units	 0.0313	 0.0320	 0.0305	Mean	recidivism	rate	 0.207	 0.218	 0.195	N	 1,453,959	 761,058	 576,653	Note:	Each	regression	includes	all	the	controls	in	Column	6	of	Table	3.2	(see	Notes	to	Table	3.2)	and	state-by-year	fixed	effects.				 	
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Appendix	Table	3.11.	Estimates	of	the	relationship	between	share	of	affordable	vacant	single-	and	
multi-family	rental	units	and	1-year	recidivism	excluding	female	felons	Outcome:	1-year	recidivism	 All	 Black	only	 White	only	Share	of	affordable	vacant	single-family	rental	units	 -0.162**	 -0.203**	 -0.0421		 (0.0730)	 (0.0869)	 (0.0714)	Share	of	affordable	vacant	multi-family	rental	units	 -0.0379	 -0.0380	 -0.0421		 (0.0652)	 (0.0616)	 (0.0640)		 	 	 	Standard	deviation	of	share	of	affordable	vacant	single-family	units	 0.0182	 0.0197	 0.0179	Standard	deviation	of	share	of	affordable	vacant	multi-family	units	 0.0322	 0.0330	 0.0314	Mean	recidivism	rate	 0.304	 0.288	 0.294	N	 1,885,406	 862,506	 674,157	Note:	Each	regression	includes	all	the	controls	in	Column	6	of	Table	3.2	(see	Notes	to	Table	3.2)	and	state-by-year	fixed	effects.				 	
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Appendix	Table	3.12.	Estimates	of	the	relationship	between	share	of	affordable	vacant	single-	
and	multi-family	rental	units	and	1-year	recidivism	limited	to	first	time	offenders	Outcome:	1-year	recidivism	 All	 Black	only	 White	only	Share	of	affordable	vacant	single-family	rental	units	 -0.0892	 -0.160*	 0.0354		 (0.0687)	 (0.0885)	 (0.0606)	Share	of	affordable	vacant	multi-family	rental	units	 -0.0386	 -0.0347	 -0.0449		 (0.0523)	 (0.0714)	 (0.0495)		 	 	 	Standard	deviation	of	share	of	affordable	vacant	single-family	units	 0.0189	 0.0202	 0.0183	Standard	deviation	of	share	of	affordable	vacant	multi-family	units	 0.0335	 0.0341	 0.0317	Mean	recidivism	rate	 0.178	 0.179	 0.169	N	 971,487	 405,727	 403,526	Note:	Each	regression	includes	all	the	controls	in	Column	6	of	Table	3.2	(see	Notes	to	Table	3.2)	and	state-by-year	fixed	effects.				
